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A B S T R A C T
The author explicitly specifies a New Keynesian style model 
embodying a financial constraint on the availability of equity and a 
financial market imperfection with regard to the existence of state- 
contingent assets based upon the published papers of Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (1988, 1990, and 1993). Using computer based numerical 
simulation, the author validates the three unproven Propositions found 
in the Greenwald and Stiglitz 1993 article with regard to the model's 
comparative static behaviour. Through the inclusion of a parameter 
for technology into the production function, the author shows that 
observations made by Greenwald and Stiglitz with regard to the effect 
of equity infusions is subject to qualification. Investigation of the 
model's inter-temporal behaviour reveals that the claims made by 
Greenwald and Stiglitz with regard to multiple periodicity are again 
subject to many qualifications. Linearization around the steady-state 
equilibrium as suggested by Greenwald and Stiglitz is shown to offer 
limited insight because of the implied non-linearity of the model's first 
order difference equation. Calibrated numerical simulation of the non­
linear difference equation reveals the potential for both single and 
multiple periodicity, period doubling bifurcations, and chaotic 
trajectories displaying sensitivity to initial conditions. In addition it 
was shown that the model's implied random attractor was key to 
understanding its inter-temporal behavior. In the Greenwald and 
Stiglitz articles the existence of derivative markets such as futures or 
options to manage risk are assumed away. The author, in order to 
investigate the effects of futures or options markets upon business 
cycles, modifies the explicitly specified model to include the use of 
state-contingent assets. Introducing the use of derivative financial 
products to manage risk, using numerical simulation, produces the 
surprising result that in the aggregate they may lead to slightly greater 
output instability. In addition to the model's structure, several 
intuitive reasons for these results are discussed in depth. The 
Greenwald and Stiglitz model also assumed that the cost of capital 
was not risk adjusted. The author modifies the explicitly specified 
model and using numerical simulation shows that like other unrealistic 
assumptions concerning dividend distribution, leads to alternative 
laws of motion. The research is concluded with discussion of 
possible policy and regulatory implications
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CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION
1.0 Introduction to the Issues
The problem of accounting for cyclic fluctuations in output, 
recurring booms and busts, falling and rising unemployment, and price 
instability is as old as economics itself. From the earliest writings the 
fundamental issue facing theorists has been whether cyclic 
fluctuations can arise only through external, exogenous events; or 
whether cyclic fluctuations are inherent to an economy, the result of 
an endogenous process. In the former, identified with the Neo­
classical world and its derivatives, through the maximizing behaviour 
of rational agents, prices and wages adjust with sufficient speed to 
ensure continuous market clearing and hence no spare capacity, 
including unemployment. In the latter, although individual firms and 
consumers are equally rational, rigidities and constraints in adjustment 
processes lead to under-utilization of resources, including labour, in 
the aggregate. These alternative conceptions of cyclic fluctuations 
have profound implications for economics as a whole because they 
require distinct micro-economic paradigms and imply different forms 
of general equilibria.
Taking these alternative conceptions of how business cycles 
arise somewhat further, we find they hold distinct implications for the 
rationality and logical consistency of a self-organizing economy. Is 
the nature of an economy logically consistent with general equilibrium 
theory? Is it benign, only going awry because of external shocks or 
poor policy? Are the effects of such shocks self-correcting if left to 
their own devices? The modern justification for the exogenous and 
self-correcting conception economic fluctuations was found in the 
General Equilibrium system conceived by Leon Walras (1954), 
although its intellectual forbearers stretch back to Smith's invisible 
hand argument and the broader teachings of the Enlightenment, 
notably the Philosophes. Economic cycles induced by exogenous 
shocks and disturbances may occur, but the utility maximizing 
behaviour of consumers coupled with the profit maximizing behaviour
of firms in a competitive economy, would return the state variables 
to equilibrium along a welfare efficient frontier. Idle savings and 
spare capacity are not permanent problems and may be remedied 
through’speeding the process of adjustment. Today, this conception 
finds expression in the New Classical and Real Business Cycle school 
of thought. The alternative conception, embodied in endogenous 
models of economic fluctuations, is that the self-organizing economy 
is logically inconsistent with general equilibrium theory. It is flawed, 
not self-correcting and without intervention, potentially malign. In 
contemporary research, this conception of how fluctuations arise in 
a self-organizing economy, uses micro-theoretic imperfections to 
explain aggregate fluctuations and sub-optimization. It is known as 
the New Keynesians school.
Reconciling or creating a synthesis between the two
conceptions of why fluctuations in output for self-organizing
economies may arise would appear insurmountable given their 
assumptions, structures, and respective short-comings. On the one 
hand we have New Classical models, consistent with general
equilibrium theory and the received principles of micro-economics 
combining exogenous serially uncorrelated impulses (perturbations) 
with a propagation mechanism producing serially correlated
responses. Such propagation mechanisms involve confusion over 
nominal values versus real values, requiring changes in output and 
prices to be unexpected in order for cycles to be generated (Lucas, 
1972), Further research into general equilibrium consistent models 
of economic fluctuations, the Real Business Cycle have relied upon 
unexpected random supply-side shocks through the production 
function (Kydland and Prescott, 1982; and Long and Plosser, 1983), 
although empirical evidence for supply shocks is not supportive (Hali, 
1990). Some have questioned the realism of the Real Business Cycle 
school requiring an external agent, such as technological events as 
the initial impulse (McCallum, 1986).
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On the other hand, we have the equally problematic alternative 
to the Real Business cycle school, the heirs to Keynesianism. They 
rely upon micro-theoretic conditions in a disequilibrium setting to 
generate output fluctuations. Often they involve second-order type 
arguments. For example, flat profit functions imply income losses are 
second order in magnitude, making adjustments in prices unjustified. 
Apart from the problem of logical inconsistency with general 
equilibrium theory, the short-comings of New Keynesian research are 
several fold. Firstly, in trying to create strong micro-theoretic 
foundations, at the partial equilibrium level; it places the burden of 
aggregate demand fluctuations upon the narrow foundations of erratic 
private expectations of consumption and investment spending, 
leading rational agents to sub-optimization. Phenomena such as 
menus costs, mark-up pricing, wage and price inflexibility, or nominal 
rigidities as found in Mankiw's collection (1993) might affect a single 
industry or market, but are they sufficiently pervasive to affect the 
entire economy ad infinitum? In the Samuelson sense, is there 
sufficient c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  between the maximizing behaviour of 
individuals/firms a n d  t h e  stability conditions relating to the interaction 
between economic units (page 258, 1983). By comparison, we recall 
that Keynes, at least, appealed to s y s t e m i c  collapse in the efficiency 
of capital and s y s t e m i c  wage rigidity. A second criticism of the New 
Keynesian school is that while their models seek to explain inter­
temporal fluctuations in output, their sources of sub-optimization are 
essentially static, and not correctible through other endogenous 
mechanisms such as technological improvements and innovation. 
That systemic endogenous flaws, as Keynes believed were not in any 
practical sense, self-correcting, is an arguable proposition especially 
in the conditions of the 1930s; however to believe that the mono- 
causal micro-imperfections found in New Keynesian theories and 
models, in a modern innovative economy would persist, stretches 
credibility.
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From the above we see that a unified theory embracing both 
schools of thought is unlikely, however there may be value in 
investigating the principles of c o r r e s p o n d e n c e ,  between micro­
foundations and aggregate stability conditions. Within a given school 
of thought, it may lead to a richer understanding of how the 
alternative conceptions may produce a synthesized conception of 
economic fluctuations. Moreover, in seeking some form of 
reconciliation between the competing schools, and addressing the 
highlighted short-comings of the New Keynesian variant, it may 
suggest ways that such models may be used to address the extent 
to which endogenous innovations may interact and correct 
macroeconomic disturbances and alter the path of cyclic fluctuations.
1.1 The Problem
We have seen above that the New Keynesian school of thought 
utilizes endogenous phenomena, such as rigidities and sub- 
optimization, to explain fluctuations in aggregate economic output. 
Such models, like Keynesianism itself, it is argued are logically 
inconsistent with the t a t o n n e m e n t  process of the Walrasian 
auctioneer. The attainment of Samuelson c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  is 
questionable based upon the remarks above. Unemployment and 
spare resources require some rigidity somewhere, so that all markets 
simultaneously do not clear a n d  that economic agents remain 
unaware of disequilibrium (Gale, 1983). Recall, disequilibrium, in the 
New Keynesian literature, is stable, and not simply a short-run 
deviation from neo-classical results, for otherwise any form of 
Keynesian economics would simply involve the slowness of 
convergence to Walrasian equilibrium, and not the sub-optimization 
generated through constraints and rigidities.
To create general equilibrium foundations for the Keynesian 
system a prodigious amount of intellectual effort was undertaken. 
Beginning with Clower (1965) and later Dreze (1975) an alternative
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general equilibrium framework for the Keynesian model was proposed, 
involving trade in e f f e c t i v e  d e m a n d s ,  that is traders make plans based 
upon predictions of what they expect to be able to trade at given 
prices. Bennasy in a series of articles (1975, 1976, 1977) attempted 
to develop a theory of rationing scheme compatible with non- 
Walrasian equilibrium in Keynesian style model. But such s o l u t i o n s  
to the problem of logical inconsistencies inherent to any Keynesian or 
New Keynesian style model were not without critics, notably 
Malinvaud (1975), Gale (1983) and others. Faced with seemingly 
intractable problems of creating non-Walrasian disequilibrium 
foundations for a Keynesian model, and seeking to explain spare 
resources and unemployment over sustained periods, we return to the 
question of adjustment or connection between the Keynesian 
disequilibrium condition and the Neo-Classical paradigm with its 
general equilibrium structure. Specifically, in this regard, we consider 
the role of Arrow-Debreu securities in the form of endogenous state- 
contingent assets in possibly affecting the convergence to a 
Walrasian solution in New Keynesian models.
To understand this possibility, we recall that the direction of 
causation in the two schools of thought are distinctly different. We 
have explained that New Keynesianism is not simply about tardy 
adjustment arising from frictions in an essentially classical world, but 
rather concerns rational agents achieving sub-optimal solutions 
because of rigidities and constraints. In Keynesianism and its heirs, 
economic fluctuations, markets not clearing, and the existence of 
spare resources are the r e s u l t  of imperfections and constraints. In the 
New Classical and Real Business cycle approach, in contrast, full 
utilization of resources in equilibrium results f r o m  prices and wages 
adjusting quickly enough to ensure market clearing without spare 
resources. This causal distinction between the schools of thought, 
suggests a possible synthesis between the competing schools, 
although not reconciliation.
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We have mentioned the questionable reality of static immutable 
rigidities as found in the New Keynesian set-up. The non-existence 
of complete markets for all state-contingent assets has been used to 
explain the existence of business cycles in the absence of exogenous 
disturbances and within a general equilibrium setting (Lucas, 1987 
and Krainer, 1992). Moral hazard and transaction costs have been 
posited as reasons why complete Arrow-Debreu markets do not exist. 
But what if there existence through an endogenous economic process 
were possible, one as endogenous as the rigidities precluding full- 
optimization? Would they reduce or eliminate the effects of rigidities 
and the effects of constraints precluding general equilibrium 
optimization? How would the existence of state contingent assets 
affect the dynamics of New Keynesian models? Would problems of 
moral hazard create new effects? Would they transform New 
Keynesian style models into Neo-classical type solutions or would 
combining state contingent assets with rigidities lead to sub-optimal 
solutions of a new nature? If such securities interacted with a firm’s 
risks and exposures, could any such results be reconciled with 
Modigliani-Miller capital structure theory which argues the valuation 
and hence behaviour based upon it, is invariant to capital structure? 
These and many related issues we have undertaken in the present 
research.
1.3 Methodology
In order to pursue the above subject matter we have turned to 
the New Keynesian style models involving both a financial constraint 
and a financial market imperfection. Like other New Keynesian 
models, in such research, rigidities at the micro level become cycles 
at the macro level because of sub-maximization of social welfare. 
Such models use capital markets imperfections in alternative forms 
such as rationing of capital by quantity rather than price (the rate of 
interest rate), monitoring costs in extending credit, resulting for
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example, in not risk adjusting the cost of capital, informational 
asymetries between lenders and borrowers, and moral hazards in 
borrowing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Typically such conditions lead 
to one form of finance, such as external capital through borrowing 
having costs additional to that of funds which are generated 
internally, through profit retention. In our research we utilize one 
model in particular by Joseph Stiglitz and Bruce Greenwald (1988, 
1990, 1993) (hereafter, G S )  embodying both a financial constraint on 
the availability of equity, a financial imperfection relating to capital 
borrowed which induces a form of risk aversion and the assumption 
that contingent assets do not exist. The emphasis in such models, 
as that by GS, upon imperfections and constraints as sources of 
cyclic behaviour, make them ideal for analysing whether the 
introduction of state contingent assets as an endogenous means of 
c o r r e c t i n g s uch imperfections, may have macroeconomic implications. 
To this end, our methodology involves including Arrow-Debreu type 
securities into such a model as a set of specified explicit relationships. 
To emphasize, by introducing state contingent assets we are not 
merely making prices more flexible and speeding up the adjustment 
process so that a New Keynesian model has the general equilibrium 
properties identified with New Classicism. Rather at micro-theoretic 
level we are in c lu d in g  structures and relationships to possibly off-set 
the effects arising from capital market imperfections.
Most New Keynesian research involves the creation and 
analysis of implicitly specified relationships. In contrast, in our 
methodoiogy we utilize numerical simulation. Analytic methods have 
limited applications with regard to learning the inter-temporai 
behaviour of such models of aggregate fluctuations, as the one 
developed by GS. There are several reasons for such limitations. 
Such models, as the one by GS, use non-linear difference or 
differential equations, and as analysis of such equations, with the 
exception of s o m e  first order ones, is either difficult or impossible;
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numerical simulation is necessary to examine the inter-temporal 
dynamics of output fluctuations (Baker & Gollub, 1990 or Ott, 1993). 
Faced with such limitations, many researchers, such as GS, have 
resorted to methods of linearization in the neighbourhood of a steady- 
state solution, including Taylor's formula or Liapunov's direct method 
(Azariadis, 1993). We consider linearization around steady-state 
equilibrium, but showthat such simplifications ignore and obscure the 
rich dynamics inherent to the GS model, such as higher periodicity, 
period-doubling bifurcations, and multiple steady-states. We 
discover, in fact, that the claim by GS that their model generates 
cycles of multiple periodicity is unwarranted using linearization. In 
our research, using numerical simulation, we discover that small 
changes in initial parameter values produce alternative trajectories of 
varying periodicity, changing the model's laws of motion. The inter­
temporal dynamics of a non-linear models based upon the work of GS 
may even exhibit aperiodic cycles which are extremely sensitivity to 
initial conditions, deterministic chaos. Furthermore, through 
calibration of our numerical method, we find that for any form of 
cyclic behaviour to occur, a minimal level of technological investment 
productivity is required, and that an aggregate economy exhibiting 
greater productivity, appears more prone to oscillatory vibrations.
In order to undertake numerical simulation we naturally require 
explicit functional forms. Using the various GS models as guidance, 
we combine the requirements of their implicit functional forms with 
received micro-economic theory to specify explicit equations and 
relationships. Although there are software packages for simulation 
of difference and differential equations, we have chosen to write our 
own program, using a spread-sheet language. Designing the structure 
and algorithms of the simulation program de novo, has helped in the 
research conceptualization. Having problemitized the issues 
surrounding New Keynesian models of economic fluctuations and 
shown how we intend to confront such issues, we turn to the
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literature review found in Chapter 2 , in order to place the subject 
matter in a formal setting.
9
2.0 Introduction
In the following literature review, we will examine in depth the 
two contemporary approaches to analysing and modelling economic 
activity and disturbances of a cyclic nature. Business cycle theories 
may be compared and contrasted using three key concepts: 
-Perturbation, that is how cycles begin;
-Propagation, that is how economic forces disseminate and inter- 
-act; and
-Laws of Motion, that is the nature of periodic motion (or limit 
cycle) into which the system settles after some transient period 
or the nature of the steady state when motion ceases.
Applying these three concepts to the literature, the differences 
between contemporary schools of thought will be made clear. These 
efforts will show how our topic, a theoretical contribution to the 
business cycle literature which incorporates certain recent financial 
innovations at the microeconomic level, is related to the field of 
research and knowledge. In so doing so, we will establish both its 
justification and lineage. Through tracing key themes found in the 
topic of Business Cycles, the intellectual context of our own work will 
be examined. By revealing the field's key themes, we will be able to 
show how our own research is both derived from and contributes to 
the body of knowledge.
2.01 Schools of Thought in Retrospect
The evolution of business cycle theory has been a long one, and 
has involved virtually al! schools of economic thought. Surveying the 
many contributions to the business cycle literature, leads to two 
related observations: That emphasis upon reconciliation and
synthesis with received views has been minimal and attempts to 
reconcile the many contributions with the paradigms of 
microeconomics presents a great challenge. Ignoring previous work,
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C H A P T E R  T W O .  L ITER A TU R E R E V IE W
often new models of business cycles have arisen in order to explain 
the latest events. Advancements in economic and econometric 
techniques have also spurred the development of new business cycle 
theories, but with minimal interest in ensuring reconciliation with 
previous research. Many theories of business cycles have relied upon 
a particular modification to the basic micro economic paradigm 
without considering its general equilibrium implications. Although 
theories of business cycles have evolved with the progress of 
technique and the desire to explain prevailing events, yielding 
distinctive modifications to received paradigms, the challenge of 
producing a u n i f i e d  o r  g e n e r a l  t h e o r y  e m b r a c i n g  competing views and 
having adequate foundations in microeconomics remains.
Competing theories of business cycles abound, often having 
distinct micro economic foundations, in part, because what they seek 
to explain varies. This point is illustrated in the many definitions 
found of what a business cycle is. There are strongly empirical and 
theory neutral definitions such as the following: "Business cycles are 
recurrent sequences of alternating phases of expansion and 
contraction that involve a great number of diverse economic 
processes and show up as distinct fluctuations in comprehensive 
series on employment, income, and trade- aspects of aggregate 
economic activity." {Sargent, 1992, page 283). In a similar empirical 
vein, Sargent describes business cycles as the "... tendency of certain 
economic variables to possess persistent cycles of approximately 
constant amplitude... (Zarnowitz, page 215, 1979). On theoretical 
grounds some definitions of business cycles excluded amplitude 
criteria, as found in an earlier definition of Burns and Mitchell (1946). 
According to Mitcheil and Burns, expansions and contractions may be 
strong or weak, sudden or persistent. The definition of Dotsey & 
King (1987) found in the N e w  P a /g r a v e  D ic t io n a r y  o f  E c o n o m i c s  has 
strong theoretical flavour. Their definition includes the statistical 
aspects of business cycles: They define a business cycles as the "...
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stochastic components of macroeconomic time series - as stationary 
stochastic processes.", implying that cycles may not arise from 
deterministic and non-random events. Meanwhile, also on theoretical 
grounds, Nelson & Plosser (1982) define business cycles as not 
necessarily stationary and not necessarily arising from stochastic 
components of time series. The variety of business cycle definitions 
underscores the difficulties inherent to any coherent classification. 
With these competing definitions in mind, we now discuss some 
earlier theories of business cycles in retrospect. Considering them, 
will permit us to see how in contemporary research, such themes 
reoccur.
Early economic theories of business cycles relied largely upon 
exogenous forces as sources of disturbances. For classical 
economists such as Smith, Ricardo, and Mill, exogenous forces or 
perturbations producing cyclic behaviour included weather, 
demographics and technology. Such perturbations alone explained 
the occurrence of business cycles, because the model embodied 
among other features, a vertical aggregate supply curve, flexible 
wages and prices. Any system or model based upon such 
propositions exhibited n e u t r a l i t y , that is, the equilibrium was 
invariant with respect monetary effects; and d i c h o t o m y ,  that is real 
variables are independent of the absolute price level.
More formally, business cycles in the classical system stood upon 
four pillars: Namely, that i.) Prices were set in order to clear all 
markets- including the labour market; ii.) There was no money illusion; 
iii.) Price expectations had unitary elasticity; and iv.) Alternative 
equilibriums did not have any distribution effects. In the classical 
system, the independence of output and employment from the price 
level implied a vertical aggregate supply, movements in which alone 
can change the level of output. In classical business cycles, changes 
in aggregate demand only affect the level of prices. Thus exogenous 
forces were relied upon because under the classical system, by virtue
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of Say's Law, market economy's generated stable and efficient 
equilibria. If markets function in the Walrasian sense, then cycles can 
only arise from exogenous shocks, or cycles must be equilibrium 
phenomenon, as Frisch (1933) would later argue. The use of 
exogenous forces to explain business cycles produced a model fully 
compatible with micro theory.
Arguably in response to economic conditions and as alternatives 
to the classical model, endogenous models of business cycles were 
posited. Such models of business cycles were based upon theories 
at variance with the axioms and propositions found in the classical 
system. A subject of discussion was whether an efficient and stable 
equilibrium may be achieved at minimum cost. In this vein, examples 
of endogenous models include Hawtrey's gold standard theory (1913) 
or under-consumption theories of Hobson (1909, 1922). In the 19th 
Century, Marx gave rise to many theories showing that cycles are 
inherent to an economic system involving the private ownership of 
capital and required an excess supply of labour. In the opinion of 
endogenous cycle theoreticians, the invisible hand was either flawed 
or non-existent. Later endogenoustheories of business cycles utilized 
investment-based theories; good examples of which are the works of 
J.M. Clark (1917) and Wicksell (1936). Kalecki's (1935) model used 
the following dynamic equation of capital accumulation, to produce 
constant oscillations in investment capital, K, for certain but arbitrary 
values in the parameters a, t, n .
(2-1) a aK{ t )  = — K{ t )  -  ( —  + n) K(  t - x )
T  17
According to Goodwin (1951), Kaiecki believed that the institutions 
and internal structures of capitalism inevitably generated business 
cycles. Endogenous theories of cost-price/profit margin relationships 
were also called into service in the works of Mitchell (1941). 
According to Sherman (page 70, 1991), Mitchell saw the business
1 3
cycle as inherent and unique to capitalist institutions".
Hayek (1933 and 1939) proposed that disturbances expressed as 
business cycles were equilibrium phenomenon rather than 
disturbances from equilibrium. Endogenous theories of business 
cycles challenged the classical structure, posing the possibility that 
if the system was not self-correcting and if perturbed, would not 
return to equilibrium through the effects of excess supply and demand 
upon price.
Some proponents of endogenous economic cycles went so far as 
to argue for a dropping of key axioms and propositions found in the 
Classical economic paradigm. Kuznets in a seminal paper, entitled 
"Equilibrium Economics and Business Cycle Theory", argued that the 
incorporation of business cycle theory into economic theory may 
require the abandonment of the rational agent assumption (1930). 
Kuznets stated that there were two ways of incorporating business 
cycles into classic microeconomic and equilibrium theory: 1.) as "... 
a consequence of cycles in o u t s i d e  factors and that this variation in 
what might be called the economic constants does not necessarily 
disturb the determinate fundamental relations between economic 
factors..." (page 396); or 2.) as a "... deviation from a preconceived 
picture of reality..." (page 399). Today we would call the former 
Real Business Cycles, and the latter as New Keynesian Business Cycle 
Models.
In the 1930s, a comprehensive theory of the macro economy and 
cyclic behaviour circumventing reconciliation with micro economics 
was tried in the work of Keynes. In the General Theory. Keynes
(1936) side-stepped classical propositions discussed above, by 
replacing the microeconomic division of value theory and monetary 
theory found in classical economics, with a paradigm based upon 
output as a whole which was distinct from the theory of the 
individual consumer or firm, (Hoover, 1991). Keynes attributed the 
business cycie, and in particular the events of the 1930s, as a
1 4
collapse of the marginal efficiency of capita! combined with wage and 
price inflexibility. Instability in aggregate demand was the source of 
fluctuations in aggregate economic activity. Keynesian business 
cycles were the result of endogenous flaws, inconsistencies which 
prevented a full-employment solution. In t h e  G e n e r a l  T h e o r y ,  three 
alternative endogenous explanations appear: 1.) Wage levels are too 
high to be consistent with full employment; 2.) The expenditure 
sector curve never reaches the full-employment level of real income 
at any positive rate of interest; and 3.) The demand or supply for real 
cash balances imply a monetary sector curve at too high a rate of 
interest. The possibility of endogenous innovations modifying such 
cycles was not considered.
As a tool for business cycle analysis, the Keynesian model or its 
heir, the text book IS-LM neo-classical synthesis developed by Hicks
(1937), became the source of many debates, mostly involving its 
micro foundations and the nature of equilibrium. Surveying the 
Keynesian style models of the post World War II period, we find that 
many used endogenous relationships such as multipliers and 
accelerators to generate cycles (Gordon, 1986), and to add a dynamic 
dimension (Plosser, 1989). Findings faults with the Keynesian 
system began not long after the publication of the G e n e r a l  T h e o r y .  
There was much debate over whether the equations of the national 
income model had a full-employment solution (page 47, Bailey 1971). 
Hicks and Leontieff initiated the attack suggesting the interpretation 
that the model of Keynes was s p e c i a l  c a s e ,  not a contraposition, and 
hence reconcilable with the classical system (Hicks, 1937). Later 
critics such as Clower (1965), observed that the Keynesian business 
cycle showed neither convergence nor stability, and violated 
Walrasian law of flows. Moreover, according to Hahn (1977), it was 
not a general equilibrium model. Whether the synthesis structure 
was used for Keynesian analysis (fixed money wages) or monetary 
neutrality positions, it lacked rigour at the micro economic level. It
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attempted to identify disequilibrium with inefficient sub-optimai 
outcomes, such as unemployment; while equilibrium meant full 
employment.
The’frontal challengeto Keynesian economics began in the 1960s 
with the rise of monetarism, the principle proponent of which was 
Friedman (Friedman & Schwartz, A  M o n e t a r y  H i s t o r y  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s ,  1963). Again using the same basic IS-LM Model, exogenous 
money supply effects were considered for their nominal effect. 
Utilizing a quantity-theoretic proposition that changes in the stock of 
money are the main determinant of changes in nominal income, 
monetarists argued that the demand for money is relatively stable. 
Fluctuations in aggregate demand and real economic activity could 
arise from phases of low and high growth rates in the quantity of 
money, because of significant lags in wage and price adjustments. 
Hence, the main source of critical monetary disturbances is outside 
the private economy in central bank policy actions. The monetarists 
approach to business cycles claimed to be in harmony with classical 
micro foundation, because it attributed nominal cycles to exogenous 
erratic aggregate demand growth caused by unstable monetary 
growth. Monetarists believed that fiscal policy was ineffective, and 
that monetary policy alone should be the tool of policy. Like 
Keynesianism, the level of aggregation, however, obscured many 
issues.
Considered in retrospect, although the structure of the basic 
Keynes - Hicks ISLM Model was adaptable to different schools of 
business cycle research, the problem of ensuring consistency 
between competing theories, and reconciling such theories with 
micro economic precepts remained. As tools for analysing business 
cycles, ISLM/Neo classical synthesis models were weakest where 
they had to be the strongest, that is in the concept of equilibrium. 
Were business cycle phenomena such as unemployment and declines 
in GNP the result of disequilibrium situations? Using short-run non
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neutral money, Patinkin tried to explain business cycle phenomenon 
as short-run disequilibrium phenomenon occurring as the real balance 
effect (1954). A sluggish real balance effect implied that money 
supply shocks could have short term real effects. The levels of 
aggregation in such works, however, obscured critical issues. 
Moreover, it was only a model of short-run disequilibrium. Clower 
(1965) questioned its logical consistency, claiming that it lacked 
adequate micro foundations. According to Hahn (1977, page 26), 
either such theory was not about equilibrium at all or it depended on 
certain price rigidities. Such models begged the question of whether 
agents were out-of Walrasian equilibrium or whether a different notion 
of equilibrium was required. Such criticisms had significant 
theoretical implications because business cycles had long been 
considered equilibrium phenomena, in order to reconcile business 
cycles with received classical microeconomic theory and to create a 
cohesive vision, it was felt that the debate needed to c h a n g e  g e a r s .  
Perhaps better macro economic theory, demanded stronger micro 
foundations, particularly with regard to such issues as exogeniety and 
equilibrium. It was felt such efforts would lead to a better 
understanding of business cycles.
Interest in creating a unified model of the macro economy which 
explains cyclic behaviour, and which is consistent with received 
microeconomic theory, led to research into equilibrium and 
disequilibrium theory. Although the contributions such as Barro and 
Grossman's disequilibrium model of a macro economy provided inter­
temporal adjustment insights, the behaviour depicted did not resemble 
empirical cycles (Barro & Grossman, Chapter 6, D y n a m i c s  o f  
A g g r e g a t e  D e m a n d ,  1976). A further criticism of disequilibrium 
macro models was that at a micro economic level, they implied 
uncleared markets and non-optimizing behaviour on the part of 
individuals. Exogenous models, in contrast regard cyclic behaviour as 
disturbances from equilibrium. The random shocks required for such
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models, however, do not produce the persistent movements in output 
or employment identified with business cycles, unless a propagation 
mechanism as used by Frisch (1933) was utilized. Such issues have 
led to research into questions involving the existence, desirability, and 
stability of equilibrium. Whether expansions and contractions occur 
as part of an equilibrium process, or whether cyclic disturbances are 
evidence of the economy being out of equilibrium became the focus 
of debate.
Equilibrium theories initially utilized monetary misperception 
mechanisms, as pioneered by Barro (1977) and Lucas (1972,1975), 
as the source or impulse for cycles, but were replaced more recently 
by real business cycle theories, often called New Classical theories. 
Originated by Nelson & Plosser (1982) and Kydland & Prescott 
(1982), their approach involves equilibrium using unanticipated 
exogenous changes in technology as a source of cycles. In such 
models, the shocks arising from changes in technology dissipate over 
time. The emphasis in real business cycle theory is upon the source 
of disturbance to equilibrium and generally does not include the 
propagation mechanism. New Classical models of business cycles 
work as displacements from equilibrium.
In contrast, contemporary disequilibrium theories, known as the 
New Keynesian school, use nominal rigidities and inefficiencies at the 
microeconomic level as the source of aggregate disturbances. Claims 
of realism at microeconomic level figure strongly in this school of 
thought, although this may be somewhat disingenuous. According 
to Greenwaid and Stiglitz (hereafter, GS) (page 120, K e y n e s i a n ,  N e w  
K e y n e s i a n  a n d  N e w  C la s s i c a l  E c o n o m i c s ,  1987) this school of 
thought seeks to "... adapt micro-theory to macro-theory." Rather 
than trying to develop a macro economic theory which is consistent 
with received precepts of micro economics, NK researchers have 
turned the issue on its head, that is attempting to re-write the latter. 
Such research was pioneered by Mankiw (1985), and Akerlof &
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Yellen (1985). According to New Keynesians, rigidities at the micro 
level become cycles because of sub-maximization of social welfare: 
Flat profit functions imply income losses are second order in 
magnitude, and hence adjusting prices is not justified, (Krainer 1992 
page 48). In addition to the equilibrium versus disequilibrium 
distinction, other key differences between these two contemporary 
schools of thought include the dichotomy between nominal variables 
such as money and real variables such as output. Known as Money 
Illusion, in the New Keynesian school the distinction is violated. 
Misperceptions between what is nominal and what is real at the 
microeconomic level are both a source of perturbation and explain 
cycle promulgation. In addition to remaining inconsistent with 
standard micro economics, New Keynesian models, as they involve 
many "small stories" or competing models, do not lend themselves 
easily to a synthesis or g e n e r a l  v i e w .
2.02 Discussion Plan
By discussing business cycle theories in retrospect, we have seen 
the emergence of contemporary research from its earliest traditions. 
In addition, we have seen the varying role played by micro 
foundations from the original implicit models of business cycles found 
in the writings of the classical economists to the work of the present 
day. We have seen the difficulties of reconciling competing schools 
of thought with one another and with received micro economic 
theory. In contemporary business cycle literature, the New Keynesian 
school and the New Classical-Real Business cycle school, the debate 
over micro economic foundations as we have seen, continues, as 
manifested in concern over the nature and existence of equilibrium 
and exogeneity. In order to understand such research in-depth, 
identify its short-comings and thereby create grounds for the present 
work, we utilize the mathematical concepts found in Lagrangean 
dynamics and the theory of chaotic dynamics or sensitivity to initial
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conditions, originating in the works of Henry Poincare' (1913). By 
applying such concepts to contemporary schools, their strengths and 
weaknesses in relation to the issues raised above, may be analyzed.
We' begin using the concept of P e r tu r b a t io n  as a tool for 
contrasting and comparing the Real Business Cycle approach with 
that of New Keynesianism, followed by P r o p a g a t io n  and L a w s  o f  
M o t i o n  or d y n a m i c a l  b e h a v io u r . (We use the term, p e r t u r b a t i o n  inter­
changeably with the terms such as, s h o c k s  or i m p u l s e . )  By 
discussing how cycles begin, and spread-out, whether they are 
c o n s e r v a t i v e  or d i s s i p a t i v e ,  that is whether they exhibit p e r s i s t e n c e ,  
and the nature of periodicity (if any); the differences between 
contemporary schools with respect to micro economic precepts and 
such notions as equilibrium, duality and dichotomy; and exogeneity 
wilt be delineated. This schema will reveal the literature's limitations 
and point the way for future research.
2.10 SOURCES OF PERTURBATION
2.11 Background
By the term, p e r t u r b a t i o n ,  we refer to the shocks or disturbances 
or other forces upon a system, in this case an economy, which are 
additional to the forces which causes its regular motion. It is also 
distinct from the p r o p a g a t i o n  mechanism. By propagation we refer 
to how disturbances interact, and spread from one economic variate 
to another. In the business cycle literature, perturbation as a source 
of cycles has been distinguished from cycles which arise in of 
themselves, from a specified model's structure. In contemporary 
economics, exogenous perturbation as a source of cycles is generally 
associated with Real Business Cycles, while endogenous propagation 
is associated with New Keynesian Cycles. This typology of business 
cycles, we will show, however, is not rigorous: Lagrangean classical 
dynamics allows for small oscillations around both a static equilibrium 
position and steady motion. A model in which perturbations modify
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or augment endogenous cycles, through some form of persistence or 
propagation may as well be constructed.1
Historically, the endogenous and disequilibrium models of 
business cycles, whether it was Marx, Kalecki, or Keynes have 
always been the main opposition to the equilibrium classical system, 
using exogenous shocks. Such dichotomy may however, be artificial. 
There is no a-priori reason, why model economies might not involve 
both exogenous impulses along with endogenous dynamic cycles. 
The seminal work of Frisch (1933) distinguished analytically between 
perturbation and propagation, however, in his view dynamic laws 
explain the damped oscillations, that is dissipation of energy through 
propagation; while impulses or shocks, as forms of perturbation, are 
the random shocks which by adding energy, maintain the cycle. 
According to Frisch (1933, page 197), impulses or shocks outside the 
economy can maintain a cycle generated from within the system. 
Thus for example:
x b^ f ( x t r z t )
(2 .2 )
Given an exogenous process {zt} and an initial output condition x 0 , 
the equation suffices to uniquely determine the evolution of the 
predetermined state variables, which in turn predetermines the 
evolution of the other endogenous state variables. If there are no 
exogenous shocks the equation for xt+1 reduces to:
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1 Under Classical Dynamics, with constant coefficients and 
linear equations of motion, analysis of disturbances and 
oscillations assumes that the body is r i g i d ,  that is the position 
of any part of the body's mass does not change in position 
relative to any other part, regardless of the forces acting upon 
the body. (For example, the ratio of unemployment to imports is 
constant throughout the cycle, changing proportionately.)
(2 .3 )
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x t +1= f ( x t )
Unless such a system converges asymptotically to some constant 
value, in the form of a steady state, call it, x \  we would have an 
e q u i l i b r iu m  with endogenous fluctuations. Endogenous fluctuations 
may be either deterministically cyclic or deterministically chaotic, that 
is sensitive to initial states (Guesnerie & Woodford, 1992), a point 
which we pursue in depth below. Thus, on the basis of mathematical 
formalism alone, there are no reasons to define endogenous cycles as 
a concept relevant only to economies without exogenous shocks. 
There is no a priori reason to dissociate endogenous cycles from 
models exhibiting steady state equilibria.
2.12 Real Business Cycle Equilibrium Models
Typically in contemporary exogenous shock models the emphasis 
is upon the source of perturbation. The equilibrium is well defined, 
and often unique locally, and stable in the sense that in the absence 
of recurrent exogenous shocks, the economy will tend towards a 
steady state, but because of shocks a possibly stationary, (that is, 
having constant phase space) pattern of fluctuations will be observed. 
Propagation in such models is not emphasized, and as the systems 
depicted by such models are dissipative, persistence is minimal. The 
equilibrium and exogenous school of business cycles, falls under the 
rubric of New Classicism, uses various sources of perturbation to 
generate cycles. For example, in the new classical approach of Lucas 
(1972,1977) and Barro (1976); misperceptions in the money supply 
process, that is, extracting signal from noise, results in shocks or 
impulses which disturb the system from equilibrium. Such shocks are 
exogenous. A subsequent version of new classicism, known as real 
business cycles, is found in such works of Nelson & Plosser (1982), 
Kydland & Prescott (1982), Long & Plosser (1983), Barro & King
(1984), King & Piosser (1984), or Cooley & Hanson (1989); in such 
research changes in aggregate supply through technology or labour 
are the source of perturbations. The real business cycle model uses 
exogenous perturbations to an equilibrium system to generate output 
fluctuations. These shocks may be caused by changes in 
demography, technology, or other factors. Supply side shocks can 
be represented with the following production function:
(2.4)
Y t - f  ( L t ,  K t , z t )
where Yis real GNP, /  is the functional form, L is the labour input, K  
is the capital stock, z  is a term that picks up shocks to the production 
function, all subscripted over time, t . In real business cycle models, 
the source of perturbations, the shock term is assumed to evolve 
according to the following process:
(2.5)
z t + i = ® ’+ z ’t:+ G t+i
where a is a constant term, and 6 is a random error term with an 
expected value of zero. In many real business cycle models, 
technology increases at a constant rate, a , plus any innovations in the 
random error term, e, which may be expressed analytically, thus:
(2 .6)
Thus changes in the production function are a random walk with drift.
According to real business theory, an economy is constantly 
receiving exogenous perturbations or shocks to the production 
function, as expressed above. In this school of thought, such shocks 
are not necessarily offsetting, that is a positive shock is not 
necessarily followed by a negative shock. Hence, the effect of 
shocks may accumulate, leading to some form of persistence. If
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consecutive shocks occur in the same direction, then output growth 
changes. These shocks are viewed as p e r s i s t i n g  over time, for the 
foreseeable future. This observation has intuitive appeal because in 
the real world effects upon output activity may persist for several 
quarters, above the long run growth trend. Although real business 
cycle models involve the supply side of the economy, interactions 
with money are not precluded. In some models, there is a correlation 
although without Granger causation, between output and money: 
Increases in real GNP lead to higher demand for real money balances, 
thus linking a perturbation with a method of propagation.
2.13 New Keynesian Disequilibrium Models
As explained above, although there is no reason for endogenous 
cycles to be only relevant to economies without exogenous shocks. 
Nonetheless, this is often the tactic employed by researchers using 
such models. In the New Keynesian literature, shocks, impulses, or 
perturbation do not play an important role. In the works of R.J. 
Gordon (1982); Mishkin (1983); or Hall & Fields (1987) deterministic 
cycles originate in the endogenous rigidities. While in the work of 
Mankiw & Romer (1988) or Mankiw (1990) weak incentives by 
individual firms to optimize profits by adjusting output, leads to sub- 
optimal social welfare in the aggregate, demonstrating our earlier 
point with regard to New Keynesian research turning the problem of 
reconciliation with received theory, or leads to r e - w r i t i n g  micro 
economics. It also leads to many competing, not necessarily 
consistent explanations of dynamic behaviour. In New Keyensian 
models of the economy, t h e  f a u l t  i s  n o t  in  t h e  s t a r s , b u t  in  
t h e m s e l v e s .
Let us look at perturbation in the New Keynesian business cycle 
in depth. A major contributions of New Keynesian research is the 
prediction that unstable aggregate demand and supply are important
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determinants of the business cycle. Aggregate demand instability 
causes business cycles because wages and prices are assumed to be 
less than perfectly flexible in the short run. ("Menu Costs" in 
Mankiw, 1985). Aggregate supply effects cause business cycles for 
the same reason that the classical model suggests: real changes in 
the labour market and/or the production function change the quantity 
of output firms can produce at a given price. Thus in the New 
Keynesian perspective, the source of the cycle is endogenous to the 
economy itself. (Around what sort of growth trend the cycles occur, 
for example static, deterministic, stochastic, is a matter we will 
address later.)
In the New Keynesian business cycle, the sources of cycles are 
sometimes similar to those found in traditional Keynesian reasoning. 
Erratic private expectations of consumption and investment spending 
lead to aggregate demand uncertainty. In addition to such sources 
for cycles, New Keynesians also stress unstable money demand. 
Thus violating classical neutrality, as such phenomenon it is argued, 
have real effects. These additional theories of cycles are very 
different from traditional Keynesian arguments. Furthermore, they 
distinguish the New Keynesian school from dichotomy of the real 
business cycle school: nominal magnitudes have real effects. How 
such endogenous perturbations work their way through the economy 
is also different in the New Keynesian business cycle, and will be 
discussed in the subsequent section.
2.20 METHOD OF CYCLE PROPAGATION
2.21 Background
Propagation refers to the internal dynamics of a market economy, 
that is with or without a policy shock or impulse to fundamentals 
(money supply, tastes, or technologies), how disturbances from a 
static or steady motion equilibrium by one or more economic variates, 
for example unemployment or interest rates, lead to disturbances in
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other economic variates, such as GNP. Propagation phenomenon 
may arise from an initial shock, like ripples in a pond from a stone, or 
from endogenous oscillations. It may be of a dissipative or 
conservative nature. Propagation, may or may not involve exogenous 
impulses or disturbances, and may lead to either deterministic or 
chaotic cycles. Propagation is an important aspect of business cycles 
because the transmission from one market to another may generate 
cyclic behaviour which persists long after the initial stimulus is gone, 
as shown by Rotemberg & Saloner (1986). Moreover, the 
transmission of energy across the economy may lead to cyclic activity 
at the aggregate level. We will find below, that contemporary 
schools of business cycle research take very different perspectives on 
these issues.
2.22 Propagation in New Classical Business Cycles Models
In New Classical Models of business cycles, whether we are 
referring to the older monetary misperception models of Lucas and 
Barro, or the real business cycles of Kydland & Prescott, how a cycle 
begins has always been more important than how it spreads out. In 
the Lucas (1975) model of monetary misperceptions, temporary 
external random shocks are propagated into a cycle (around a growth 
trend) by a linear propagation model which provides a mechanism for 
the effects of the shock to persist over time. For Lucas and Barro, 
the cause of business cycles is outside the economy, while the 
endogenous structure only serves to propagate the impulses through 
the system.
In real business cycles, real shocks rather than monetary shocks 
are transmitted into cycles by, a linear propagation mechanism. 
Some real business cycle models developed in the late 1980s, (see, 
Stockman (1988) for a review) included dynamic recursive techniques 
to solve sole agent optimization problems in linear propagation 
mechanism. Real business cycle models rely mainly upon the shock
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rather than the linear propagation to generate cycles. This approach 
is a break from the tradition of Wicksell and Frisch, who combined 
exogenous shocks with endogenous methods of propagation to 
generate cycles.
Real business cycle propagation is something of a hybrid between 
damped oscillation models, where new energy is required in the form 
of repeated shocks, to offset the dampening, as found in the model 
of Frisch (1933); and the non-oscillatory convergence models where 
the cycle is driven purely by shocks, as found in Slutsky (1937). Real 
business cycle propagation does not use persistence (serial 
correlation) to propagate temporary random shocks (eg. technology, 
demographics) as in the work of Slutsky who showed that output 
resembling economic time series could be generated in this manner. 
In real business cycles, because linear propagation is not strong 
enough, shocks must be auto-correlated or persistent to generate 
cyclic behaviour resembling actual time series. Propagation in the real 
business cycle model, beginning with Lucas, interprets the 
propagation mechanisms as a means of transmitting exogenous 
shocks through an otherwise stable economy. Propagation 
transforms shocks into cycles, in contrast, for earlier economists, 
notably Frisch, dichotomy between impulse and propagation was 
developed to explain how exogenous impulses outside the economy 
can maintain a cycle generated from w i th in  the system. In real 
business cycles propagation takes something of a b a c k - s e a t  in driving 
the economy. Serial correlation is not emphasized. Propagation 
merely explains how exogenous impulses of themselves become 
cycles. According to Mullineux, Dickinson & Peng (1993) such 
emphasis, however, may be implausible. A fundamental objection to 
real business cycle propagation mechanisms, they argue, is that they 
are linear. Surveys of non-iinear business cycle modelling (for 
example, Scheinkman (1990)) show that the presumption of linearity 
has iittle merit, making linearization around the steady-state, as many
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widely used, of questionable merit. Non-linear models, as we will 
show below, exhibit empirically appealing dynamics, resembling 
business cycle activity, as well bifurcation and deterministic chaos.
2.23 Propagation in New Keynesian Business Cycles Models
We have explained that New Keynesian Disequilibrium Models 
rely upon erratic private expectations of consumption and investment, 
along with unstable money demand, as sources of aggregate demand 
instability. Rigidities act as an endogenous source, although not an 
exogenous impulse, to business cycles. New Keynesian propagation 
of such unstable demand when combined with rigidities works in its 
own way, as we explain below.
In the New Keynesian business cycle, if an economy experiences 
an increase in aggregate demand, the initial response will be an 
increase in both prices and output. The increase in demand, even if 
it is anticipated in such models, causes prices to rise but only 
modestly relative to the change in demand because New Keynesians 
argue that private disincentives such as menu costs and mark-up 
pricing practices keeps prices from being completely flexible In the 
short run. Rigidities figure strongly. With mark-up pricing, prices rise 
in the short run by the full amount of the change in aggregate 
demand o n l y  if the costs also rise by the full amount of the change 
in aggregate demand. New Keynesians, however, claim that short 
run costs are insensitive to demand changes.
In the works of New Keynesian researchers such as Gordon 
(1982), Mishkin (1983), Mankiw, Akerlof & Yeilen (1985), Rotemberg 
(1987), Bali, Mankiw & Romer (1988), or Romer (1990) there are 
several explicit propagation mechanisms. In such models, short-run 
costs are seen as insensitive to changes in demand. In the short-run 
nominal wages are also rigid, explaining why costs are insensitive to 
changes in demand. In the models of Taylor (1980) and Blanchard 
(1987) wages and prices adjust differently, because of
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implicit and explicit labour contracts. Another reason for slow cost 
adjustment arises from the existence of price contracts between 
firms and suppliers. Until contracts are renewed, orders are received 
and filled at old prices. For example, in the model of Caplin & Spulber 
(1987) the fixed cost of changing prices, "microeconomic frictions", 
have macroeconomic effects. Failing to adjust to changes in the 
short-run, costs in the form of nominal rigidities, in some models arise 
because firms are assumed to operate in imperfectly competitive 
markets, as in Mankiw (1988) and Startz (1989). A further New 
Keynesian business cycle propagation mechanism involves accounting 
practices. F ir s t- in , f i r s t - o u t ,  procedures emphasizes historic rather 
than replacement costs. If items are not priced at the marginal 
replacement cost, then perceived costs will not move with demand. 
The net result of such propagation phenomenon is that an increase in 
aggregate demand will cause prices to rise in the short run, but not 
by the full amount of the increase in demand. Moreover, as part of 
the propagation mechanism, the increase in price level drives down 
real wages which allows firms at the aggregate level to employ more 
labour and produce more output. To describe propagation in New 
Keynesian business cycle models our focus is upon features which 
retard or prevent classical solutions. New Keynesian propagation is, 
in a sense a f r ic t io n , retarding the clock-work like mechanism of the 
classical system. New Keynesian rigidities act like frictional or 
viscous forces in classical dynamics, leading to a dissipation in 
system energy thereby preventing a return to Walrasian equilibrium. 
Disequilibrium is stable, and not merely a short-run deviation from 
neo-classical results. Otherwise much of New Keynesian economics 
would simply involve the slowness of convergence and not sub- 
optimization. A good example of such New Keynesian propagation 
mechanisms, is found in the model of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) - 
or Akerlof and Yellen (1985), prices as set by individual firms do not 
adjust to profit maximizing levels of output, after changes in costs,
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because the profit function is relatively flat around the optimal level 
and therefore, the loss from n o t  adjusting is of a second-order 
magnitude (by the envelope theorem). Such behaviour collectively, 
leads to sub-optimization and a loss in welfare.
Consider an example based upon the model of Akerlof & Yellen
(1985), in which monopolistically competitive firms have set prices 
and output so as to maximize profits. Their sales depend upon 
relative prices (along the demand curve) and aggregate demand (such 
as real money balances) which shifts the demand curve. In this initial 
equilibrium, output has been determined so as to maximize profits. 
Now suppose that there is a small decline in the money supply, and 
because of rigidities, several firms do not adjust prices downward. 
In a classical sense, because the profit function is relatively flat, they 
behave sub-optimaily because the profit loss is relatively small from 
sub-maximization. Such a situation might also arise if firms do not 
adjust prices because of short-run cost rigidities, as discussed earlier. 
Now, if a sufficient number of firms behave this way, prices will be 
higher than they would otherwise be because of the contraction in 
output, and hence the value of real balances will be lower. Such 
second order effects lead to overall rigidity of general price level. The 
implicit propagation mechanism in such cycles is that second order 
effects, because of flat profit functions, are not sufficient incentive 
for an individual firm to adjust prices to profit maximizing levels. In 
the aggregate, such implicit propagation mechanisms, reduce by a 
f i r s t  o r d e r  magnitude the value of the real money balance, eventually 
shifting the demand curve for all the firms remaining. Krainer calls 
this phenomenon an "aggregate demand externality." (Krainer, page 
48, 1992).
2.30 LAWS OF MOTION
2.31 Background
Above we have discussed the issue of propagation with respect
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to contemporary business cycles. Our concern was how either 
exogenous shocks or endogenous rigidities spread-out to affect the 
larger economy, and thereby generate a business cycle. In this third 
section ‘ on L a w s  o f  M o t io n ,  using concepts found in classical 
dynamics, our concern is now the nature of periodic motion. 
Periodicity may be of any order, although if we identify periods with, 
say, three month quarterly economic data, cycles in excess of eight 
iterates or more are uncommon. Our focus will be upon how 
business cycle aggregates, such as output, behave over time about 
a position of either equilibrium or steady state motion or even 
deterministic chaos. The stability of motion will be a key concern. 
In New Classical models and Real Business Cycle models, we will see, 
motion arises from recurring shocks to the production function and to 
the supply side of the economy. Such perturbations lead to motion 
which is either of a periodic nature (a limit cycle) or after a transient 
period settles into a steady state, viz motion has ceased. Such 
shocks or perturbations are stochastic, they exhibit persistence, and 
are not necessarily off-setting.
In contrast, the laws of motion found in New Keynesian business 
cycle models arise from the micro economic imperfections specified 
in their structure. Such motion is self-generating and endogenous to 
the specified structure, including erratic expectations with regard to 
investment and consumption spending, but not stochastic 
perturbations like the Real Business cycle school. The motion 
exhibited by New Keynesian models may involve oscillatory behaviour 
(limit cycles) of various orders of periodicity and may even exhibit 
deterministic chaos. Some endogenous models involving 
disequilibrium theory presents a s p e c i a l  p r o b l e m  from a laws of 
motion standpoint, as measuring displacement without either a static 
or equilibrium path coordinate, the degrees of freedom, in a classical 
dynamic sense, is not defined. Borrowing from classical dynamics, 
if we do not know where a physical mass is supposed to be, or in an
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economic setting where an economies's output should be, as in 
classical equilibrium, how can displacement via a law of motion have 
any significance? A reference point is required to measure 
displacement from it.
2.32 Laws of Motion in New Classical Real Business Cycle Models
In contemporary equilibrium business cycles, including both the 
original monetary disturbance models of Lucas and Barro or the newer 
real business cycle models of Kydland and Prescott, cycles originate 
with an exogenous perturbation mechanism, in the form of a 
stochastic shock to the supply side of the economy. Propagation 
uses a linear mechanism in order for the shocks to p e r s i s t  over time. 
Such impulse energy, however, is not generally sufficient to produce 
continuous cycles, resembling economic time series, which as 
mentioned earlier has been a criticism. Rather, once the energy from 
such shocks has dissipated, a return to a dynamic stable equilibrium 
occurs. The laws of motion for real business cycles may be described 
in the following manner: After an initial shock, the energy from such 
shocks is dissipated, fluctuations are damped and the time path after 
a shock is convergent. In most such modes there is insufficient 
persistence for shocks to generate oscillatory motion. According to 
Real Business cycle theorists, economies are constantly receiving 
such shocks, creating the regular oscillations we call business cycles.
The laws of motion for real business cycles part company with 
some of their intellectual predecessors: In the model of Frisch (1933} 
sufficiently close erratic impulses, adding energy to the system, 
through persistence are sufficient for cycles to continue. This 
possibility was also proposed by Slutsky (1937) and in the earlier 
work of Wicksell (1936). In real business cycles there is a little 
persistence to shocks (no auto correlation), while cycles occur within 
a dynamic equilibrium process which perturbations briefly effect. In 
time the economy returns to its trend growth, which m a y  exhibit
3 2
oscillations (Hall, page 126). Such oscillations are generated as an 
optimising agents' response to productivity shocks. As Prescott
(1986) expresses it: "... given the people's ability and willingness to 
inter-temporally substitute consumption and leisure, it would be 
puzzling if the economy did not display these large fluctuations in 
output and employment..." A model developed from the literature 
will illustrate this observation analytically.
In order to see how a real business cycle model is able to 
generate cyclical fluctuations solely through a consequence of the 
optimising behaviour in response to a technological shock, we review 
the basic ingredients of the Plosser (1989) model. The utility function 
of a representative agent from consumption, C, and labour, L , is of 
the form:
(2.7)
<7t=E"=0B cts( c t t s , L j
The production function, of a single final good Y t produced under 
constant returns to scale technology is represented by:
(2 .8)
Y t =Qt F ( K t i N t )
Where K t is the predetermined capital stock at time t-1; N t is the 
predetermined input in time t; and 0 f is a temporary shift factor to 
model total factor productivity. Now, the produced commodity Y can 
either be consumed or invested. If invested it becomes part of the 
capital stock, that is available for production in the next period. Thus 
capital stock will evolve according to the following non-autonomous 
first order dynamic difference equation, where i t is investment at time 
t:
(2.9)
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The following resource constraints for each period t  are:
(2 .1 0)
L t+ N tZ l } C t + I t < L Y b
A representative agent will be used to compute a set of relative prices 
which are market clearing, viz equilibrium prices. These choices 
represent at the individual agent level, the outcome of a competitive 
economy. Optimally, the agent chooses an amount of consumption, 
work effort, and output over time. The optimization problem faced 
by the representative agent is specified by the following Lagrangian: 
(2 .1 1 )
L = 2 Z B < [ u { C t , 1 - N t)] N t- C t - K t t l + (1-6) Ft]
The first order conditions give the time paths for the variables using 
the time-invariant decision rules:
(2.12)
c t=dKt , [et.s] t)
N t = N ( K t , [Gt+j;)
K t n = K ( K t , te^o)
To understand the Laws of Motion for this real business cycle 
model, we begin by paraphrasing Plosser's (1989, page 73-74) 
observation that "in the absence of changes in technology, that is 
when 0, = 0 , f o r  a ll  t , and given some initial capital stock; the values 
of consumption, hours worked, capital and output for the 
representative agent described above, will converge to the constants 
above, referred to as the steady state, that is where the relevant 
variables all grow at the same identical rate." As a Law of Motion, 
the steady state is a generalization of the concept of a stationary
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state, in which the relevant variables all remain constant, that is grow 
at zero rates. Since, according to Plosser, the decision rules are 
monotonically stable, non-iinear decision rules may be approximated 
using linear equations. King, Plosser, & Rebello (1988) use this 
assumption to isolate the exogenous shocks as the origin of the 
business cycle. An example of the steady state for the capital stock 
equation wouid be the following:
(2.13)
Where the arguments, p 2, MJ,, W 2 are functions themselves of the 
underlying parameters of tastes and technology. In Plosser's model, 
the next period's capital stock depends on the current capital stock 
and the current level of productivity and subsequent discounted 
productivity shifts. According to Plosser, the steady state conditions 
ensure the following:
(2.14)
Pi<l;p2>1
To formulate a Law of Motion, this result guarantees the stability of 
the solution. Given equation 2.9 for capital accumulation, then 
through an iterative method, the cyclical component of the capital 
stock K t can be written as a function of past shocks:
(2.15)
K t = f  (S A . j . j
This result means that the cycle is entirely exogenous. As a Law of 
Motion for this very typical real business cycle model, if exogenous 
shocks do not exist, then the model reduces to:
(2.16)
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which is a stable solution. Thus in the Plosser model, the response 
of individual agents to productivity shocks, in work, effort, output, 
consumption, and investment leads to stable cycles being generated 
which are Pareto optimal (see, Chapter 12, I n t e r - t e m p o r a l  O p t im a l i t y  
of Azariadis, 1993). The Laws of Motion in real business cycle 
models is logically consistent with the macro economic paradigm of 
equilibrium economics, as Kuznets predicted.
2.33 Laws of Motion for New Keynesian Business Cycle Models 
The laws of motion found in New Keynesian business cycle 
models arise from the micro economic imperfections specified in their 
structure. Such motion is self-generating and endogenous to the 
specified structure, including erratic expectations with regard to 
investment and consumption spending. We have seen that the laws 
of motion in New Keynesian models, like the original research inspired 
by the G e n e r a l  T h e o r y , largely rely upon erratic private expectations 
of consumption and investment spending as major sources of 
aggregate demand instability. New Keynesian models which utilize 
aggregate supply effects are exceptional, but tend to use real changes 
in labour markets or production functions to alter the quantity of 
output firms are willing to produce at a given price level.
The motion exhibited by New Keynesian models may involve 
osciilatory behaviour (limit cycles) of various orders of periodicity and 
may even exhibit deterministic chaos. In the New Keynesian 
approach, micro economic imperfections in market structure, 
incomplete rationality, and a sluggish adjustment process produce 
varieties of inter-temporal behaviour, involving non-Walrasian 
equilibrium. The emphasis is upon rigidities, frictions, and 
constraints, which prevent solutions. In some models, the specified 
structure given certain parameter values leads to regular oscillatory 
behaviour around a stationary mean which we might refer to as 
business cycles. In other instances, the same model with different
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parameter values, may produce an inter-temporal solution which is 
chaotic, and anything but regular. Initial conditions may also affect 
the inter-temporal solution.
In some New Keynesian business cycle models, we find that the 
notion of equilibrium coordinates are well defined and therefore the 
laws of motion may be described even in the short run; while others 
New Keynesian business cycle models lack equilibrium coordinates. 
Some endogenous models of the New Keynesian variety involving 
disequilibrium theory present a s p e c i a l  p r o b l e m  from a laws of motion 
standpoint, as measuring displacement without either a static or 
equilibrium path coordinates, leaves the degrees of freedom, in a 
classical dynamic sense, undefined. Recall, from the beginning of 
Chapter Two, to define business cycles as stationary stochastic 
processes is common, however, many New Keynesian business 
cycles, exhibit alterative inter-temporal behaviour. Often in such 
models the assumption is that business cycles are disequilibrium 
phenomenon arising from rigidities. The static counterpart of a New 
Keynesian model represents an economic environment which is 
stationary, without being necessarily in equilibrium. In a dynamic 
New Keynesian model, a non-stationary environment may not be in 
dynamic equilibrium. By way of comparison, in equilibrium Real 
Business cycle models, steady motion implies that with respect to real 
economic output, (the counterpart to physical coordinates and 
velocities), the system remained constant. In a Real Business Cycle 
model, the system of steady motion was such that after disturbance, 
economic aggregates may either oscillate or because of damping, 
energy dissipation, slowly return to the steady motion path. In New 
Keynesian models, the system is not constant with respect to output 
(velocities and coordinates in the physical sense). Begging the 
question of whether cyclic behaviour can be described if a stationary, 
albeit stochastic, process has not been specified? Borrowing from 
classical dynamics, if we do not know where a physical mass is
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supposed to be, even probabilistically, or in an economic setting 
where an economies's output should be, as in classical equilibrium, 
how can cyclic displacement via a law of motion have any meaning? 
A reference level of output is required to measure displacement from 
it, cyclic or otherwise.
The above observations suggest analysing the dynamic behaviour 
for New Keynesian models, that is defining laws of motion, creates 
complications. In the above literature review, business cycle models 
have been classified using the concepts of endogenous versus 
exogenous schemes, equilibrium versus disequilibrium approaches, 
and how motion begins, how it propagates, and whether it persists. 
Considering the laws of motion for New Keynesian models, requires, 
at times, dropping the presumption of underlying stationary process. 
Cycles of various periodicity may occur, such models may even 
exhibit as we show in Chapter Five, deterministic chaos. Some New 
Keynesian models exhibit hysteresis and multiple steady-states. 
Without shocks (perturbations), a non-stationary time-path may arise 
as a consequence of the dynamic interaction between economic 
agents. In considering such inter-temporal behaviour, it is important 
to remember that the presumption of a reference frame arising from 
an underlying stationary trend, may not be relevant. Defining the 
laws of motion for such business cycle models, presents challenges. 
Looking at two well-known models from the financial imperfections 
and constraints literature, illustrates the differences in inter-temporal 
dynamics.
Financial constraints and financial market imperfections figure 
strongly in the New Keynesian business cycle literature and as we will 
see shape their laws of motion. We will examine two such models to 
see what Laws of Motion they obey.- The stylized facts behind these 
business cycle models include the asymmetrical information between 
borrowers and lenders; the asymmetrical effects of interest rate 
changes upon the quality of borrowers; the difficulty which lenders
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have in monitoring borrowers after credit has been extended; and the 
practical limit to writing financial contracts which are tied to real 
performance (such as return on equity or return on sales) rather than 
nominal amounts and nominal rates of return on debt which may not 
be risk adjusted. In the next chapter, we discuss the evolution of 
these concepts in depth, however, for the purposes of understanding 
business cycle Laws of Motion, we look at two such models.
Consider the model found in Greenwald & Stiglitz (hereafter, GS) 
(1988,1990, and 1993), which we fully explore in Chapters 3 and 4, 
although here we introduce it. We have the objective profit function 
for the i ' t h  firm:
(2.17)
71 \ q £  -  (1  + r t ) ( w $ ( q £ )  - a ? )  - c £ f ( v
Qt: L J
Where, q is the profit maximizing level of output for the i ' t h  firm, r  
is the rate of interest, w t is the wage paid at time t , 0 (q j is the 
labour requirement for an output of q ,  a (  is the internal equity 
reserves of the i ' t h  firm at time t , c/ is the cost of bankruptcy of the 
i ' t h  firm at time t. F ( \ / t+1) is a probability distribution for the risk of 
bankruptcy arising from the relation between the firm specific 
threshold level, d t+J, and the firm specific price realized at time t +  1 
when output is sold, which we call i/ t+/, for which the working 
capital was borrowed to pay wages at time t . Maximization of 
equation 2.17 yields an aggregate supply function of the form:
q t = q ( w t , r t , a l . . . . a ?  f F)
(2.18)
In their model, GS add an inelastic labour supply, along with an 
aggregate demand equation which includes a money market condition 
for equilibrium. The two equilibrium conditions in the model are the
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following (Where V fi is the reservation wage, and L the inelastically 
supplied quantity of labour.):
4 0
(2.19)
wt  = W*, i f f  L ;  o t h e r w i s e  $ ( q t ) > L
For labour demand at time t ,  L dt, we have the following, where it is 
assumed that all firms for a given level of equity, will produce equal 
levels of output because of identical technology and hence have equal 
labour requirements:
In the GS Model, the crucial state variable is real equity, as it 
determines the level of output. Its dynamics are specified with the 
following first-order difference equation:
(2 .2 1 )
Where, M '\ is the net dividends paid out of accumulated profits. At 
the steady state, the given supply of labour, L , determines the full 
employment output level, q \  where Q (q*) -  L . Hence given q \  
equilibrium in the goods market determines r \  In this way the 
steady-state wage which ensures that the full employment is such 
that aggregate demand equals aggregate supply:
(2 .2 0)
(2 .2 2)
Equation 2.22 defines a function on wages, accordingly:
(2.23)
w t= w ( a t)
Although dividend payments are stochastic, GS specify that they are 
an increasing function of the amount of equity, GS express real 
dividends, M /p  as m t+ 1= m ( a t+J) , leading to their difference equation.
(2.24)
a t+i  = Q* “ [ w ( a t ) L - a t  ( 1 + r * )  = G { a t )
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Where G (a t) is the generalized function of the autonomous non-linear, 
first-order difference equation on equity, a t . According to the 
authors, GS, under suitable assumptions on parameters, this 
difference equation is globally stable around a full employment, real 
equity value of a*. The equation describes the Law of Motion for the 
GS model. According to GS, equation 2.24, describe both paths to 
equilibrium: "... from an initial equity position below a* there is 
generally a path of increasing output... and equity that converges to 
a*; from an initial equity position above a \ there is a full employment 
path along which falling equity and wage levels converge 
monotonically to a* and w \ " (GS, page 118, 1988). According to 
GS, in their model, perturbations to the steady-state may arise from 
monetary shocks, demand shocks, and "uncertainty" shocks" with 
regard to future expected firm specific prices, P t+1/ P t or u 't+ J. 
Depending upon whether the increase in, for example, the degree of 
"uncertainty" is permanent, then the drop in output at each level of 
equity, a 't will be permanent. According to GS, small shocks can 
have large and persistent effects upon output (page 106-107, GS, 
1993), however an exogenous shock on money supply, real demand, 
or "uncertainty" may have short run effects without altering the 
steady-state level of output (page 118, GS, 1988). The claims of GS 
with regard to dynamics of their model, we note, however, combine 
linearization and a n a ly s i s . Owing to the model's non-linearity, such 
claims generally require validation using numerical methods, as we 
pursue later ( C h a o s  in  D y n a m ic a l  S y s t e m s ,  Chapter 1, Ott, 1993).
We observe that with respect to finding a law of motion for this 
New Keynesian business cycle model, that it is arguably c l a s s i c a l  
even in the short run, because nominal shocks have an effect only if 
they are n o t  anticipated, which may be argued resembles a real 
business cycle model (page 168, Benassi, Chirco, and Colombo, 
1995). If the shocks are anticipated, the effects are manifested 
through supply considerations. A further point to observe here, from 
a Law of Motion standpoint is that the financial constraint found in 
the model, the link between equity and output, implies short run 
multiplier effects. For example, if the money supply were to fall and 
its effects were not anticipated, it would lead to a fall in real equity 
values, which in turn would produce a fall in overall output. Lower 
output, via a negative multiplier, means lower income for consumers, 
which has second round effects for employment and income. The 
propagation mechanism of the GS model relies upon real interest 
rates: the decrease in real demand translates itself into a drop in real 
interest rates through the implied increase of demand for real 
balances, which translates into further decline in price, lower 
revenues and profits, and hence lower real equity, and output. (Such 
dynamics work through the demand for working capital to pay real 
wages to produce next period output and dividends tied to anticipated 
but not realized profits.) Such effects may produce unemployment as 
L ( q J  falls below q * ,  the steady state level of output. Similarly, short- 
run effects are caused by real shocks upon demand or uncertainty.
The laws of motion for the GS model exhibit several classical 
traits, according to Benassi, et al (Chapter 4, 1995). The economy 
described by GS is perfectly competitive and exhibits flexible prices. 
It differs from a classically inspired system, in our estimate, in its use 
of information assumptions which appear as a bound on the firm's 
equity sales, from which bankruptcy and related costs arise. This 
equity constraint produces risk averse behaviour by the firm. Non­
neutral nominal shocks occur because prices and wages affect the
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firm's asset position and risk taking investment is non-neutral with 
respect to the positions of debt and equity holders. Moreover, 
because financial contracts for borrowing are not specified in real 
terms and are not tied to financial performance, but rather to nominal 
rates of interest which are not indexed or risk adjusted, aggregate 
output effects occur. Financial markets, because of the equity 
constraint and the financial market imperfection, rather than being 
mere reflections of the real-side of an economy, are in the GS model, 
the source of cyclic persistence. Surprisingly, however, in 
combination with these New Keynesian traits which make it worthy 
for inclusion in the two volume set, New Keynesian Economics, 
(edited by Mankiw & Romer, 1993); the GS model has classical traits 
from a business cycle standpoint because of its Laws of Motion and 
much of its structure. Returning to our earlier observation on the 
problems inherent to defining laws of motion for many New 
Keynesian models, in the GS model aggregates obey stochastic 
stationary processes.
Finding what could be described as a New Keynesian Law of 
Motion in Farmer's (1984) piece on aggregate supply is somewhat 
easier. Like the work of GS, the role of bankruptcy is used in output 
determination, although Farmer's approach provides a contract 
theoretic framework. In his model, the contract form is endogenous 
to the model: the rate of interest and the efficiency of the contract 
are related. Describing his model, a firm contracting with an outside 
financier must provide him with an expected return at least equal to 
the available alternative- the real interest rate. There is a perfect 
competition in contracts, which implies a real relative rigidity. Now, 
in a risky environment, the firm must commit to payments in good 
states of nature sufficiently high in order to compensate for lower 
payments in bad states of nature (Benassi, et al, pages 164-165). 
The firm's ability to repay its obligations, in bad states, is limited by 
its wealth- as specified in the default contract. Hence, an increase in
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the interest rate becomes an increase in the promised good-state 
payments: if the contract is signed before (and the employment is set 
after) uncertainty is resolved, so higher payments mean lower 
demand'. Thus, higher rates of interest increase the frequency of 
either bankruptcy (Farmer, 1984), or as in his iater work, of lay-offs 
(Farmer, 1985), thereby linking real rates of interest to the aggregate 
supply schedule. Quoting Farmer (page 923, 1984): "... the 
important implication of using a bankruptcy constraint to generate risk 
averse behaviour is that the magnitude of the employment distortion 
is predicted to vary systematically with the rate of interest."
Interpreting the model from its laws of motion we find that in 
Farmer's model output and employment depend upon the real rate of 
interest, so that a shock on the asset market has a direct effect on 
the goods and labour markets. From a Motion standpoint this leads 
to two observations. Firstly, that these shocks are real, since "... 
money may be included in a variety of ways, but any method that has 
the property that only real balances matter will generate steady-state 
equilibria in which the rate of inflation equals the rate of monetary 
expansion" (Farmer, page 928, 1984). Secondly, Farmer's model 
economy has no natural rate, since its steady state equilibrium rate 
of unemployment depends upon the sequence of asset market 
equilibrium (hysteresis)- and hence of real shocks affecting the latter 
unlike GS. His model's law of motion, cannot be described as New 
Classical. The equilibrium to which his economy converges is n o t  
invariant to the path followed to reach it. The law of motion for this 
model would be described as path dependent. Reviewing these two 
New Keynesian business cycle models for the properties of their 
dynamic behaviour reveals that generalizations aboutthe literature are 
not made easily. As Fair notes (page 143, edited by Beiongia & 
Garfinkel, 1991) with respect to New Keynesian models of business 
cycles "...it is hard to get a big picture.... There are many small 
stories." Accordingly, their laws of motion vary, and even exhibit, as
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we have seen, New Classical traits.
2.40 CONCLUSIONS
Contemporary business cycle literature, New Keynesian and Real 
Business Cycle, can trace its origins to the beginnings of economics. 
Expressed in a new manner, and using the latest techniques, 
contemporary business cycle literature confronts the timeless and 
basic issue of whether a self-organizing economic system in which 
capital is privately owned and markets direct its allocation, will 
generate stable output and efficient utilization of resources, including 
people. In order to explain departures from this ideal, Real Business 
cycle theorists attributes oscillations to exogenous and possibly 
persistent, perturbations. If not for such exogenous occurrences, 
they argue, an economies's output would grow uninterruptedly along 
trend, reflecting the marginal productivity of capital. Essentially, this 
depiction of an economy's behaviour might be faulted as a d e u s  e x  
m a c h i n a  solution. How, it might be asked, can a model of business 
cycles make any claim to universality or comprehensiveness, if forces 
outside the model are needed to generate aggregate supply 
instability? We ask, why are not unexpected growth in the money 
supply or improvements in technology endogenous to the system?
New Keynesian models, by contrast, we have seen appeal to 
micro imperfections to explain changes in aggregate demand, and 
oscillations along trend. Their research resembles the original 
propositions of Keynes on the obstacles to a full-employment/output 
solution arising from any of the following aggregate conditions 
mentioned previously:
•Wages being set too high;
•The demand or supply for real cash balances having a horizontal 
range at too high a rate of interest; or
•The expenditure curve never reaching the full-employment level 
of real income at any positive rate of interest.
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But New Keynesians lay claim to macro explanations utilizing 
essentially partial equilibrium phenomenon, such as imperfections in 
competition, capital markets or information, and in this way differ 
from the broad foundations arising from general wage and price 
inflexibility used by Keynes. New Keynesians, in trying to create 
robust micro foundations, and overcome the logical inconsistencies 
found in models derived from the G e n e r a l  T h e o r y , leave us with 
many s m a / l - s t o r i e s ,  none of which would appear strong enough to 
carry the weight required for a comprehensive model of fluctuations 
in aggregate economic output as influenced by changes in aggregate 
demand. As mentioned in Chapter One, the Samuelson principle of 
c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  seems to be ignored. A second shortcoming of New 
Keynesian models is that although the modeled micro-imperfections 
generate persistent cyclic dynamic behaviour, they remain essentially 
static and not self-correcting. Keynes appears to have believed that 
the economy was e v e n t u a l l y  self-correcting, but that the wider social 
costs were unacceptable, and therefore demanded an activist fiscal 
policy, especially in view of his distrust of Central Bankers 
(Leijonhufvud, 1968). In contrast, New Keynesian theorists utilize 
micro-imperfections to generate dynamic results, but appear to leave 
unexplained w h y  such imperfections are not correcting, for example, 
through innovations in how markets function or what products are 
available. (Would a macroeconomic model ever anticipate cost 
lowering innovations such as information technology?) Whether such 
micro economic innovations may remedy or modify the cyclic 
oscillations depicted in New Keynesians models, and if so, how, is the 
subject of this dissertation. In order to pursue this subject, we 
present and explore in Chapter Three in much greater depth, the 
Greenwald-Stiglitz (GS) model in which financial market imperfections 
and constraints are the sources of macro economic disturbances.
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C H A P T E R  TH REE. M O D E L  R E V IE W  A N D  B A C K G R O U N D
3.0 Introduction
In this chapter we will explain how a New Keynesian business
cycle model embodying a financial constraint and a financial market
imperfection may be utilized to model and analyze the effects of
certain innovations, in the form of futures and options securities, used
for the management of financiaj^risk. Our interest concerns the
impact of such forms of innovation upon aggregate economic activity
and how they may inter-act with the stylized endogenous
specifications found in such models as sources of cyclic behaviour.
in the course of this research, we investigate whether there is a
theoretical basis for the many stylized assertions that the use of such
securities as futures and options have changed business behaviour,
and by doing so, have generated desirable macroeconomic effects, as
measured by aggregate output, and by dynamic stability.
Conventional wisdom with regard to futures and options and
their use for risk management, typically embodies three unproven
stylized assertions:
•The growth in the availability and use of options and futures 
has been as a response to the growth in systemic macro risk 
arising from secular changes;
•The adoption of risk management practices by business has 
been beneficial to shareholders; and
•The pervasive use of risk management has yielded 
macroeconomic gains by reducing the amplitude of business 
cycle behaviour without a reduction in long-term growth rates.
For example, we find the view that the practice of risk management 
using options and futures has arisen in response to secuiar economic
changes expressed by Professor Clifford W. Smith1
"Not surprisingly, the financial markets have responded to this 
increased volatility. The past fifteen years have witnessed the 
evolution of a range of financial instruments and strategies that 
can be used to manage the resulting exposures to financial 
price risk."
Professor Smith, an Editor of the J o u r n a l  o f  F in a n c e  further alleges
that the use of risk management represents sound practice for all
concerned. He writes:
"Today, financial price risk can affect not only quarterly profits 
but may determine a firm's very survival. Unpredictable 
movements in exchange rates, interest rates, and commodity 
prices present risks that cannot be ignored. Its no longer 
enough to be the firm with the most advanced production 
technology, the cheapest labour supply, or the best marketing 
team-because price volatility can put even well run firms out of 
business."
In a similar vein, we find in T h e  H a n d b o o k  o f  C u r r e n c y  a n d  I n t e r e s t
R a t e  H e d g in g , published by the New York Institute of Finance, that
by managing risks, firms may be able to r e d u c e  e x p e c t e d  t a x e s ,
r e d u c e  c o s t s  o f  f in a n c ia l  d i s t r e s s ,  i n c r e a s e  d e b t  c a p a c i t y ,  a n d  r e d u c e
a  f i r m 's  b o r r o w i n g  c o s t s  (1990). Turning to the aggregate impact of
risk management, we find Professor Smith's implied observation that
macro-economic gains arise because the risk bearing parties are able
to carry their costs with greater efficiency. He writes:
".... financial instruments now exist that permit the direct 
transfer of financial price risk to a third party more willing to 
accept that risk."
4 8
1 The Handbook of Interest Rate Risk Management, Robert 
Schwartz and Clifford Smith, 1990.
It would seem, according to Professor Smith, what is good for the 
individual firm, must in the aggregate be "desirable". In a similar 
vein, Professor Schiller in M a c r o  M a r k e t s :  C r e a t in g  I n s t i t u t i o n s  f o r  
M a n a g in g  S o c i e t y ' s  L a r g e s t  E c o n o m i c  R i s k s  (1993), argues that it 
might be possible to reduce or eliminate macro-economic disturbances 
through appropriate risk management. We find that a logical 
connection between risk management and the achievement of a 
firm's financial and commercial objectives is widely asserted among 
practitioners and academicians within this field, with the implication 
that such activities contribute to share holder value, and moreover 
have desirable aggregate effects. For example, Robert G. Tompkins 
in O p t i o n s  A n a l y s i s  (1994), writes, "Options function as insurance 
and in this area the needs of world commerce and services by the 
world of finance dovetail perfectly." In A d v a n c e d  S t r a t e g i e s  in  
F in a n c ia l  R i s k  M a n a g e m e n t ,  it is claimed that m a c r o - s w a p  or m a c r o ­
o p t i o n ,  as is currently under development, holds the potential for 
insulating companies from the risks of general economic down-turns 
(Chapter 13, A d v a n c e d  S t r a t e g i e s ,  Marshall, Bansal, Herbst, and 
Tucker, editors R.J. Smith and C.W. Smith, 1995). The above 
viewpoints, notwithstanding, as we discusss below, are problematic 
at many levels.
Looking at the individual firm, the arguments for the 
management of financial risk are not c u t - a n d - d r y .  According to some 
authorities, an accepted and received perspective on why firms 
should hedge does not exist (Leiand, 1998). The conventional 
viewpoints, as expressed above, adopt the r i s k  t r a n s f e r e n c e  model of 
options and futures in which derivative markets are likened to 
insurance. In this school of thought, derivatives exist in order to price 
and sell systemic risk between hedgers and speculators. A fully 
hedged position represents the purchase of certainty equivalence. 
This school of thought has a long lineage, dating at least to Keynes 
(1923, 1930) and later reinforced by Kaldor (1939) and Hicks (1946).
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Outside of the technical requirements, the Keynes/Hicks perspective 
implies that futures markets are biased downwards with regard to 
estimates of prices in the future to reflect the risk premium earned by 
speculators, that such markets behave systemicaily vis-a-vis the 
securities markets, and that in the aggregate hedgers are net short.
As we will pursue in depth in Chapter Five, for any and all of 
these points, empirical support is not uniform. An immediate problem 
with the perspective of Keynes, Kaldor and Hicks, is that if derivative 
markets behaved systemicaily, hedging involves the trade-off of non- 
diversifiable reward against risk. Under risk neutrality, points found 
on the security market line have a net present value of zero. Only 
with positive risk premia will investors pay to avoid systematic risk. 
Trading-off risk against return through taking long or short positions 
on state contingent assets produces no gains to shareholders, since 
market capitalization is risk adjusted and hence invariant to capital 
structure (Modigliani & Miller, 1958, 1963).
in addition to the micro-theoretic issues surrounding the 
conventional views on hedging, we have problems regarding the 
alleged macro benefits. The connection between the use of options 
and futures for hedging and the alleged benefits at the individual 
economic agent level, to gains at the macro-economic level, however 
measured, have yet to be established, although often presumed. 
With little or no theory, relying upon anecdotes, it is often asserted 
that the use of risk management can stabilize the economy and 
smooth cyclic disturbances, (see, for example, Schiller, Chapter 4 
1993). The aggregate gains to the use of futures and options for risk 
management is believed to arise, because the hedger/speculator 
relationship shifts costs to where it may be borne at lower cost. 
Such observations assume that risk preference and tolerance is not 
uniformly distributed; while making many non-trivial presumptions 
with regard to aggregation (see, Sato, 1975). As Bacchetta and 
Caminal (page 3, 1996) note, "...the fact that financial factors matter
5 0
for individual firms does not imply that they matter at the 
macroeconomic level." The presumption that if risks could be 
m anaged  away, the macro costs of mistakes might be reduced or 
eliminated, lacks theoretical underpinnings and is difficult to establish 
empirically, for several reasons including secular changes in the 
economic environment. Among the questions raised by the above 
positions with regard to the use of futures and options by 
corporations under the rubric of risk management are the following:
• Are the effects of risk management purely firm specific, or are 
their aggregate positive externalities, such as the smoothing of 
business cycles?
• Are there effects at the Aggregate Demand and Supply 
levels?
• Does the use of R M  techniques, in a sense create a public 
good through the reduction in investment and consumption 
instability?
•What are the business cycle properties of an economy having 
contingent asset markets?
• Can an optimal span of state contingent markets be 
formulated?
The controversial theoretical foundations for risk management 
may appear surprising in view of the fact that virtually all the World's 
exchanges offer both simple and complex derivative products/as a 
means of managing exposures and expressing complex market views, 
but the role of finance in general in the theory of business cycles has 
not received adequate attention (Krainer, 1992). According to the 
author, the implications of how financial contracts of any variety 
shape supply adjustment in both product and financial markets has 
been overlooked. A rigorous analysis or modelling of the significance 
of risk management, involving for example futures markets, for the 
macroeconomy has yet to be undertaken, while progress with regard 
to theoretical general equilibrium modelling of futures market is only 
recent. The literature on General Equilibrium Theory with Incomplete
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Asset (GEI) Markets (see, Geanakoplos, 1990, for a survey) is a 
recent example, however, it has not been extended to the business 
cycle literature or macro-economics in general.2 Equally surprising 
is the small attention which has been given to the modelling of 
futures markets themselves at even a partial equilibrium level. The 
economics of futures markets has received limited attention (Goss 
and Yamey (1976)); while the economic role in the economy of such 
practices in the aggregate are less well understood (J.L. Stein (1986; 
and 1992, edited by Goss); Silber, (1984) edited by Peck). The 
asset/inventory management approach to futures and options 
promoted by Williams (1994), which we return to in Chapter Five, is 
intriguing but not widely accepted. From the above, we see that the 
inclusion of risk management innovations into a macroeconomic 
framework or a model capable of addressing the unproven assertions 
mentioned earlier, remains untrodden ground.
To illuminate these issues and address them on a rigorous 
micro-theoretic basis, we have turned to the business cycle models 
found in the N e w  Keynesian literature. Their emphasis upon 
imperfections and constraints as sources of cyclic behaviour, make 
them potentially ideal for analysing whether hedging as a means of 
correcting such imperfections, has macroeconomic implications. 
Such models combine uncertainty in the formation of expectations 
with micro-theoretic constraints and imperfections. In such models 
m istakes arising from the combination of uncertainty and 
imperfections lead to cycles. Introducing risk management into such
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2G E I ,  f i r s t l y ,  has  p r o v i d e d  a f ramework  f o r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
t h e  p r i c i n g  o f  a s s e t s  and t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  a s s e t  s p a n ;  
S e c o n d ly ,  GEI h a s  f o r c e d  e c o n o m is t s  t o  d e v e l o p  new m e t h o d o l o g i e s  
f o r  c o n s t r u c t i n g  e x i s t e n c e  p r o o f s  f o r  g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m ;  
t h i r d l y ,  i t  h a s  d e m o n s t r a t e d  a s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  b e tw e e n  
r e a l  and f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t s ;  f o u r t h l y ,  i t  ha s  shown t h a t  d e f a u l t  
and b a n k ru p tc y  can  be u n d e r s t o o d  as  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  and n o t  
d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  phenomenon; and f i f t h l y ,  i t  ha s  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  
p r e s u m p t io n  a g a i n s t  th e  P a r e t o  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  t h e  m arke t  p r o c e s s .  
( G e a n a k o p lo s ,  1 9 90 ) .
models as way of correcting imperfections and reducing uncertainty, 
may present a means of addressing the issues raised earlier, as well 
offering further insight into their dynamic behaviour. To adequately 
conceptualize the above issues, we explore in Chapter Three the 
theoretical specification of such N e w  Keynesian models, their 
methods of propagation and laws of motion, including the role of 
imperfections in dynamic behaviour, after which we turn our attention 
to one model in particular by Greenwald and Stiglitz 
(1988,1990,1993).
The role of mistakes and imperfections are important for macro 
economic models of business cycles because both N e w  Keynesian 
and Real Business approaches have in distinct ways used them to 
motivate aggregate activity, as noted in the previous chapter. Would 
the signal extraction problem found in a Lucas model or the 
technology shocks of Kydland & Prescott have the same implications 
if economic agents, anticipating uncertain outcomes, hedged their 
exposures? In N e w  Keynesian models, we ask, would risk 
management correct the aggregate demand instability induced by the 
effect of erratic expectations upon consumption or investment 
decisions? In such models, could the impact of second order sub- 
optimization be neutralized through risk management? If economic 
agents, facing uncertain environments, were to hedge parameters on 
which their consumption and investment spending plans were based, 
would the sources of instability be removed, thereby changing the 
dynamic aggregate behaviour? Risk management, it might be 
argued, would inter-act with the laws of motion found in such 
models. Indeed, the use of risk management products might even 
change an economy's iaws of motion in ways more complex than 
simple assertions derived from aggregating partial equilibrium results. 
The fact that risk management has been ignored from a macro- 
economic standpoint and business cycle standpoint, notwithstanding 
the many groundless assertions noted earlier, may be surprising, but
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such innovations are fairly recent. To fill this gap, the purpose of our 
research is to understand the significance of innovations in financial 
risk management, at the macro level, and shed light upon the many 
stylized assertions regarding the use of derivative products. To this 
end, in Chapter Three, with reference to the relevant literature, a 
theoretical model is presented and discussed with a view to laying the 
ground-work to address the above issues.
The methodology for our research involves a theoretical 
contribution to the N e w  Keynsian business cycle literature, which 
explicitly includes the use of options on futures markets for risk 
management. As the model may not be solved analytically, and 
because linearized approximations of non-linear systems may obscure 
their properties, we rely upon numerical methods to investigate its 
cyclic and macro-economic properties (Ott, 1993). In the Literature 
Review, Chapter Two, we discussed the major features of 
contemporary business cycle models. W e  have given considerable 
space to business cycles models known as N e w  Keynesian. In 
Chapter Three, we discuss in depth the features and properties of 
N e w  Keynesian models having a financial constraint and financial 
market imperfection model. Our primary emphasis will be upon 
business cycle models which incorporate credit market imperfections 
and financial constraints, to model the role of money or capital.
3.1 NK Models having Credit Market Imperfections
The risks arising from many economic events and trends facing 
economic agents, may not be risk m anaged through the use of 
derivative hedging schemes. Examples of wrong products and wrong 
markets abound. Several authors have considered the implications 
of being able to hedge the erratic expectations arising from levels of 
GNP, inflation, or growth in specific markets (Haar 1993, Schiller 
1993, 1995). In contrast, the world's financial markets offer 
derivatives products connected to virtually all traded securities,
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both assets and liabilities, including foreign exchange markets, 
commodity markets, bills and bonds, share prices, credit to mention 
but a few. For example, at the company level, hedging the interest 
rate exposure on a floating rate source of funds, or the foreign 
exchange revenue from a foreign investment are c o m m o n  fair. If 
such efforts are beneficial at the company level and whether they 
have macro and macro-dynamic implications remains to be seen.
To address the question at the business cycle level whether, 
hedging by economic agents has macro effects such as generating 
positive externalities, w e  turn to a class of N e w  Keynesian models 
which explicitly include a financial market component. In these 
models, phenomena such as erratic expectations, frictions, 
constraints, and returns with regard to sources of capital are both the 
sources of perturbations and result in modifications to the laws of 
motion for economic cycles. As the dynamic properties of such 
models may not be learned analytically, we develop and specify such 
a model and use calibrated simulation to learn its properties. The 
simulations we use to establish a reference frame with which to 
compare aggregate dynamic performance if risk management were 
included, functionally specified, and modeled. Such N e w  Keynesian 
models are appealing for they include both a financial constraint along 
with a form of financial market imperfection, both of which might be 
effected through the use of derivatives. To appreciate the 
foundations upon which we build our analysis, w e  begin our 
discussion by considering two classes of N e w  Keynesian business 
cycle models, using the classical dynamics schema found in Chapter 
Two. This approach will allow us to look at their structure in some 
depth.
N e w  Keynesian Business Cycles Models with credit market 
imperfections originate from a set of stylized facts which we will 
illustrate with some examples. The stylized facts behind this field of 
research include the asymmetrical information between borrowers and
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lenders; the asymmetrical effect of interest rate changes upon the 
quality of borrowers; whether and to what extent financial capital is 
rationed by price or quantity; the difficulty which lenders have in 
monitoring borrowers after credit has been extended; and the 
practical limits to writing financial contracts which are tied to real 
performance (such as return on equity or return on assets or return on 
sales) rather than rates of interest, which may or may not be risk 
adjusted, tied to fixed amounts of capital.
As sources of business cycle perturbation, such models stand 
in marked contrast to models found in the real business cycle 
literature. In NK models, there is a break-down in classical duality, 
reversing the direction of causation between real markets and 
financial markets. One approach is the so-called financial accelerator, 
where information imperfections in capital markets exacerbate 
business cycle fluctuations (Bernanke, Gertler, & Gilchrist, 1994). In 
the model on which our research is based, the credit market 
imperfection arises from the de facto lending contract, specified in 
nominal amounts and at nominal rates of interest, set at a contracted 
rate rather than being tied to performance. Borrowing in the face of 
uncertain return on sales and investment, leads to possible 
insolvency. Thus financial phenomenon produce real side effects, 
which is a marked departure from the financial structure irrelevancy 
found in the Modigliani-Miller theorem and Neo-Classical duality.
H o w  credit market imperfection models of the business cycle 
lead to aggregate demand and supply instability, will now be 
considered. Our concern is how imperfections, as means of 
perturbation, works its way into having macro economic effects, that 
is how it is propagated, and thereby modify an economy's laws of 
motion, such as changing the periodicity of cycles. In this respect, 
credit market imperfection models, exhibit either of two approaches 
regarding propagation: i) The role of financial markets in affecting 
aggregate supply and demand through the monetary transmission
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mechanism; and ii) whether the effect of lending markets is felt 
through credit rationing or through higher interest rates. The model 
on which our research is based relies upon the former as well as the 
latter, both of which will be discussed below in order to place the 
research in context.
The monetary transmission mechanism as a means of 
propagation of credit market imperfections has been fairly well- 
explored in the NK literature. On the first approach, Fama (1985) and 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) challenge the traditional Neo-Classical 
IS-LM view in which higher interest rates induce consumers and firms 
to reduce their investments and purchases: Debt capital is rationed 
by price. In such literature by contrast, contractionary economic 
policy, selling government bonds to the public, for example, not only 
raises interest rates but m ay influence the tendency of banks to lend 
by reducing the quality of bank reserves. Such phenomenon may be 
described as a sort of reverse  incom e or giffen g o o d  e f fe c t ’, banks 
lend more to compensate for the decline in loan demand, producing 
a moral hazard. Moreover, if information on credit market conditions 
is imperfect, other lenders may not be able to off-set this lending 
shortfall. Such models are at variance with classical duality, as they 
have causation running from the financial side to the real side of the 
economy, rather than the latter being a reflection of the former. This 
direct effect upon banks leads to reduced credit, which in turn leads 
to real effects through investment. The impact upon financial 
intermediation is also examined by Diamond and Boyd (1984), 
Prescott and Boyd (1986). McCulloch (1975) suggested that 
financial m is-interm ediation, that is mis-matching the tenor of assets 
and liabilities by the banking system, (for example, lending long and 
borrowing short), causes uncertainty about nominal interest rates, 
misdirecting investment decisions in the real sector.
Turning to the second area, that is credit rationing, w e  find a 
contractionary economic policy leading to credit rationing, as shown
5 7
in the models of Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981). Capital is not rationed by the price mechanism, the rate of 
interest, but rather through availability. Mankiw (1986) and Blinder
(1987) also demonstrate the role of rationing in affecting the lending 
process. Empirical research by Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein
(1988) and Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) finds support for 
these microeconomic effects of credit rationing at an aggregate level. 
The implications of capital rationing we expand upon our in research, 
where a constraint on the availability of equity leads firms to borrow, 
often sub-economically.
Focusing upon the concept of dichotomy in credit market 
imperfection models of business cycles, for example involving a 
constraint on the availability of new equity, reveals a fair amount 
about the method their of propagation. Classical dichotomy rests 
upon the tenet that purely nominal changes cannot have real effects. 
Classicism and N e w  Classicism postulate that the economic decisions 
of firms and consumers with respect to consumption, saving, and 
investment, are the result of real factors. In N e w  Keynesian Credit 
Market Imperfection Models, dichotomy is violated and second order 
effects are insufficient to influence optimizing behavior.
In the relationship between financial markets and their method 
of propagation, Credit Market Imperfection Models are distinguished 
from other schools of thought in their rejection of Neo-classical 
dichotomy. The standard approach of the finance literature has been 
to analyze an economy where production and investment decisions 
are separated from financing decisions, and then to determine the 
impact, if any, that alternative financial structures will have upon firm 
valuation, and ultimately aggregate activity. Known as the F ish er 's  
Separation Theorem in Capital Market and Structure Theory, it 
precludes any interaction between real and financial magnitudes, as 
would be found in garden variety classical economics (I.Fisher, 1930). 
For any given set of operating decisions, the equilibrium total market
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value of any firm, is unaffected by its financing decision. Moreover, 
according to the Theorem, the firms financing decisions have no 
effects on either the wealth or the capital market opportunities of its 
securities holders. The Theorem holds that the optimal operating 
decisions of firms are not dependent upon financing decisions, 
(Arrow, 1964). A  firm's financing decisions have no effect on its 
total market value, (Debreu, 1959). Operating and financing 
decisions are, separable. In the classical paradigm, financial markets 
merely reflect the operating efficiency, the state of technology and 
nature facing the firm. The economy may dichotomized.
in NK Credit Market Imperfection Models of business cycles, 
the Fisher's Separation Theorem is rejected. Rejecting dichotomy 
means that initial disturbances are propagated from financial markets 
to real markets. In Credit Market Imperfections models, dichotomy 
is turned on its head: Financial market problems are the source and 
means of propagation and not merely the reflection of the real world. 
They are both the perturbations which lead to aggregate demand and 
supply effects, and the means through which such effects spread-out. 
For example, in some models, in response to monetary and real 
shocks, capital markets initiate supply adjustments in the product and 
asset market while financial contracts constrain and shape supply 
adjustments in product and financial markets.
in many NK Credit Market Imperfections Models of Business 
Cycles the rejection of classical dichotomy is the means of 
propagation leading to aggregate demand and supply effects. 
Rejecting dichotomy, credit market imperfections in the form of 
financial constraints lead to real disturbances. The propagation 
mechanism behind this phenomenon assumes that second order 
effects are insufficient incentive for a firm to adjust its behaviour in 
the face of, for example, a shift in aggregate demand (page 48, 
Krainer, 1992). In NK models using credit market imperfections, 
bankruptcy monitoring costs or asymmetric information on the quality
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of the loan may induce a lender to reduce or restrict the quantity of 
credit, to limit adverse selection, which when combined with limited 
access to self-finance may increase the probability of bankruptcy 
{page 144, Benassi, et al. 1995). In another model, credit markets 
and aggregate demand, for example, may be affected by the fact that 
loan contracts are generally written in nominal terms, in which case 
nominal events may have real effects, as appears in the models of 
Farmer (1984) and Gertler (1988). Shocks which initially might have 
reduced output or redistributed wealth between lenders and 
borrowers, diminishes the allocative efficiency of credit markets. In 
models as Bernanke (1983), Bernake and Gertler (1989), Greenwald 
and Stiglitz (1988), and Williamson (1987) have shown how financial 
market imperfections can magnify the effects of disturbances 
introducing new propagation mechanisms. In Mankiw (1986), 
changes in nominal interest rates alter the riskiness of the pool of 
borrowers. The social surplus of credit markets might be a 
discontinuous function of interest rates, so that if rates change, a 
formally efficient market might vanish. All these models, are 
examples of reversed dichotomy where financial markets are the 
source of perturbation and the means of propagation leading to 
aggregate cyclic disturbances. Al! of these NK credit market 
imperfection and capital rationing models contradict "...the basic 
tenet of the Modigliani-Milier (hereafter, M M) theorem, according to 
which the balance sheet of the decision maker is immaterial to his 
profit (or utility) maximizing choices." (page 154, Benassi, et al., 
1995). Moreover they do not attempt to reconcile their findings with 
the conditions under M M  theory in which capital structure may have 
output effects.
Support for the view that credit market imperfections have 
macroeconomic effects has been investigated at the empirical level. 
Friedman (1983, 1986) finding a high correlation between aggregate 
nominal measures of credit and real activity; while Wojnilower (1 980)
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and Eckstein and Sinai (1986) have investigated the role of credit 
disturbances in macro fluctuations using data since the Second World 
War. While the severity of the Great Depression, according to 
Bernanke (1983) was due to the downward shock to credit supply 
stemming from the increased riskiness of loans and the concern 
which banks had over maintaining sufficient liquidity in the event of 
unexpected withdrawals- runs. King (1983), Bernanke and Blinder
(1989) and Romer (1990) have investigated empirically the view that 
bank lending seems to have had little role in explaining macro 
fluctuations and cycles, leaving a role for rationing and credit market 
imperfections as the NK theorists believe. Their work supports the 
NK credit market imperfection perspective, and is contrary to the 
orthodox view that the demand for loans is responsive to interest 
rates and income levels. In their view there is no cyclic impact effect 
upon GNP from rate changes.
3.2 NK Models having a Financial Constraint
W e  have discussed the structures and logic found in NK credit 
market imperfection models. W e  have reviewed how by reversing 
duality, cycles may be both generated and propagated. Our own 
research into the significance of risk management upon business 
cycles involves both credit market imperfection models and an equity 
constraint models. Such models are interesting because h o w  loan 
contracts are specified, might have significance at the aggregate 
level, if the exposures accepted by the debtor, and the amount of 
capital and agreed return placed at risk by the creditor, were fixed or 
limited or could be modified. In addition to market imperfection 
models of business cycles, the use of risk management also concerns 
models involving what are known as financial constraints. In the 
model upon which our research is based, a financial constraint on the 
availability of equity figures strongly, because firms wishing to 
expand are forced to borrow when no more new equity may be
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raised, and debt capital has a special cost. In order to understand the 
derivation of our research, w e  will review the related literature.
Interest in the Financial Constraint as a component of NK 
research into credit market imperfections grew out of the general 
recognition that the budget constraint and Keynesian notions of 
liquidity preference lacked logical coherence, (see, Kohn, 1984).
To understand this perspective, we begin by recalling the traditional 
paradigm. In the macroeconomics found in the Keynesian- 
neoclassicai literature, each household owns a variety of assets which 
compose its total present wealth. Given the household's present 
wealth, the problem is how to allocate between cash and other 
assets. The desire to hold cash is a function of income and the rate 
of interest, and is known as the liquidity preferen ce  function. The 
financial sector in the Keynesian system could be specified and 
analysed in balance sheet terms, as stocks rather than flows. Among 
practitioners, the general view was that aggregative analysis of 
money supply and demand was adequately underpinned by Patinkin's 
(1956) integration of monetary and value theory. The budget side 
was considered sufficiently justified at the microeconomic level. 
Although other researchers attempted to round-out this paradigm, the 
general picture seemed sufficiently complete. For example, Tobin 
(1958) advanced this theory further by proposing that the demand for 
money is partly a result of the weaith-holder's desire to diversify their 
holdings.
Historically, dissatisfaction with the above outlook began with 
the finding of its logical shortcomings. Clower (1965, 1967), Hahn 
(1966, 1977, 1978 and 1980) and Tsiang (1966,1969,1977) 
maintained that because the role of money had not been given a 
formal expression, the normative and positive implications were 
specious. Thus, although the NK literature using the financial 
constraint is a relatively new improvement to the budget constraint 
school of thought, and it has antecedents dating back to Robertson
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(1948) and Tsiang (1948).3 Dissatisfaction with the liquidity 
preference function led to Clower's 1967 model proposing to replace 
the budget constraint with a general financial constraint, and thereby 
give more rigour to the liquidity preference schedule. What money 
actually did needed to be modeled explicitly. Clower's dichotomized 
budget constraint was designed to capture the role of money in 
enforcing budget constraints. The timing of his work was opportune. 
The Keynesian perspective that the endogenous logic of the economy 
was not perfectly self-coordinating had remained popular; while the 
view that business cycles were disequilibrium phenomenon, was 
gaining ascendency. Moreover, there was a growing dissatisfaction 
with loose aggregative specification. The financial constraint filled-in 
the picture. The work of Clower and others provided a structure for 
a new level of disequilibrium analysis. In combination with the four 
features common to other NK research, the use of financial 
constraints, provided an additional logical pillar for NK research.
Some recent applications of models using the financial 
constraint will illustrate its usefulness as well as show how the 
features common to other NK models are quite intact. A paper by 
Howitt (1988), is a good example of this sort of research. In his 
model, inflation has real effects through the timing and coordination 
of transactions. In his model, because goods in inventory and money, 
are held, the effects of inflation are complex. For example, agents 
w h o m  he terms middle m en , because of perfect access to finance, 
are not affected by inflation, while other agents are. The differing 
effects of the financial constraint leads to individual and social 
optimums diverging, with implications for the conduct of monetary 
policy, and our earlier aggregative externality theme. In an article by 
Aoki and Leijonhufvud (1988), the micro foundations for investment
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3S ee ,  t h e  s u r v e y  by Kohn (1981,  1984) a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  d e f e n s e  
o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  c o n s t r a i n t  on a g g r e g a t e  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  i n  Kohn  
( 1 9 8 0 ) .
are modelled. In the model, because the firm typically lacks direct 
information on the rate of accumulation of capital by its competitors, 
future rental values of capital goods cannot be imputed. Hence it is 
unable to calculate its current demand price for additions to its capital 
stock. In Aoki and Leijonhufvud the information problem facing firms 
is solved through certain sets of microeconomic assumptions about 
behaviour.
The role of the financial constraint in NK research also has 
focused upon inflation when stabilization policies are anticipated. 
Drazen and Helpman (1985a, 1985b) used a model without labour 
supply, where different policy instruments have different inflation 
impacts. In Drazen and Helpman (1988) the model is extended to 
include an elastic labour supply, and the policy instruments of labour 
taxation and open market operations. They find, for example, that 
the anticipated method of taxation, for example, distortionary labour 
taxation versus lump-sum taxation, generates different inflation paths. 
Anticipated open market operations may also, in their model, lead to 
rising inflation. With inelastic interest elasticity of demand for money, 
stabilization using open market operations, leads to rising inflation, 
prior to the actual stabilization date; while labour tax stabilization prior 
to the actual stabilization date leads to declining inflation. This work 
of Howitt is extended by Kohn (1988) to include how money enters 
the economy, where he finds that different types of inflation have 
different redistributive effects, in the presence of financial 
constraints. First order effects occur in the Kohn model because 
second order partials with respect to inflation are assumed to be 
small. Again, we have reversed duality as a means of propagation 
combined with sub-optimality: Disturbances in financial markets lead 
to aggregate effects.
Another important area of NK business cycle financial 
constraint research uses the flow of funds approach. This approach 
emphasizes micro foundations and again takes the reversed duality
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approach found else where in the literature, that is phenomenon on 
the financial side of the economy may have real side effects. In a 
seminal piece by Tsiang (1982) with wider implications for non- 
classical macroeconomic and even monetary theory, the author 
adopts the flow approach, and discusses the implications for liquidity 
preference theory. To consider a core issue relating liquidity 
preference theory, Diamond (1988) develops a financial constraint 
model without money, but with credit. He proposes an endogenous 
Keynesian mechanism, in which the expectation of insufficient credit 
leads to an actual credit crunch with macroeconomic implications.
3.3 The Greenwaid-Stiglitz Imperfection and Constraint Model
Having explained and illustrated the lineage of NK credit market 
imperfection models and NK financial constraint models with their 
implications for both static and dynamic economic behaviour, we now 
look at one model in depth, as we propose to use its structure for 
modification in our own original research contribution. (We note that 
the model cannot be solved analytically, and hence in order to learn 
the implications of non-linearity for inter-temporal dynamics, it must 
be specified functionally and simulated, a task we leave to Chapter 
Four.) Our focus is upon the NK research of Greenwald and Stiglitz 
(hereafter GS) as appear in a series of related articles (1988, 1990, 
and 1993) all involving a financial constraint and a form of credit 
market imperfection. The financial constraint, in these models, 
concerns the availability of equity while the credit market imperfection 
is in the form of a de facto lending contract, at a interest rate not 
adjusted to the risk of default. In addition, there are several other 
features making it unique.
The set-up of the GS Models is fairly standard macroeconomic 
structure in which the main NK financial constraint modification is 
that instead of credit rationing, an equity constraint exists. Firms in 
their model are forced, therefore to borrow debt capital, and as inputs
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must be paid for before outputs are sold, the decision to produce 
represents an inherently risky investment decision. The use of 
borrowed working capita, therefore, involves a credit market 
imperfection in the form of informationally asymmetry. A  borrower 
might prefer the cost of funds to be tied to returns on sales or, if 
aware of the risks of default, might adjust to risk, the price of the 
loan. Since the cost of capital is not risk adjusted to price driven 
fluctuations in the market value of the firm, neither the borrower nor 
the lender can be sure whether the decision to borrow is a good idea. 
All the aforementioned GS articles have identical themes and similar 
structures, however the 1993 version is simpler and more elegant. 
It will therefore be the focus of discussion, as well as our po in t o f  
departure for our research and modelling efforts, although at times 
reference will be made to the Appendices of earlier article, as GS 
utilize them to justify various assertions and results found in the 
latter.
Placing the GS model in context, we begin by noting it has 
several direct antecedents. Such models use various forms of credit 
market imperfections and financial constraints to create macro 
disturbances and effects. The GS paper is similar to that of Bernanke 
and Gertler (1989), Fazzari, Flubbard and Peterson (1988) and 
Hubbard (1990), as well as the much older pieces by Lindbeck (1963) 
and Kuh and Meyer (1957). In some of these works, various 
measures of financial soundness play a role in determining 
investment. In Bernanke and Gertler (1989) a costly state verification 
model constrains the availability of new equity. By comparison, the 
GS model's approach to the equity constraint is generalized: Asking 
the question what are the properties of aggregate behaviour with risk 
averse firms facing an equity constraint? If firms are forced to 
borrow at a known cost but for an unknown future return, what are 
the macro implications? The GS model resembles the earlier literature 
on dividends, such as Lintner (1971) and Bhattacharya (1980) where
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the impact upon a firm's market valuation from reducing dividends is 
examined. Again classical duality is turned on its head, with financial 
decision making having real world implications, rather than being 
merely a reflection of operating efficiency and technology. This 
arrangement is also inconsistent with the financial structure 
irrelevance proposition found in the M M  literature.4 Whereas in 
other NK models, sub-optimal borrowing led to reduced dividends, 
lower market capitalization, and reduced aggregate supply; in the GS 
work, the mechanism involves aversion to bankruptcy because of the 
nature of externally generated capital. In the GS Model, as future 
output prices may be below a critical level, having borrowed working 
capital for an uncertain future return because of the equity constraint, 
dividend and wage commitments may lead to a sharp fall in equity 
reserves and output. Output prices below anticipated levels have 
aggregate supply effects, with cyclic propagation through sticky real 
wages and dividend payments, as paid for through borrowed working 
capital. The model's structures and assumptions as discussed below 
suggest several avenues of research. In particular, the observations 
about the GS Model suggest various ways in which it may be 
modified to our purposes. Our objective is to capture the realism of 
financial innovation, to answer, in particular what are the aggregate 
business cycle results, if any, of the use of risk management 
techniques, using futures, options, and other derivatives? H o w  would 
an economy behave if contingent assets were to available to manage 
the risks of lower than anticipated prices? Do any of the alleged 
benefits of managing risk have any macro-economic impacts? A 
critical and explicit assumption to the GS Model is that firms do not
6 7
4C o r p o r a t e  c o v e n a n t s  o f t e n  i n c l u d e  l i m i t a t i o n s  on t h e  amount  
o f  d e b t  i n  a c a p i t a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  t h e  r e a l i s m  o f  an e q u i t y  
c o n s t r a i n t  i s  d e b a t a b l e .  F o r  l e n d e r s  t o  p l a c e  l i m i t s  on th e  
amount o f  a d d i t i o n a l  g e a r i n g ,  i s  common p l a c e .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  
r e t u r n s  t o  e q u i t y  h o l d e r s  a r e  a d j u s t e d  f o r  r i s k  t h r o u g h  th e  
m ark e t  p l a c e .
have access to futures markets and therefore face an uncertain price 
in the future for investment/production decisions today (GS, page 79,
1993). Remember, because of credit market imperfections, loan 
contracts cannot be written to remove the risks inherent to 
production and future sales. Observations on the GS Model lead to 
several original innovations involving the use of derivative products 
for risk management. By modelling financial innovation of derivative 
markets, such as futures or options, in a NK Financial Constraint 
model, business cycle questions may be addressed. It wiil allow us
to consider sources of disturbances, methods of propagation, and the
>
iaws of motion of a business cycle modei which features these 
important changes in the structure of financial markets. W e  review 
the modei itself, and afterwards discuss various changes.
The GS Model (1993 version) begins with the aggregate supply 
side of the modei, and addresses the requirements for classical 
microeconomic system. With output as a function of labour alone,
g=<j> (1 ) , c|)/> 0, 4>//< 0
(3.1)
P=0)/(j)/
(3.2)
where uj is the nominal wage. Dividing both sides by price level P, we 
have the following definitions in real terms:
( S > / P - W
(3.3)
Using these definitions and equation 3.2, GS develop a competitive 
supply model:
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w/§' = Marginal Cost of Production 
l=w/$'=MC
(3.4)
At this point in their discussion, GS discount other Keynesian labour 
supply relationships in order to justify their new relationship between 
output, risk bearing, and the probability of bankruptcy. According to 
GS, other theories of the Keynesian labour supply function, assuming 
constant real wages in a recession, have neither empirical nor 
theoretical justification; their theory of aggregate supply does: Rising 
bankruptcy costs shift the aggregate supply leftward.
A  brief digression will bring these matters into focus. Recall, 
in the Classical Model:
N s-N{ w/p) tN'>o
(3.5)
and the supply of labour is an increasing function of the real wage 
(w/p), thus actual employment at the real wage N s, equals the actual 
employment N. Substituting N for Ns, yields
N=N{w/ p)
(3.6)
Whereas in the Keynesian System, the equation I\ls = N s(w/p) is 
eliminated, removing both a supply schedule and an equilibrium 
condition for the labour market. By appending the labour supply
function in a non-interactive manner, the Keynesian result that N < 
N s is produced, that is there is an excess supply of labour- 
unemployment. The Keynesian model also violates Walras' law as 
applied to flows: The excess aggregate demand for goods equals the 
sum of the excess supply of labour weighted by the real wage, 
holding assets constant. Turning to the GS Model, in their concave 
to the origin output function specified in equation 1, for labour 
supply levels of /, > l2, the marginal products of labour evaluated at 
/; exceeds the real wage evaluated at t2, respectively. This 
phenomenon occurs because of the continuity of the production 
function is such that with a sufficiently sharp fall in employment as 
resulting from a recession, the marginal productivity of labour exceeds 
the real wage. Although both the second derivatives of output with 
respect to labour, evaluated at /, and /2 respectively, are less than 
zero, they are not equal, as one would expect for small changes in / 
and with a sufficiently continuity in the production function. As the 
difference between /, and l2 goes to epsilon, the derivatives wil! be 
equal in the limit, approached from either direction.
<j>"(i2) -*<(>"(I , )  , 4. " ( i 1 )-<i)//(J2)
(3.7)
l i  *22 • 3-2
Such phenomenon as used in the GS model violate classical first order 
sufficiency condition for optimality that the value of the marginal 
product equals the wages for all inputs.
A key feature of the GS model is how firms respond to the 
threat of bankruptcy. In the GS Model, as firms produce more they 
are required to bear more risk in the form of bankruptcy (c t = cq t), 
and this perspective leads the authors to replace equation 3.3 with 
the following equation where M B C  represents the endogenously
7 0
determined marginal cost of bankruptcy (see Chapter Four, section 
4.3, for detailed discussion).
P= ((jb/<&/) +MBC
(3.8)
Dividing by P, equation 3.3 may be replaced with:
1 = iy/4>/+P
(3.9)
where w e  make p the real marginal cost of bankruptcy, and w  is the 
real wage. Given p and w, an equilibrium level of output of the firm 
may be determined. Including bankruptcy costs, we now have new 
first order marginal conditions: Production occurs at the level of
output where price equals marginal costs of production (including 
bankruptcy costs). According to GS, it is because of bankruptcy 
costs that the aggregate supply schedule shifts.
Using the above ground  rules, GS next develop the aggregate 
supply function from firm behaviour. The relationship between input 
decision making and output results are the heart of the model's 
dynamics. It is assumed that firms are identical, but are exposed to 
unique price shocks. They are indexed / = /, and decisions
occur over discrete time intervals t = T. It is assumed that at 
the beginning of each period, t, a given firm inherits both a nominal 
level of debt B / ,  and the output of the previous period q 't. v It is 
further assumed that there is a one period lag between paying and 
using inputs in production, and the production of output, which is key 
to understanding the model's dynamics: W e  have output gfy, only 
ready for sale at the beginning of period t, although the nominal debt, 
B t.u was incurred at the beginning of period t - 1 in order to pay for the 
inputs that were required for producing qit,1. All borrowed capital
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must be used to pay wages and dividends out of profits at time t 
which has already been stipulated in the previous period. When 
profits are strong, firms increase output, borrowing capital to pay for 
new workers, increasing real wages. An increased wage bill, 
combined with dividend commitments, however, when profits are 
below anticipated levels has persistent or knock-on effects. In the 
event that profits at time t are below what was anticipated at time t- 
1 when capital was borrowed to pay wages, it may produce a 
situation where higher wages lead to lower profits. With the 
stochastic treatment of net dividend distribution as specified by GS 
or with dividends either sticky-downward or at a fixed share of 
profits, the possibility is created for capital reserves of equity to be 
further affected and reduced.5 The reduced equity leads to a fall in 
output. A stylized diagram of the model's dynamics is shown in 
Figure 3.1, below:
Turning to the mechanics of firm behaviour, w e  note that 
associated with the borrowed working capital, the debt, is a nominal 
contractual rate of interest R t.1t which we note is indexed to the firm, 
although the GS model does not consider the possibility of different 
firms facing different rates of interest: All firms are identical and face 
the same working capital costs. Nominal contractual interest service 
on debt by i'th firm, would be:
(3.10) (1 +
For the i'th firm, the price of goods g ©  sold at time t, F t is randomly 
distributed with a distribution F and density function f, and 
determines the nominal equity of the firm. Profits are assets less 
liabilities and determine the nominal equity of the firm, A \ :
7 2
5As  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  i n  C h a p te r  Fou r ,  d i v i d e n d s  s h o u l d  
r e f l e c t  t h e  f i r m ' s  c o s t  o f  e q u i t y  c a p i t a l .  A d ju s t m e n t s  t o  t h e  
m ark e t  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  o f  f i r m s  i s  more l i k e l y  t o  o c c u r  t h r o u g h  
a d j u s t m e n t s  t o  th e  p r i c e  o f  a s h a r e  a t t a c h e d  t o  a d i v i d e n d  s t r e a m  
t h a n  t h r o u g h  changes  in  d i v i d e n d s  t h e m s e l v e s ,  b e c a u s e  o f  
s i g n a l l i n g  e f f e c t s  ( T . A. Marsh & R .C .M e r to n ,  1 9 8 7 ) .
(3.11)
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A 't =  F f f , ,  - (1 +
GS MODEL - STYLIZED DYNAMICS
H
Shifts in Aggregate Supply result 
from changes in risk of bankruptcy, 
and changes in internal funds, 
equity.
I
F i g u r e  3 .1  S t y l i z e d  Dynamics
Naturally, the greater equity the firm has, the more solvent it is, that 
is the smaller the probability of bankruptcy. When equity, A 't <  0, 
the firm is declared to be bankrupt. The condition for bankruptcy 
arises, when the level of debt service on working capital from the 
payment of wages, adjusted for net dividend distributions, exceeds 
the value of inventory produced from output. In the GS model, 
although firms are assumed identical, and we will further assume that 
at least initially have the same level of equity, the price shocks which 
they face over time, are random, and unique or firm specific. With 
the same level equity at time t, because of different price shocks at 
time t +  1, one firm may be bankrupt and another not. Some firms 
may be very profitable and others not. Inter-firm effects as might
arise from bankruptcy, however, are not considered in the GS modei, 
except to the extent that the net proceeds of bankrupt firm are 
assumed in the GS mode! to be distributed to creditors.6 Rounding 
out the basic set-up, it is assumed that firms face real wage w, as per 
equation 3.9, above. Firms may borrow as much as they want at the 
prevailing rate of interest, but at terms which must yield the lender an 
expected real rate of return rr Critically, it is not assumed that the 
cost of capital is in any way risk-adjusted to, for example, the firm's 
capital structure.
In the GS Model, the problem facing firm managers is one of 
one period static profit maximization.7 The ob jective  function has 
one instrumental variable, cft, which once workers are paid, leads to 
a level of debt B t, and a contractual nominal return B t, that firm / 
inherits at the beginning of period t +  1. The decision of how much 
working capital to borrow locks firms into a wage bill (paid for with 
borrowed working capital) and from whence the inter-temporal 
dynamic properties of the model originate, as discussed above and 
shown in Figure 3.1. It is assumed at least implicitly, that firms do 
not borrow for the purpose of creating reserves (Benassi, et al., page 
162, 1995). Given the equity constraint, initial conditions for state 
variable, the level of output determines a level of borrowing. With 
this set-up, GS now proceed to make the following sets of unique 
assumptions.
For assumption A1, we specify, following equation 1 above, 
but written in inverse notation, output is a function of labour alone, 
which GS assume is the same for ail firms:
7 4
6F o r  s i m u l a t i o n ,  a s  d i s c u s s e d  in  C h a p te r  F o u r ,  we w i l l  
assume t h a t  b a n k ru p t  f i r m s  a r e  r e f l o a t e d  a t  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  
a v e r a g e  l e v e l  o f  e q u i t y  o f  f i r m s  w h ich  a r e  s o l v e n t .
7U n d e r  c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  r i s k  a v e r s i o n ,  m u l t i -  
p e r i o d  o p t i m i z a t i o n ,  i t  may be  shown i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  
o p t i m i z a t i o n  w i t h  a s i n g l e  p e r i o d  t im e  h o r i z o n  (Fama, 1 9 7 0 ) .
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I t  =4> (<3Tt )
(3.12) 
where:
(3.13)
And, because of the inversion w e  have the following expressions for 
diminishing returns:
cj>/> o , 4>//=> o
(3.14)
For the next assumption, A2, we have the price level faced by an 
individual firm is determined by the firm specific random variable i / t 
and the overall price level P v thus:
(3 .1 5 )
and u\, the firm specific relative price of output of the i 'th firm, is 
identical and independently distributed with a distribution function F (),  
and density function f ( ). W e  note that the stochastic price shock 
faced by the ith firm is unique, although the distribution and density 
functions are not firm specific. Notwithstanding the firm specific 
price shock, in the GS model, firms are assumed implicitly to be 
identical in their technology of production. The initial levels of equity 
may vary, however, for simulation w e  will assume that they are 
identical.
For assumption A3, we note as above, if A ’t < 0, a given firm 
will go bankrupt, and their entire proceeds from the sale of
are disbursed to creditors, that is debt holders, without general 
equilibrium implications. (General equilibrium in the GS modei, as will 
explain, is in the labour market, not the credit market.)
A'further result, manipulating the above relates to the level of 
inherited nominal debt to nominal wage payments and the level of 
nominal equity. Thus we have,
Bt = P twt* i < l t ) - A £
(3.16)
Given assumptions, A2 and A3, the i'th firm will earn returns at time 
t +  1 according to the distribution on firm specific prices realized only 
when prices are revealed. Bankruptcy occurs when what firms have 
promised to pay exceeds their income. Using result of equation 4 and 
assumption A3, we have the following condition for bankruptcy:
(i +r £)b £ ;> p U q £
(3.17)
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N o w  if we substitute into equations 15 and 16, w e  have the 
following result for the ith firm:
Ai <; ( l + P t )  ( — L )
P t . ( ( wt4> ( q£) -  a£)
= v, JLp  i "qt
(3. 18)
w here, a't = A '/ P t , or the real equity ievel of firm / at the beginning 
of period t, and \/t+1 is the price threshold in period t +  1, at which the 
ith firm is just solvent, that is the level equity is positive. Depending 
upon the firm specific price realization in relation to this threshold, 
bankruptcy may occur.
A key feature of the GS Model is the effect upon firm 
behaviour which the possibility of insolvency leading to bankruptcy,
may have. Due to credit market imperfections, loan contracts are not 
written based upon returns to sales, but rather as a nominal rate of 
interest on an amount of borrowed working capital. (Moreover, as 
we will explore in Chapter Six, the cost of capital is not risk 
adjusted.) Thus returns to sales may be specified for both solvency 
and insolvency cases as the following, respectively, as returns to 
lenders. (We note, GS avoid making the general price level random, 
as opposed to firm specific prices, as a pointless complication.) With 
regard to the variability faced by decision makers in firm specific 
prices, P t+1, the model's dynamics lies. Remember, i / t = P / P t, and 
using equations 3.15 and 3.16 above, we have the following 
conditions for solvency and bankruptcy respectively: A  firm's total 
net income after dividends must equal or exceed debt obligations.
U +ij/W  - ± - )  = ( i + f l / j / J j i
t+i e+:
(3.19)
If, and only if,
ubi i  * vt+i
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Bankruptcy occurs however when,
(1 +Rti ) ( —  -
(3.20)
If, and only if,
u f  i  < v b+1
(3.21)
Using the price level neutrality assumption stated earlier, namely that,
(3.22) P t+1 = E (P t+1)
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w e  assume that the future price level is the expected price level, 
equations 3.17 and 3.18 may be modified to obtain the real rate of 
return to the ith lender in period t. It is assumed that lenders are 
perfectly informed and risk neutral, and are enjoined from purchasing 
equity in the ith firm. This result leads finally to the real rate of 
interest, rt. Assumption A4,
(3.23)
Using equations 3.7 and 3.11 can be solved for the equilibrium level 
of the contractual nominal interest rate R v and the solvency threshold 
i/,+ 7, as a function of cft/a't,w t,rt, and P /E (P t+1).
(3.25)
Substituting from equation 3.24 into F (u ), results in an expression for 
the probability of bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy occurs when the level of equity of the i'th firm including 
retained profits and the revenues from the sale of output are 
insufficient to satisfy the debt service or loan commitments. 
Throughout it is assumed that ioans are only serviced without 
amortization of principle, and borrowing does not occur to create 
reserves, as mentioned earlier.
Setting forth the optimization problem of the individual firm, 
involves the instrumental variable qfr Firms select output to
(3.24) Fft =  Fit(q 't,a 'v w t,rt+  1, P /E (P t+1)
Prob. of Bankruptcy = F \v£+1lq£, a t2, wt, -t~ -r , 1 + r  J
'  h ( P t+±) i
(3.26)
maximize expected real profits, which is composed of total sales 
revenues minus repayments to lenders, and minus an expected real 
cost of bankruptcy. Note, c 't is the cost incurred in the event of 
bankruptcy and F (v 't+1)  is its probability o f  occurring (as per page 88, 
GS). Thus, we have assumption A5, of firm level profit maximization:
s [ (p / * i >  qi-(l+R?) (Ptwc<M g / )  - A ei ) ] - c ti F ( y (ij.)
(3.27)
It should be noted that in order for firms to be averse to the risk of 
bankruptcy, the expression c /F  must be convex in output, cft. A  firm 
cannot "grow" its way out of the fear of bankruptcy. By assumption, 
risk aversion grows with size, the importance of which w e  n ow 
discuss.
An important assumption found in the GS model is that the 
cost of bankruptcy is an increasing function of the firm's level of 
output. The intuition is that larger firms produce larger output, and 
are therefore more expensive to administer in the event of 
bankruptcy. (The liquidation of General Motors on a percentage basis 
costs more than that of the corner green grocer.) Moreover, if 
bankruptcy costs were merely a fixed amount, firms could escape 
such threats by increasing sales and output to the point that such 
costs were nothing but a minor annoyance. Finally, since bankruptcy 
may occur when managers have selected a high level of output, q  
involving wage-bill commitments and because of economic 
contraction, realized prices next period are low; it underlies that 
conditions of insolvency in the GS model occur because of poor 
judgement or the inability to manage exposures. Thus, w e  have 
assumption A6,
(3.28) c\ = cq\
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Given assumptions A2 and A3, we can rewrite the objective function,
over the instrumental variable cft, assum ption 5, as equation 3.29. 
Maximizing over subscript i, w e  have:
8 0
Max
i
<Zt
<3Tt-(l + r t) (wt<b(q?) -af) -c/F(Vt+1)
(3.29)
in this expression, a firm's real output is a function of real wages, real 
interest rates, real equity holdings, and relative price uncertainty. GS 
now proceed to derive first order conditions for an interior maximum 
found in Equation 3.30.
1 -  ( l + r t) M > /=p £
(3.30)
(We note that no appeal is made to the Weierstrass Theorem for the 
sufficient conditions for such a maximum to be a global maximum.) 
In addition, the authors, solve the marginal bankruptcy costs of the 
ith firm in period t.
i dct \
{----- 7 F  +Kd q f 1 dqf J
(3.31)
For the second order conditions, GS refers the reader to the appendix 
of the 1988 paper in which they are derived.
3.4 Extending and Modifying the GS Model
In order to model and analyze whether the use of financial 
innovations in the form of derivatives, for the management of 
financial risk have macro-economic implications; the GS model must 
be extended and modified. W e  conclude Chapter Three by discussing 
these modifications from a conceptual standpoint. Our observations 
and proposals for modifying the GS Model as discussed above, relate 
to four areas.
1. H o w  to include futures or options upon futures markets in 
the Model so that their static and dynamic macro-economic 
effects may be assessed;
2. The micro-theoretic requirements for such a modifications 
to function;
3. Other changes to the GS model to enhance its realism; and
4. The dynamics of non-linearity and its simulation.
In order to include explicitly risk management into the GS model with 
a view to examining its macro implications, we adopt the arbitrage 
principle between futures markets and interest rates. W e  recall that 
in the GS Model, firms are forced to borrow because of the equity 
constraint but are unsure of what the return on future sales of output 
will be realized in next period. GS deliberately assume away futures 
markets on the grounds of transaction costs. The absence of futures 
markets implies that every output decision implies a risky investment 
decision, given the constraint on the availability of equity. The 
macroeconomic consequence of this arrangement is that the 
aggregate supply function, in addition to wages and prices, also 
depends upon the aggregate equity position of the firm. For example, 
firms with sufficient equity, avoid the risk of borrowing sub-optimally; 
while firms with insufficient equity, are forced to borrow and invest, 
not knowing what prices and thereby what returns will be realized.
81
Different equity levels determine different output paths, including 
ones with full-employment. The non-existence of futures markets or 
the inability to correctly forecast next periods output prices results in 
a form of aggregate externality in the form of supply mistakes, as 
mentioned earlier. The absence of futures markets in the GS model 
points to how the impact of futures markets upon macro variates 
might be analysed. Although w e  return to subject of alternative 
paradigms concerning futures markets in Chapter Five, in order to 
explain how futures markets and risk management may be 
incorporated in the GS Model, we provide some further theoretical 
background on futures markets.
A great deal has been written on whether Futures markets are 
efficient predictors of spot prices in the future, or whether futures 
market display a bias. Keynes argued that the risk premium was the 
source of bias and backwardation. Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1946) 
argued that the futures price would be less than the expected value 
of next period's cash price. They believed that backwardation was 
normal, that is the futures price will be at a discount to the expected 
next period cash price. This difference between the expected spot 
price and the future price available today, represents a risk premium, 
which the hedger pays to the speculator. Their observation implied 
that if not for the existence of risk premia, the futures price would be 
a good predictor of the expected spot price, (Anderson and Danthine 
(1983)). These theories may provide useful insight with regard to 
the risk premia, however they do not provide any economic insight 
into the relation between the spot price today and in the future, and 
the price quoted in the futures market. For example, futures prices 
for the same delivery specification change continuously. Can risk 
premia be continuously unstable? The market efficiency literature, 
has devoted reams to testing whether futures markets are efficient 
unbiased predictors of prices in the future (Bray, 1983). Although the 
Keynes-Hicks insurance paradigm of hedgers and speculators is
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appealing, alternative models of risk management have been 
proposed, as explained beiow. In Chapter Five we return to one such 
paradigm using inter-temporal asset allocation.
Other theories on the use of futures markets, such as portfolio 
approaches offer minimal insight of relevance to the risk management 
problem. Approaches, using Capital Asset Pricing Theory [eg. Sharpe 
(1964), Cummins (1983), or Main (1982)] or Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
[Ross (1976)] have also been applied to futures markets with little 
realism, Cho (1988). The basic problem with such approaches is that 
if futures market behave systemicaily vis-a-vis the market, 
diversification has no effect upon risk. Portfolio theory involves 
diversification against idiosyncratic risk. In contrast, Systemic risk 
cannot be diversified, only idiosyncratic risk. To argue that futures 
markets as a means of risk management always behave in a 
idiosyncratic manner in relation to the underlying markets, however, 
would find little support.
In contrast with the above schools of thought, viewing futures 
markets as a problem of intertemporal asset allocation provides the 
theoretical underpinnings we need to inform and advance our 
research. As discussed earlier, in the GS model, cyclic behaviour 
arises because of the inter-temporal asset allocation problem faced by 
firms. Regarding the relationship between spot prices and future 
prices, as an intertemporal asset allocation problem sheds 
considerable light upon the relationship between futures prices and 
interest rates. The work of William's The Econom ic Function o f  
Futures Markets (1994) addresses this question from a fresh 
perspective. Inspired by the work of Cox, ingersoll, and Ross (1981), 
Breeden (1979), Frenkel (1975), and the classic works of Brennan 
(1958) entitled, "The Supply of Storage", and Working (1948, 1949, 
1953a., 1953b.); Williams argues that the relationship between the 
current spot price and futures price, long or short, reflects an interest 
rate in commodity terms of the "borrowed" or "lent" position
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respectively. According to Williams, futures markets are a means of 
intertemporal asset allocation to ensure the good use of assets. It is 
neither a means of pricing and exchanging risk, akin to insurance, nor 
is it a means of portfolio diversification. Instead, the benefits of risk 
management arises because futures markets are a form of implicit 
loan markets, akin to Working's notion of the supply of storage. Seen 
as a means of allocating resources over time; the relationship 
between spot and near and distant futures markets prices may be 
used to create a yield curve and determine implied rates of interest. 
W e  see then that the William's paradigm of futures markets is of 
immediate relevance to the modelling the use of derivatives in the 
N e w  Keynesian setting of the GS model, as it will serve to explain the
inter-temporal dynamic effects thereby arising. If one viewed the use
/
of derivatives as a means of pricing and transferring risk, risk 
m anagem ent, as imagined by the many authors discussed above, it 
might follow that their use would be stabilizing at the macro 
economic level. In contrast, adopting the Williams paradigm that the 
use of derivatives concerns inter-temporal asset allocation, as w e  will 
see, is consistent with the inter-temporal dynamic effects generated 
in Chapter Five.
Turning to the details of the William's paradigm will help us 
consider how it may be implemented in the GS setting. Assuming no 
bias as risk premia, for example, a three month option on a futures 
contract expiring in six months time implies a rate of interest rate 
three months hence.8 in Williams' model, interest rates are
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8I f  a r i s k  p rem ia  do e x i s t ,  t h e  f u t u r e s  m a r k e t s  a r e  b i a s e d  
e s t i m a t e s  o f  s h o r t  te rm  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  The s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h i s  
b i a s  i s  f a v o u r i t e  a r e a  o f  r e s e a r c h :  F o r  e x a m p le ,  "The
Determinants of Hedging and Risk Premia in Commodity Futures 
Markets", H i r s h l e i f e r  (198 9) ; and "Macroeconomic Forces: 
Systematic Risk and Financial Variables: An Empirical
I n v e s t i g a t i o n Young, B e r r y ,  H a r v e y  and P ag e  ( 1 9 9 1 ) .  The v i e w  
among p r a c t i t i o n e r s  i s  t h a t  f u t u r e s  m a rk e t s  a r e  p r e d i c t o r s  o f  
s h o r t - t e r m  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  and n o t  b i a s e d  o r  o t h e r w i s e  p r e d i c t o r s  
o f  s p o t  o r  f u t u r e  s p o t  p r i c e s ,  ( S t i g u m ,  1981) w h ic h  a c c o r d s  w i t h
predictors of the equilibrium relationship between the spot and futures
price, and the value of a position today versus the value of position
"tomorrow", ceteris paribus, because futures markets represent an
implicit form of borrowing, implying rates of interest in terms of the
deliverable. Quoting Williams, (ibid, page 74, (1994)).
"A short hedging operation [selling forward], the spot purchase 
of a commodity and its simultaneous sale for future delivery, 
amounts to borrowing a commodity over an interval of time 
while lending money. Likewise, a typical long hedging 
operation is often in part an implicit forward loan of a
commodity   it follows that a futures market for a
commodity is primarily part of an implicit loan market for that 
commodity."
For example, a spot purchase and a short sale in a futures market, is 
an implicit loan for a commodity at the rate of interest /. Adhering to 
this paradigm, futures markets are a way of borrowing or lending 
positions, that is allocating assets on an intertemporal basis. For the 
i 'th firm, the relationship between the spot price at time t and the 
futures price available at time f, for delivery at time t+1, implies a 
commodity rate of interest, in the absence of risk premia (Williams,
1994). The "use" of a commodity like the use of money attracts a 
rate of interest on the commodity itself. If borrowed, the rate of 
interest represents h o w  much additional amounts of the commodity 
must be returned, and if lent how much additional commodity one 
can expect (Chapter 4, Williams, 1994).
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Where P ft is the future price at time t for deliver the next period and 
it is the rate of interest in commodity terms thereby implied. 
Similarly the decision to sell from output today versus promising to 
deliver via the futures market, may be conceptualized using the same
t h e  p a r a d i g m  ad v a n c e d  by  W i l l i a m s .
framework.
In the William's paradigm, the relationship between the cash 
and the futures market may be used to derive an implied Fischerian 
forward'rate and yield curve in commodity terms. Assuming no risk 
premia, by selling the cash position in the present, a firm could take 
the proceeds and invest it at the market rate, say r, or alternatively, 
the firm could sell in the next period via the futures market earning 
yield / on the commodity itself. If the forward rate exceeds the rate 
r, the firm will use the futures market; while if the implied forward 
rate is less than r, the firm will sell in the cash market now, and 
invest at r. In equilibrium, both strategies should be equally 
profitable, via the presence of arbitrage, implicitly, futures markets 
are a means of borrowing and lending, for example, commodities. By 
comparison, it is the presence of intertemporal arbitrage opportunities 
with discrete time lags and futures markets assumed away, however, 
which in the GS model figures strongly in its dynamics of 
insufficiently risk averse firms over-investing in working capital and 
driving-up real wages, and with certain dividend assumptions, driving 
equity down and eventually output, in the GS model the lag between 
when borrowing/investment decisions are made, combined with 
variability in firm specific prices affecting what returns on working 
capital are realized, including the possibility of bankruptcy, which 
together play a critical role in the model's dynamics. Adopting the 
William's paradigm, importantly, tells us why using derivatives as a 
means of inter-temporai asset allocation may have an effect upon the 
Laws of Motion found in a GS style model. Gains arise from the use 
derivatives through improved inter-temporal asset allocation, locking 
in the value of future production. Consistent with the William's 
paradigm, introducing options into the GS model improves inter­
temporal allocation, encouraging investment and output, and would, 
if a short-side of the market were modelled, eliminate opportunities 
for arbitrage. As wiil be shown through simulations of the G S  model,
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the use of derivatives allows firms to concentrate upon price 
relationships rather than the absolute level of prices.
The William's paradigm applied to understanding the GS Equity 
Constraint Model's provides insights with regard to critical questions 
as the impact upon aggregate cyclic behaviour of innovations, such 
as derivative markets. Incorporating the use of derivatives into the 
GS model may permit us to iearn the extent to which they may 
interact with the endogenous sources of cycles found in such models. 
In order to explain the results thereby arising, the William's paradigm 
w e  will see, provides useful insights. To address the general question 
of the significance of firm level financial factors upon business cycles 
and the specific question of the use of derivatives upon business 
cycles, w e  propose firstly to modify the GS model by including put 
options which may be used to obtain a minimum level of return on 
borrowed working capital. In outline, such options will be priced 
endogenously through the model using, inter alia, the cost of capital 
and the uncertainty in firm specific prices F f if j , without new 
exogenous assumptions required. The extent of usage of risk 
management will be endogenized based upon the relationship 
between the futures price versus cash price and the rate of interest, 
and variability in firm specific prices.
In accord with the William's paradigm that futures markets 
arise endogenously rather than being assumed into existence, and 
that their usage is an econom ic problem, we propose that the 
modifications to the GS model should be of the same spirit (Chapter 
6, Williams, 1994). In the actual GS Model, as mentioned, the 
existence of futures markets is assumed away. Capital markets are 
highly imperfect, and are limited to debt and equity securities with the 
latter constrained, but without state-contingent assets. Between the 
extremes of not existing and being completely available, w e  introduce 
options on futures markets into a version of the GS model, as a 
means of analysing the effects of such risk management practices
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upon business cycles. W e  have noted that in the GS model, the 
assumed absence of futures markets are a source of "mis-borrowing", 
and possible bankruptcy during economic down-turns, leading to 
dynamic aggregate output effects. In a modified version of the GS 
model, w e  propose making a supply of derivative products 
endogenous to the model and making their use a matter of economic 
decision making for the individual, optimizing firm.
The above theoretical structure, as outlined, for example, will 
allow us to ask what would be the business cycle effects if the ability 
to service borrowed working capital (because of the equity constraint) 
were ensured via options? Would the risk of bankruptcy be the same 
if borrowing, per se, did not increase the risk to book value from 
expanding market value through gearing? Would there be Aggregate 
Supply and dynamic effects from the use of derivatives priced 
according to underlying price variability and the cost of capital? The 
micro-theoretic requirements for such modifications of the GS model 
along the lines discussed are several-fold. Although we motivate 
them fully in Chapters Four and Five, we sketch them here for their 
relevance to conceptualizing the problem at hand, the business cycle 
implications of futures and options markets. In the GS model, the 
marginal cost of bankruptcy drives a wedge between traditional 
marginal cost and wages. Aversion to bankruptcy arises because of 
the variability surrounding firm specific prices, d t+ u that is Pit+ / P t and 
their relationship to the threshold level \/t+1. GS make the bankruptcy 
threshold level and hence the probability of bankruptcy a function of 
many parameters, about which there is little uncertainty. As w e  will 
explain in Chapter Four in depth, firm specific prices for which future 
output is sold is stochastic and for a given firm, its relationship to its 
specific threshold level determines when bankruptcy occurs. In the 
simulated version of the modified GS Model, we will also use the 
standard deviation for the stochastic process on firm specific prices 
in the pricing of options on futures used to manage the risks of
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investing in working capital. By specifying the modified GS model 
accordingly, its realism is enhanced, and thereby w e  make the 
provision of derivative usage endogenous to the modei. W e  do not 
assume perfect capital markets, willing futures markets into existence 
aiong with their use, but rather given variously endogenously 
determined parameters, we assume that if they are economic to use, 
a market exists. Lastly, with regard to the use of derivatives, w e 
invoke sm alf-country assumptions, that is with regard to the 
availability of risk management at the prevailing price, representative 
firms in the modified GS model face a horizontal supply of options 
with which to manage the value of future inventory.
Other changes to the GS model to enhance its realism concern 
the cost of capital and profit retention. As we will discover in 
Chapter Five, the use of derivatives for enhanced inter-temporal 
allocation of assets, "risk management", does indeed change the GS 
model's laws of motion, however, two key assumptions found therein 
may not be realistic. As mentioned earlier, it is common place in the 
NK literature, for example, Fama (1985) and Bernanke and Blinder
(1988) to challenge the traditional Neo-Classical IS-LM view, 
compatible with received Financial Theory, that higher interest rates 
induce consumers and firms to reduce their investments and 
purchases: Debt capital is rationed by price or the cost of capital is 
risk adjusted so that financial gearing does not change the firm's 
market capitalization. In Chapter Six, including risk management in 
the model, we consider the inter-temporal effects of replacing the 
assumption of a fixed cost of capital with one tied to the quality of 
credit, specifically the ratio of debt to equity. As we have observed, 
in the GS modei, capital structure is composed of debt and equity. 
Equity is constrained which leads to possibly sub-economic ex ante 
borrowing of working capital. Such behaviour implies a ratio of debt 
to equity, investigating the aggregate effects of rationing debt capital 
as well by price, according to the quality of credit, might be revealing.
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A  further modification to the model, which again may enhance its 
realism concerns dividend payments. GS avoid any modelling of 
dividend structure by merely assuming that it is theory neutral or 
stochastic. They only observe that dividend payments must be 
sufficiently so that the impact firm equity does not grow explosively 
(page 100, GS 1993). Overall, GS devote little attention to the 
implications of profit distribution. To rectify this limitation we and 
implement a version of the GS model as a simulation program, in 
which we assume that dividends are a fixed percentage of profits. 
Varying the fixed percentage of profits retained, we will learn has 
inter-temporal effects upon the model's dynamics. In the GS model 
we will see how both rigid real wages and dividend payments as fixed 
percentage of profits, sharply reduces internal capital, equity, leading 
to the dynamic swings in output. Like other aspects of the GS 
model, this effect is a key implicit assumption of their work. W e  note 
that it challenges received financial theory on the neutrality of 
dividends versus capital gains from the standpoint of effects upon 
valuation, ("D iv idend  Policy, Grow th , and the Valuation o f  S h a res ,"  
Miller & Modigliani, 1961) just as much as allowing capital structure 
to effect valuation. Arguably, by increasing debt to pay potential 
dividends, the model creates a bias favouring equity holders at the 
expense of debt holders. Although equity holders are keen to expand 
market value, the concern of bond holders is only to preserve book 
value. What if, however, dividend payment could adjust both up and 
down to the rate of change in profitability in a manner sensitive to the 
distinct incentives of debt and equity holders? Would valuation 
neutrality of dividend structure be restored? Recall, that it is because 
of the firm's commitment to a level of dividends, limiting profit 
retention, which reduces equity and which in turn, leads to a drop in 
output, and further cyclic phenomenon. W e  wonder whether it is 
realistic to believe that firm would endure bankruptcy to pay a 
dividend? Although incentives to expand market value exist, it is
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usually not with complete disregard of the risks to book value during 
economic contractions. (Although following Friedman's view of 
positive economics, a model should be evaluated on the utility of its 
insights,'and not its assumptions, when such assumptions challenge 
reality, it is may be useful to question their value and implications.) 
Enhancing valuation through reducing dividends in the manner 
described above so that they are not sticky downwards or so that 
they are valuation neutral, to the extent that it protects the firm's 
equity, might dampen any oscillations in output generated through the 
dynamic laws of motion described earlier. Such modifications to the 
fixed percentage approach and their implications we leave until 
Chapter Six.
The final aspect of modification to the GS style modei concerns 
simulation of its non-linear dynamics. Although using numerical 
simulation to examine the non-linear dynamics of the GS style model 
does not modify the model per se, it does change h o w  w e  learn about 
it. As mentioned in Chapter One and explained in detail below in 
Chapter Four, GS appeal to linearization around the steady-state in 
order to make analytic observations about the model's inter-temporal 
dynamic behaviour. For example, they claim that the modei exhibits 
multi-periodicity, that is repeated observations above or below the 
steady-state, the 45° line in logistic space, resembling business 
cycles, although this claim based upon qualitative analysis is difficult 
to substantiate. As w e  justify in Chapter Four, linearization as GS 
utilize, rather than being a helpful technique, obscures much of the 
model's rich dynamics, including period doubling bifurcations, multi­
periodicity, aperiodicity, and extreme sensitivity to initial parameter 
values, that is chaos. Through calibration, numerical simulation, w e  
discover, also reveals that certain initial parameter values must 
exceed certain minimum values in order for the model to cycle, rather 
than follow a monotonic trajectory. According to many authorities, 
since analysis of even the most simple first-order difference and
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differential equations is generally not possible, numerical simulation 
is the only choice {Ott, 1993 or Baker &  Gollub, 1990). In order to 
understand the non-linear dynamics of the explicitly specified GS style 
model, with and without the management of risk, numerical 
simulation is utilized in both Chapters Four and Five.
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CHAPTER FOUR. SPECIFICATION A N D  SIMULATION OF THE GS 
STYLE M O D E L
4.0 Introduction
In Chapter Four, we explain our approach to specification and 
computer based simulation of a N e w  Keynesian macroeconomic 
model based upon the articles of Greenwald and Stiglitz (hereafter, 
"GS") (1988, 1993). The heuristic relationships found in their 1988 
and 1993 articles form the basis for the functional forms and 
algorithms developed in the computer simulation program. They are 
consistent with the class of financial market imperfection and 
financial constraint models of which the GS work is an example. 
Using the specified functional forms, as embedded within a software 
program, various simulations will be conducted which verify the 
propositions found in the GS article along with the financial constraint 
and imperfection aspects. The computer based model uses an 
optimization algorithm, to obtain partial equilibrium at the firm level, 
general equilibrium at the aggregate level, and a dynamic output 
trajectory, using the techniques of phase diagrams and simulation. 
Further simulations showing the nature of competitive equilibrium and 
dynamic behaviour wilt also be conducted, establishing the functional 
forms and algorithms used as a valid representation of a G S  style 
model. W e  conclude with various experiments to analyze the 
sensitivity of the output trajectory to changes in exogenous variables.
Before these tasks, we provide some justification of and 
background to computer simulation. There are situations when 
computer simulation of economic systems has an advantage over 
analysis of reduced form equations, particularly those arising from 
non-linear systems as found in the class of models of the GS model. 
Simulation allows us to learn how the model behaves when an 
analytic solution (i.e. the algebraic reduced form of the structured 
equations) is difficult to find or analyze from the standpoint of how 
changes in exogenous variables effect dependent variables over time
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(Ott, 1993}. In addition, when non-linearities feature in dynamic 
relationships, analysis may be impossible (page 662, Hoy, Livernoise, 
McKenna and Rees, 1996). Constraints involving inequalities may also 
make direct analysis difficult. By using a simulation program, w e  may 
improve our understanding of the dynamic behaviour of systems such 
as those involving a non-linear difference equation model as found in 
the model developed by GS. Further, simulation allows us to calibrate 
the model, to answer the question of whether plausible values for 
exogenous parameters generate fluctuations economic output 
variables resembling reality.
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BASIC MODEL
INPUTS
R=rate of interest
P -  time specific
price level.
W^wage level.
B-Alum's required
borrowing.
A-A firm’s level of
equity.
M-A firm's rate of
profit retention.
ADDITIONAL
MODEL INPUTS
initial Level of
Equity
initial D/E Ratio.
Expected vabe of
future prices.
Variance of future
prices.
Production
function
technology
MODULE!
Firm Level Optimization 
Programme
MODULE II
Competitive Equilibrium 
AS ■ AD Programme
FIRM LEVEL CHJPUnrS
•Revenues
■Costs
•Profits
-Optimal Production 
•Retained Profits 
•Solvency/Bankruptcy Status
AGGREGATE OUTPUT 
AND PRICE LEVEL
DYNAMIC OUTPUT PATH
-Stability 
-Convergence 
•Persistence 
•Perturbation 
-Laws of Motion 
-Dynamic Equilibrium
E x h i b i t  4 . 1 .  S t y l i z e d  P r o g r a m  F l o w  C h a r t
4.1 Program Design
Turning to the design of the computer program used in
simulation of a GS style model, it has been written using spread-sheet
software. To specify the GS Model as an economic system suitable
for simulation, we begin by noting the general top-down structure, as
shown in Exhibit 4.1, above. Inputs appear in two different boxes.
The ones at the top of the diagram refer to those required by the GS
Modei as published, and are denoted Basic Model Inputs. Such input
variables are exogenous to the modei, and represent the sources of
system perturbations. W e  describe both Basic and Additional Modei
Inputs in Exhibit 4.2, beiow, noting that simulations may be
performed modifying one or more related set of parameters:
__________________________ Exhibit 4.2___________________________
Basic Model Inputs
• A contractual rate of interest: Nominal: Rt; real: rt = R /P ,
• Household rate of time discount 8 which equals rt;
• A  contractual wage rate at time t, w t\
• An initial level of equity for the i'th firm, A f , real a't — A '/ P t;
• A profit retention variable, M r+/, at time 7, for the i 'th  
firm, as new equity, net of distributions; real: m 't+ i = M {t+J/ / P t)
Additional Modei Inputs -
• A  price level at time t, Pv and at t +  1 P t+1]
• A firm specific price received, at time t, P [;
•The ratio of firm specific price increase
to the general price level, P t+1/P t ~  u'\
•The standard deviation in the stochastic process on firm 
specific prices, a;
•The distribution function and density function, respectively, 
associated with the stochastic process on firm specific prices: 
F (i i t) ;  ffu'J;
• An implied ratio of debt to equity, b fja j, given an initial level 
of equity for the i'th firm, a {;
• Production function technology coefficient, k;
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Throughout, the superscript / refers to the i'th firm. It is assumed for 
simulation that the population of firms equals twenty-five. Firms 
which retain all their profits may increase their level of equity, while 
firms which distribute all their earnings, may maintain a constant level 
of equity, unless reduced by financial obligations. The revenues and 
hence the profits of individual firms are effected by firm specific 
prices which are assumed to be normally distributed.
The second set of inputs, as shown in Exhibit 4.2, denoted 
Additional Model Inputs, represent other exogenous variables which 
are used in the simulation program to incorporate various creative 
modifications to the GS style model, and allow for the generation of 
other useful experiments, as well as validation of the unproven 
observations and Propositions found in their article. Their 
corresponding variable names also appear in Exhibit 4.2. Like Basic 
Model Inputs, they feature in the model as sources of perturbation, 
some of which affect the model's law of motion, such as periodicity. 
By assumption, the model is calibrated to inputs, both Basic inputs  
and Additional inputs, which are either specified as annual rates, such 
as the annual real rate of interest, rv ex ante expected firm specific 
price increases P t+ j / P t -  u 't+ u or, are empirically realistic, such as the 
ratio of debt to equity. The real rate of interest rt which is set equal 
to 6, the consumer rate of time discount, which is not subscripted on 
time, hence making r, constant over time. The program has been 
designed so that such perturbations as exogenous inputs may be used 
selectively and individually: Unless one decides to conduct an
experiment using such exogenous variables, the program uses a 
default value. If, however, one adjusts such input parameters, as 
exogenous inputs, new sets of dynamic output solutions will be 
generated.
The dynamic economic system specified and modelled in the 
program encompasses all three of the Modules appearing in the 
middle of Exhibit 4.1. W e  have Module I which solves the firm level
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optimization problem given the various input parameters mentioned 
earlier. In Module ll the model solves for a general equilibrium in 
labour input space, using the aggregate supply schedule generated 
from the rising portion of the marginal cost curves found in Module 
I, to determine an aggregate demand for labour function. Equating the 
aggregate demand schedule with the aggregate supply of labour, we 
solve for equilibrium in wages and labour input. Lastly, w e  have 
Module ill which performs dynamic analysis as suggested in the GS 
article, through constructing a non-linear phase diagram, computing 
its slopes, and solving for iterative solutions. Using Module III, w e  
show h o w  changes in exogenous initial conditions impact the 
dynamic trajectory of equity and output over time. W e  note that the 
results from Module II are required to generate solutions for Module 
III, and similarly, the results of Module I are required for Module II. 
The outputs of the first and second modules, may be considered for 
their static results, confirming through numerical simulation behaviour 
that the stylized features of the GS Model have been reproduced.
The right hand side of Exhibit 4.1 shows the various outputs 
generated by the software programme. Proceeding from the top to 
bottom, w e  find the box labelled, Firm Level Outputs, which are the 
results of the firm level optimization problem found in Module I. W e  
have for the i'th firm, revenues, costs, profits, optimal production, 
retained profits, and its solvency versus bankruptcy status. Moving 
down, w e  have the second box, labelled Aggregate Output and Price 
Level. Through the solutions found in Module II, an aggregate level 
of output and prices are generated, along with the implied aggregate 
demand and supply of labour. As per the GS Model (page 94, 1993), 
aggregate equity and output are obtained by summation from the 
individual firms. Flaving in each period a certain proportion of the 
assumed population of twenty-five firms become insolvent would 
imply that eventually, all the firms would disappear because there is 
no process in the GS model for the creation of new firms. W e  adopt
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the convention of re-floating firms which are bankrupt at the average 
level of equity of the remaining firms. Lastly, w e  have outputs found 
in the box labelled, Dynamic Output Path. Here the results of 
dynamic solutions for the level of equity, output, and prices appear. 
Further, the nature of these solutions are described by their qualities, 
such as stability, convergence, and general laws of motion. A  listing 
of all specified functional forms used for simulation and the 
corresponding general formulation as appears in the GS article, is 
found in Appendix 1.
4.2 The Production and Revenue Functions
In this Section we describe the output and revenue 
relationships found in the Firm Level Optimization Program of Module 
I. W e  will explain what is presented in the GS Article, h o w  it has 
been expressed as a functional form in the program, and h ow the 
algorithms found in Module I make use of it. In addition, w e  will 
introduce features for the adopted functional form, not required by 
GS, but which makes validation of one of their resu/ts possible as 
well as allowing for various experiments and simulations.
The problem facing a modeller in selecting specific functional 
forms to capture the general ones found in an article such as that by 
GS is that a loss in generality may arise as such features give rise to 
unique behaviour, begging the question of to what extent the spirit 
of a model has been captured. An answer to this question cannot be 
objective. In specifying these functional forms we have sought to 
satisfy the requirements of the GS model along with meeting the 
requirements of economic theory. W e  begin with the GS production 
and revenue functions, whereafter we explain their use in the 
program.
GS assume that aggregate output q is a function of labour / 
alone, and define it accordingly:
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(4.1)
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The partial derivatives of their general function obey classical 
economic theory. W e  note that they have specified that their general 
function with only one argument, labour. By specifying their equation 
accordingly, GS have ruled-out consideration of factor shares and 
factor substitution, as would be found, for example in a CES 
production function. The specific functional form which w e  have 
selected to represent 4.1, to map from labour input space to output 
space, is logarithmic. For the i 'th firm at time t, w e  have the 
following specified functional form, which like the GS general form 
has only one argument, labour, although a parameter for the 
productivity of technology k, as we explain, has been added. The 
specified form obeys the signs required of the partial derivatives:
q R L n d g )
(4.2)
Moreover, as required by the Model, it is convex. An additional 
reason for specifying this functional form is that the GS Model 
requires that the cost function be inversely related to the production 
function, making labour a function of output, inverting a logarithmic 
function into one obeying the requirements of the cost function (as 
discussed in 4.3) is easy. Like the GS model, we note that the 
production function has no parameters for distribution, as there is 
only one input to production, labour, and consequently, no parameter 
for the elasticity of substitution.
Although not included in the GS article, we have introduced a 
technology coefficient (the degree /< in equation 4.2) to parameterize 
the productivity of labour. In addition to allowing us to make 
experiments of the effects of change in productivity upon dynamics,
the coefficient is useful to validate the assertion by GS of when 
cycles occur. The technology coefficient is similar to the parameter 
found in a Cobb-Douglas Production function or CES function.1 As 
the production function has only one input, labour, the level of 
productivity corresponds to an output per man-hour, although this is 
not reflected in the wage level, w .2 The degree of the production 
function, k, may be set as a constant of any value. Experiments 
showing the effect of changes in k upon the output trajectory appear 
in Figures 32 and 33, at the end of the chapter. This degree 
coefficient serves to represent the state of technology of an 
economy, which determines productivity of labour. Throughout all 
simulations it is constant and non-random making it distinct from the 
Kydland & Prescott (1982) style random tech n ology  shock approach, 
as appears in the literature (eg. M.O.Ravin, 1997).)
With the production function specified, formulation of the 
revenue function is a straightforward matter, and follows the P t+1q t' 
expression found in the GS article. Thus the specific revenue 
function found in the computer simulation program is the following:
Revenue = Pt+i*Qt
(4.3)
Using the production and revenue functional forms to generate a 
revenue curve, as required by Module I, for a given level of 
technology coefficient (for example, degree 5) and set of prices, at a 
single time t, for the i 'th firm, involves the construction of a simple 
algorithm. Using a schedule of labour inputs, the corresponding level 
of output, q, and the corresponding level of revenue is computed.
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*We s p e c i f y  t e c h n o l o g y  a s  t h e  power  t o  w h ic h  t h e  one  
p a r a m e t e r  1 i s  r a i s e d ;  u n l i k e  t h e  CES o r  C o b b - D o u g l a s  p r o d u c t i o n  
f u n c t i o n s  where  c a p i t a l  i s  i n c l u d e d  and a d j u s t e d  by  a p o w e r .
2The m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t  d o e s  n o t  determine  t h e  f a c t o r  incom e.  
F a c t o r  income i s  d e t e r m in e d  by  t h e  value o f  t h e  m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t  
t h r o u g h  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  s u p p l y  and demand.
Plots of revenue functions, for a given set of prices and technology 
appears in Figure 2, seen below. As may be observed the explicit 
revenue function, along with other functions which w e  develop 
below,
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FIRM LEVEL PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
I'tti Firm. Period t+1
F i g u r e  2: C o s t ,  Revenue and
P r o f i t  F u n c t io n s  f o r  g i v e n  
I n t e r e s t  R a t e s ,  P r i c e s ,
T e c h n o lo g y
obeys the requirements of the GS Model as specified in the partial 
derivatives, and displays concavity. Having explained the 
specification of the production and revenue functions found in the GS 
model, we turn to the cost function, which is key to the financial 
constraint and financial market imperfections found in the GS model.
4.3 The Cost Function
It is within the specification of the cost function, in particular 
the inclusion of a cost of bankruptcy, that the unique properties found 
in the GS Model derive. GS have added to a classical style cost 
function involving borrowed working capital, a feature to represent 
the behaviour of firms when a possibility of bankruptcy exists. This 
property gives the model its unique dynamic behaviour as well as sets 
the stage for our modifications of it. W e  divide our discussion of
explaining and specifying the GS cost function as a simulation 
program, into three sections: W e  first look at the basic cost related 
to borrowing working capital, thereafter w e  turn to the inclusion of 
expected costs of bankruptcy parameters, making observations on its 
functionality, and lastly we conclude with the specification as 
developed and calibrated in the computer simulation program.3 
Throughout, our approach is to work within the requirements of the 
GS model in combination with received economic theory in order to 
specify explicit relationships suitable for calibration and numerical 
simulation.
W e  begin by explaining the derivation of the GS cost function 
at an abstract level. The justification for deriving a cost function from 
a production function, as GS do, is found in the Theory of Duality 
between Cost and Technology functions. Since the technology of 
production, firstly, is regular (closed and non-empty) and; secondly, 
since it is monotonic; the construction of a cost function from a 
production function is a valid exercise (Varian, 1992). In this light, 
the cost function found in the GS Model is derived from expression
4.1 found above. Using w  for real wage, the marginal cost of 
production in real terms is defined as:
w/ = MC  of Production
(4.4)
Applying the concept of duality, we explain h o w  the cost 
function including the arguments for expected cost of bankruptcy 
may be developed and specified. Referring first to h o w  GS have 
presented their objective function, in general form, in expression 4.5
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3 A l t h o u g h  G S ' s  i n t e r e s t  i s  i n  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  i n v e s t m e n t  
u n c e r t a i n t y  upon t h e  dynamic t r a j e c t o r y  o f  a g g r e g a t e  o u t p u t ,  f rom  
a m i c r o - t h e o r e t i c  s t a n d p o i n t ,  l i t t l e  h e r e  i s  new: R e s e a r c h  i n t o  
t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  r i s k  upon f i r m  b e h a v i o u r  i n c l u d e  
N i c k e l l ' s  I n v e s t m e n t  D e c i s i o n s  o f  F i rm s  ( 19 7 8 ) ,  H i r s h l e i f e r ' s  
I n v e s t m e n t .  I n t e r e s t ,  and C a p i t a l  ( 19 7 0 ) .
below:
1 0 3
M a x « qt-(l+r) ( wc(j) (qft) - a ta) - c t2F (  Vff+1) j
(4.5)
As may be observed in the GS Objective Function, there are two 
aspects of cost. Beginning with the non-bankruptcy component, w e  
have:
(1 + r )  (w t<j) ( q £ )  - a £ )
(4.6)
Expression 4.6 tells us that firms borrow financial capital to pay 
labour production costs as determined by the labour requirement 
function multiplied by the wage level. The cost of such borrowing to 
the i 'th  firm is reduced by the level of equity, a/, which arises, in the 
GS model, from profits in the form of retained earnings and new 
equity sold, m f a ^ j ) , as appears in their difference equation (page 99, 
GS 1993). As profits are determined by firm specific prices which are 
stochastic, w e  see that equity a'r+; is determined by both a't and \Jt. 
With regard to new equity sold net of dividends, m (a !t+1), in the 
numerical simulation program, w e  assume rather that the dividend 
structure of firms does not change in a random manner, an approach 
involving minimal theoretical content. In order to avoid introducing 
another random variable, rather, in the simulation program we make 
dividends a fixed proportion of profits.4 By adopting this approach 
w e  are able to investigate the dynamic effects in the GS mode! of 
changes to a firm's capital base. (Arguably, by modelling dividends
4A c c o u n t i n g  and n o t  t h e o r e t i c  r e l a t i o n s h i p  e x i s t s  b e t w e e n
r e t a i n e d  p r o f i t s ,  d i v i d e n d s ,  and in v e s tm e n t  ( p a g e  553, C o p e l a n d
& W e s t o n )  . D i v i d e n d  y i e l d s  s h o u l d  r e f l e c t  th e  c o s t  o f  e q u i t y  a s  
d e r i v e d  f r o m  C a p i t a l  A s s e t  P r i c i n g  t h e o r y .  E m p i r i c a l  t e s t s  o f  
d i v i d e n d  t h e o r y  m o d e l s  s u p p o r t s  th e  v i e w  t h a t  f i r m s  a r e  l o a t h e  
t o  i n c r e a s e  d i v i d e n d s  u n l e s s  t h e y  can be s u p p o r t e d  w i t h  a d e q u a t e  
p r o f i t s  ( L i n t n e r ,  1965 and 1965, and Fama & B a b i a k ,  1968)  . 
S i m i l a r l y ,  downward  r i g i d i t y  in  d i v i d e n d  s t r u c t u r e s  may a r i s e  f o r  
v a r i o u s  r e a s o n s  i n c l u d i n g  " s i g n a l l i n g  e f f e c t s " .
as a fixed percentage of profits which itself is a function of the firm 
specific change in the stochastic process on prices, one random 
dimension has already been introduced.) As an alternative to either 
the fixed percentage approach or the stochastic approach of GS, a 
dividend structure which is consistent with received financial- 
economic theory is considered in Chapter Six. With greater 
proportion of equity in the capital structure, the effective cost of 
borrowing should be reduced, even though real interest rates may be 
unchanged. For now, however, following the GS model, w e  ignore 
the effect capital structure may have upon the cost of debt and 
equity.
To specify an explicit expression as required for the algorithm 
of the computer program, as found in Module I, we supplement the 
GS model with received theory, in the following manner. Firstly, we 
note that the left-hand expression in (4.5) uses the inverse of the 
production function: Where production was a function of labour, as 
in 4.1 above; one component of cost in the GS Model depends upon 
the amount of labour employed at the wage rate w\
M > ( g t )
(4.7)
Where w e  note that small 0 is the inverse function of the large cp 
found in equation 4.1, as used by GS. To represent the G S  Model, 
the cost function found in equation 4.7 must be the reciprocal of 4.1 
the production function. The cost function, GS specify as a function 
of the sole argument, labour. Although GS only require that the cost 
function be derived from inverting the production function, since the 
production function is concave, the cost function must be convex in 
q. Since the production function was specified in Module I as a 
logarithmic function, to represent the left-hand side of the cost 
function, w e  use an exponential function, as shown in equation 4.8 
below, as it is convex over the relevant region. This satisfies received
1 0 4
1 0 5
theory requiring a cost function be convex and rising at an increasing 
rate (M. Intrilligator, 1971).
W e  n ow turn to the bankruptcy component of the cost 
function, as found in the right-most portion of expression 4.5. W e  
will consider the role of firm specific prices in determining the event 
of bankruptcy, along with the nature of risk aversion in the GS model. 
W e  conclude with how these arrangements are specified in a manner 
suitable for numerical simulation, which explicitly includes the 
variability of firm specific prices leading to the event of bankruptcy. 
W e  begin by referring to the right-most term of expression 4.5 above, 
parameter cF (\ /t+1). It is the product of the cost incurred in the event 
of bankruptcy and F (v it+ 1), the probability distribution for the 
threshold level of its occurrence.5 The event, bankruptcy, occurs 
when firms are unable to meet their financial obligations, debt 
exceeds sales revenues, expressed in nominal terms:
where B is the firm's nominal debt. As we see, it is the firm specific 
relative price at time t +  1 or ex post, at which the i 'th firm seiis its 
output in relation to the threshold criteria, which determines solvency. 
W e  can express bankruptcy as the threshold solvency level, v'r + and 
the ex post price experienced by the i 'th firm. To do so w e  first 
define the firm specific change in relative prices in relation to the 
general price level:
(4.8)
(4.9)
5No a s s u m p t i o n s  a r e  made by  GS w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  F , and i t s  d e n s i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  we w i l l  assume  
t h a t  t h e y  a r e  n o r m a l l y  d i s t r i b u t e d .
1 0 6
(4.10)
Bankruptcy occurs when what the firm has promised to repay in 
working capital borrowed at time t exceeds the firm's income at time 
t +  1, as determined by firm specific prices, which are stochastic. A  
firm remains solvent when the market value of the firm at time f + 1 
combining revenues plus equity reserves from the previous period, 
exceeds debt obligations contracted at time t. Unanticipated change 
in nominal prices is not neutral because it affects the firm's asset 
position. The firm specific price level at time t +  1 at which 
bankruptcy occurs, we define in relation to the threshold level 
introduced earlier, accordingly:
u U < v U
(4.11)
Expression 4.11 shows when bankruptcy occurs~as the relationship 
between the firm specific price relative at time t, having distribution 
F, to the solvency threshold price of the /'th firm at time t +  1, v ' t+1. 
Alternatively, we can now express bankruptcy as:
p 1i * t+i
^ < w i A |  mvi
(4.12)
t + 1  S  I X  v }    =  v/1 +1
P t+1 g t
Where, at‘ = A { / P t represents real equity of the i'th firm. Referring to 
the above expressions based upon the GS model, permits us to see 
how bankruptcy arises when the stochastic firm specific relative price 
fails to equal or exceed the solvency threshold level.
Relating firm specific price variability to the event of 
bankruptcy will facilitate understanding the nature of risk aversion in 
the GS model. The cost of bankruptcy c is a function of q (, and
assumes decreasing returns to scale. GS identify convexity in output 
with induced risk aversion (1988, page 103). Recall, it is the 
expected firm specific prices at time t +  1, the ratio expressed by i / t+1 
to which firms, ex ante, respond to avoid bankruptcy occurring at 
time f+ 1, inducing risk aversion. GS propose, as per their 
assumption, A6, that the cost of bankruptcy increases with the 
quantity of a firm's output, for three intuitive reasons, which together 
are the basis for the ex ante induced risk aversion, as manifested by 
convexity in output q .G On this important point, w e  expand because 
understanding the source of risk aversion in the model is key to its 
dynamic behaviour. As per equation 4.1 above, GS show (1988, 
page 108) that 0 " > O  implies elasticity of output with respect to 
equity, /?<0, although it need not be a constant. According to GS 
decreasing returns to scale (labour), implies risk aversion because 
output increases with a firm's equity at a decreasing rate. These 
relationships justify the assertions by GS such as, "Bankruptcy is 
costly and firms take these costs into account in their production 
decisions." (page 82, 1993); or, "... firms act to avoid bankruptcy.", 
and "... bankruptcy avoidance behaviour induces a kind of risk 
aversion." (page 88, 1993). Thus induced risk aversion by firms in 
the G S  model arises from the convexity of the output function.
N o w  returning to the right-most expression found in expression 
4.5, combining the guidance found in the GS article with received 
theory, to express the bankruptcy in the computer program, the 
functional specification must be convex in output and display risk 
aversion to the threat of bankruptcy. As explained in footnote 7, risk
1 0 7
6N a m e ly ,  1 ) .  The s e c o n d  d e r i v a t i v e  o f  b a n k r u p t c y  c o s t  w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  f i r m  s i z e  i s  > 0 ;  2 . )  The g r e a t e r  t h e  a b s o l u t e  s i z e  
o f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  m i s t a k e ,  v i z .  o u t p u t  v e r s u s  p r i c e s  r e c e i v e d ,  t h e  
more a v e r s e  t o  r i s k  m anagers  s h o u l d  b e ;  and 3 . )  b a n k r u p t c y  c o s t s  
a r e  n o t  a f i x e d  amount, i . e .  f i r m s  ca n n ot  " g r o w - o u t - o f " w o r r y i n g  
a b o u t  them. T h e se  t h r e e  a s s u m p t io n s  j u s t i f y  f o o t n o t e  16 o f  GS 
(1993 )  , r i s k  a v e r s i o n  i s  o n l y  a c h i e v e d  i f  t h e  cF  f u n c t i o n  i s  
c o n v e x  i n  q.
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aversion only occurs when c F (v ) is appropriately convex in q, and 
referring to the GS assumption A6, bankruptcy costs increases with 
the level of the firm's output. To ensure that the cost of bankruptcy 
does rise increasingly with the level of output and that risk aversion 
is displayed, c F (v ) is explicitly specified in the computer program as:
cF  ( v A i ) = [exp(“ jr-)] F  ( v*+1)
(4.13)
W e  note that this specification is convex in q as required by GS (page 
88, 1993). The function for c cannot be an exogenous constant 
because it must be convex in output to induce ex ante risk aversion. 
The probability distribution function for bankruptcy in 4.13 F (\ /t+,) for 
determining the threshold of bankruptcy in the GS Model is not stated 
as an explicit distribution or density function, but as a function having 
the following arguments interacting in a complex manner:
F[v£+1{q£,a£,wtt Pt T , 1 +r) ]
■“ ' *t+i *
(4.14)
Where E (P t+1) is the expected increase in the general price level. To 
specify this equation functionally and make it operational as a 
simulation algorithm, we begin with some observations about its 
arguments and nature.
In the GS model the probability of bankruptcy, F, for the 
individual firm depends upon the arguments shown in equation 4.14. 
As mentioned, an explicit probability distribution and density function 
for F, GS do not specify, although for purposes of simulation w e  will 
adopt the assumption of normality. Equity and output are firm 
specific, while other arguments found in 4.14, as state variables and 
exogenous parameters, are the same for all firms, which are assumed 
identical, in the model, GS use both a general price level as weii as
a sectoral price level without mentioning how, as random variables, 
they might be distributed or how firms form expectations on their 
underlying distribution. According to GS there is less uncertainty 
about the general price level than there is with regard to firm specific 
relative prices (GS, page 86, 1993). For purposes of simulation and 
research, we will assume that the general price level is invariant. 
Bankruptcy arises when the realized firm specific prices, normally 
distributed by assumption, at time f + 7, falls below the critical value 
determined through equation 4.14. FJence the probability of 
bankruptcy refers to the chances of this event occurring. Whe n  the 
ratio of the firm specific relative price in period f+ 1 to the general 
price level in period tf P t+1/P t or u't+} is equal to or exceeds \/t+1 as 
determined by the arguments of equation 4.14, bankruptcy is 
avoided. W e  note that although the determinants of the probability 
of bankruptcy are firm specific, the F distribution is not so. (Firms 
face the same F distribution, however, the joint probability of the 
occurrence of bankruptcy is independent of one another.) For a given 
set of firm specific state variables and exogenous parameters, 
determining the probability of bankruptcy, because of firm specific 
price shocks, some firms may go bankrupt and others not. The 
differing outcomes arise because of the varying firm specific price 
shocks experienced by the population of firms, even assuming that all 
firms have the same initial level of equity as w e  have for purposes of 
simulation, although GS do not. In this regard, GS assume only 
symmetry.
Placing the solvency criteria and the probability of bankruptcy 
in a risk aversion context we note the following. Bankruptcy is 
important in the GS model because it is the source of risk aversion 
leading to modifications in investment, borrowing and eventually 
output behaviour. A time f, firm specific output cjt and equity a't, and 
wages w t, determine the critical value of \/t+ u the solvency threshold, 
and the probability of bankruptcy thereby occurring (page 88, GS
1 0 9
1993). Uncertainty over the relationship between firm specific prices 
L/t+} to the critical value as expressed by \/t+1 leads to risk aversion 
on the part of firms. Low prices, and low returns, as expressed by 
P t+ / / P t or u't+1 may lead to insufficient market value including equity, 
at+1, and hence insolvency. Bankruptcy is avoided because the 
stochastic process on t/f+/ is such that it equals or exceeds the 
threshold value Or in economic terms, in the GS Model
bankruptcy occurs because there is insufficient reserves of equity plus 
net income to meet financial obligations. When the received revenue 
from next period output is insufficient to repay the debt borrowed to 
pay wages in the present period because of the N e w  Keynesian style 
financial constraint on the availability of equity, the firm is bankrupt. 
Further with regard to the nature of bankruptcy and risk aversion in 
the GS model, we note that the borrowing decision is irreversible and 
involves an ex ante anticipation of the relationship between the firm 
specific randomly distributed relative price rff+7, which w e  will 
assume are normally distributed as explained below, and the 
threshold solvency price i/f + As mentioned earlier, according to GS, 
the major source of uncertainty Is with regard to firm specific prices 
and not the general price level (page 86, GS, 1993). The probability 
that firm specific prices in the next period may be below the critical 
level induces a form of risk aversion. When and if bankruptcy does 
occur, it is the ex post result of an ex ante decision, namely of 
whether to fund labour cost through borrowed working capital to 
produce output. The discrete time ex ante/ex post relationship 
underlies the N e w  Keynesian features of the model: There is a 
constraint on new equity being raised so firms must borrow to fund 
working capital, the uncertain returns to which occur in the future.
N e w  Keynesian features appear in the asymmetry between 
lenders and borrowers as well, since presumably the latter are unable 
to adequately monitor the density function on the solvency threshold 
price \/t+J and its relation to a uncertainty surrounding firm specific
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prices. W e  note that this ex ante/ex post relationship requires the use 
of a discrete, rather than continuous time framework. By including 
the cost of bankruptcy in the cost function, GS seek to address the 
question of the properties of aggregate dynamic behaviour for risk 
averse firms operating under financial constraints and imperfections. 
Arguably, their work is inconsistent with the Modigliani-Miiler theorem 
of the irrelevance of asset composition (risky debt and less risky 
equity) upon real variables, namely valuation and output. The 
model's set-up suggest several ways for improvement. For example, 
we note that the interest rate at which working capital is borrowed 
does not include a risk premium reflecting the risk of bankruptcy 
arising from greater debt, there is a financial market imperfection in 
that obligations are not tied to real performance, and that the future 
value of contingent assets and liabilities, such as borrowed working 
capital, may not be hedged. In the GS model, futures markets are 
assumed not to exist because of transaction costs.
To develop and calibrate a model in the style of GS suitable for 
simulation, building upon the above, we make the following points. 
Recalling expression 4.14, both firm specific and non-firm specific 
exogenous variables determine the probability that c/f+, is below \/r+ 1r 
that is, of bankruptcy occurring. The firm specific variables 
determining the solvency relative price and hence the probability of 
bankruptcy are firm equity and output. But since output, itself is a 
concave and function of equity, deterministic except for the variability 
in firm specific prices, then to the extent that the solvency relative 
price is determined by firm specific variables as equity, it is the level 
of equity, inter alia, which ex post at time t +  7, determines the 
threshold for the probability of bankruptcy. As the level of equity is 
firm specific in the GS model, and although firms are subject to the 
same, constraints and produce output according to the same 
production function, because of the relationship between random firm 
specific prices and the solvency relative price, some firms will go
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bankrupt while others will survive. (According to GS, the revenues 
of bankrupt firms are divided equally among debtors (page 86, GS 
1993), although we will adopt the convention that firms are "re­
floated"'at the average level of equity of firms surviving.) Relating 
the threshold for solvency to the random variable of firm specific 
prices, GS tell us that there is uncertainty regarding firm specific 
relative prices, although not how they are distributed: According to 
GS, the stochastic process on firm specific relative prices, P t+1/P t or 
i / t+1 has distribution function F and is i.i.d., (page 85, 1993). 
Together the relationship between the threshold for solvency relative 
price \/t+ j and firm specific prices t/r+/ determine when and if the i'th  
firm becomes bankrupt. Formally this relationship may be represented 
as the following distribution function:
Prob. (Bnkrptcy) = P{uf+1 < ) = [vf(u)du
Given a Ffu 't+ ,J, which we have assumed normally distributed, we can 
say that bankruptcy occurs with probability F* = F (u ''t+1), where we 
define u '!t+1 as the following7:
price realization for the i'th firm below which default takes place.
(4.15)
which is equivalent to:
P(Bnkrptcy) -pluf^qfK ( 1 + r )  (wc4> (q?) -af) )
(4.15')
(4.16)
7I n  t h e  s i m u l a t i o n  p rog ram ,  a p o l y n o m ia l  a p p r o x i m a t i o n  o f  
t h e  n o rm a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  u s e d .  (As  fo u n d ,  p a g e  932,  e x p r e s s i o n  
2 6 . 2 . 1 8  o f  Handbook of Mathematical Functions , 1968 . )
To specify and model the above arrangements regarding firm 
behaviour and structure in the simulation program, we assume the 
following: To numerically simulate a version of the GS model, in our 
program we assume a normal distribution for the stochastic process 
on firm specific prices t/r+;. Inputting the mean and standard 
deviation for such firm specific random price shocks, using a normal 
distribution on such shocks, the simulation program exposes each of 
the assumed population of twenty-five firms to a unique random price 
shock. The density function for the normal distribution on firm 
specific prices, p ' t41/ p t is specified accordingly:
4.17)
j f ( u A i )  -  - e x p " 1^ 1 " )^Z/2a2 -oo <; u A i  < 00
o/2ti
Where j j  and o  are the mean and standard deviation respectively. In 
the simulation program, using the normal F ( t / t+1) , distribution and 
assuming the price shocks as approximated using a polynomial 
function, faced by individual firms are i . i .d . with mean of z e r o  and a 
standard deviation varied by assumption, leads to a cost of 
bankruptcy in its event, as per equation 4.5 above. As we
would expect from an intuitive standpoint, and as we validate through 
simulation, because of ex ante risk aversion, potentially greater 
marginal cost of bankruptcy, c'v leads to reduced employment and 
output (page 92, GS 1993). Ex ante, induced risk aversion changes 
with the variance in the F  distribution on firm specific prices, o 2, and 
the cost incurred in the event of bankruptcy. If perfect foresight 
existed on prices, variance zero, borrowing decisions and leading to 
equity-output decisions would be such that the chance of bankruptcy 
would be zero, in combination with parameters for the uniform 
distribution, according to which firm specific price shocks occur, the 
developed algorithm for numerical simulation requires the use of the
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marginal bankruptcy cost function, as shown above in equation 4.13 
leading to the event of bankruptcy, based upon the stochastic 
realisation of firm specific prices,, that is when i / t+} for the i ' t h  firm 
falls below the threshold value for \/r+;.
To model expressions 4.16 in the simulation program and to 
calculate the probability that a given firm is bankrupt we have 
assumed, as mentioned above, that its firm specific price realization 
for a given firm is normally distributed. Across the population of 
firms, and hence at a given time t , the relationship between the 
distribution on firm specific price i / t+] and the threshold level 
determined by expression 4.14 determines the risk of bankruptcy for 
the i ' t h  firm sampled from the same population. Or, as per 
expressions 4.16, the individual firm's price realization is such that in 
relation to i/f+;, that if liabilities exceed revenues less equity, 
bankruptcy has occurred. If the price realisation is such that 
revenues plus assets exceed liabilities, the assumed normally 
distributed random processes u  in relation to v, is such that the i ' t h  
firm is solvent while if the latter exceeds the former, bankruptcy 
occurs for the i ' t h  firm. In the simulation program, the threshold 
criteria \Zr+; is computed according to the various arguments 
appearing in equation 4.14 and then compared with the realized 
random price u 't+1 from the distribution F. Values for t / f+7 below a 
certain threshold level, measured in standard deviations from v 't+1 are 
declared bankrupt. If ex post, prices at time t +  1 are below the 
critical level as determined by equation 4.14 above, total equity at 
time f+  1 is may be insufficient, resulting in insolvency, as per 
equation 4.9 above. At a given time t , firms form expectations of the 
chances of bankruptcy given the uncertainty on firm specific prices, 
P t + i/P t, and so adjust their behaviour which has dynamic implications. 
A final point on modelling the occurrence of bankruptcy in the 
economy represented by the GS model and the behaviour it 
occasions. In the simulation program, at a given point in time t, given
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the assumed properties with respect to the distribution on firm 
specific prices and the threshold criteria of v;,+ ?, a proportion of the 
assumed population of twenty-five firms will go bankrupt. In the GS 
article, no process on the creation of new firms is introduced. From 
the standpoint of a simulation program and assuming a fixed quantity 
of firms, this would lead to the absurdity of the economy over-time 
disappearing. By assumption, as mentioned above, in the simulation 
program, and with some degree of realism, in the period after which 
bankruptcy has occurred, the firm is r e - f l o a t e d  with the average level 
of equity of firms which are solvent. Its debt are cancelled.
We conclude our discussion of the cost function found in the 
GS model with how it relates to subject of dynamic behaviour. 
Although we pursue the laws of motion found in the GS model in 
sections below, it is important to note that the source of dynamics in 
the GS model is not the occurrence of bankruptcy, per se. In the GS 
model, it is the ex ante expectations and adjustments to the variability 
of firm specific prices which through the calculus of firm level 
optimization determines the dynamic path on equity and output, 
including whether bankruptcy may occur. As mentioned above, a 't+J 
is a function of a 't and u 't, with the latter an exogenous stochastic 
process which is normally distributed. By changing initial conditions 
in exogenous parameters, the performance of representative firms 
through the business cycle are affected. It is important to note that 
the model's dynamics are driven by both a random component and 
one which is deterministic. The model's dynamics are driven by 
bankruptcy arising because random firm specific prices are below the 
threshold level, and the aversion to bankruptcy modifying behaviour 
in reaction to the borrowing-investment-wage and profit spiral, as 
depicted in Figure 3.1 of Chapter Three. The i ' t h  representative firm 
forms ex ante expectations on firm specific stochastic future prices 
in relation to the threshold, \/t+; given the probability F (u 't+ f  thereby 
affecting inter-temporal dynamics during economic expansions and
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contractions. Ex ante expectations of the event of bankruptcy 
formed by agents causes adjustments in behaviour as determined by 
the probability distribution on firm specific prices of which they have 
knowledge. Such stochastic perturbations arising from the 
relationship between firm specific prices and their relationship to the 
threshold level, are one of the sources of dynamic behaviour, as is 
found in the Real Business literature. The dynamics of the model are 
derived from risk aversion and the effects of investment under 
conditions of firm specific price uncertainty. Random perturbations 
to the system, which result in bankruptcy, along with the nature of 
borrowing and investment, generate the model's dynamic behaviour, 
along with perturbations which effect it. The GS model is essentially 
deterministic in nature, notwithstanding the uncertainty over firm 
specific prices and consequent revenues which modifies the one- 
dimensionality of the implied non-linear autonomous first order 
difference map, making it effectively second order as we will discuss 
below. The modification of firm behaviour through risk aversion, as 
we will discuss in Section 4.6, has inter-temporal implications. We 
now turn to Section 4.4, where we use the revenue and cost 
functions to solve for firm level optimization.
4.4 Firm Level Optimization
In this section we will review the GS approach to firm level 
profit maximization, and how this is specified in Module I of the 
computer program. As this specification process does not involve the 
introduction of any new functional forms, we limit our discussion to 
validating through calibrated simulation, the three unproven 
propositions on the comparative static relationships between equity, 
production and output, and price variance, found in the GS article 
(1993, page 102). Such simulations, we note allow for analysis of 
the sensitivity of an optimal solution to changes in various exogenous 
variables. The computer algorithms and program for
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solving the classical profit maximization problem for the i ' t h  firm uses 
the explicit revenue and cost functions specified in Sections 4.2 and
4.3, the calibrated exogenous inputs at time t, and the assumed level 
of equity a \  of the i ' t h  firm, to maximize profits over quantity, q ,  
equity. The result of solving the profit maximization problem over q ,  
is an optimal output, q 'v  and a next period equity a 't+1, which may be 
used in the subsequent iteration of the profit maximization to find an 
optimal output for the i ' t h  firm, of q 't+1 at time t +  1 , and so on, for 
however many iterations. Micro phenomena, determine the level of 
equity and output, through changes or shifts in the revenue and cost 
functions from which the level of profit maximization is determined. 
Determining the aggregate level of equity, a t and q t oyer time requires 
maximization of the individual firm profit maximization problem 
through the simulation program, because as we will explain no closed 
form solution exists for an expression, such as, fyr+/; = G ( a t) , as per 
GS (page 100, 1993).
Reviewing these simulations, we see the effects upon firm level 
profit maximization of changes in exogenous variables. To show that 
Module I follows the GS Model, we recall their Propositions 1, 2, and 
3 found (1993, page 92).
•  Proposition 1. The higher the level of equity, the lower the 
marginal bankruptcy cost (risk premium) p ( ,  and hence the 
higher the level of production.
•  Proposition 2. Increases in the degree of uncertainty result 
in an increase in the marginal bankruptcy cost (risk premium) 
and hence in a lower level of output.
•  Proposition 3. At least near the capacity level, output is a 
concave function of the equity level.
To validate Proposition 1, we perform two experiments changing the 
initial level of equity, for the i ' t h  firm. As we can see from Figures 3 
and 4, changes in the initial level of equity, at time t , through
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changes in the expected cost of bankruptcy have an affect upon the 
level of output q , at time t +  1. The change between Figures 3 and 4, 
involves decreasing the amount of equity available so that the firm is 
forced to borrow more, and thereby increase its marginal bankruptcy 
cost, for a specified normally distributed F distribution on firm specific 
prices, L/t+1. We see, the cost curve and the marginal cost curve shift 
leftwards between Figure 3 and 4. Proposition 2, we verify through 
the simulations reported in figures 5 and 6, involves changing the 
standard deviation on firm specific prices, i / t+ l and thereby affecting 
the marginal bankruptcy cost through the probability of bankruptcy, 
F ( i / t+1) , as will be discussed further in Section 4.3. The two 
experiments in Figures 5 & 6 for the i ' t h  firm, concern the variability 
of firm specific prices, u it+1. In Figure 5, the standard deviation on 
firm specific prices is 10%, while in Figure 6, the standard deviation 
is increased to 20%. We observe that an increase in the variability 
of firm specific prices, leads to a decrease in output as firms seek to 
avoid bankruptcy, that is falling below the threshold level, i/f, as 
presented in the GS Proposition 2. Like the Figures 3 and 4, a 
change in the optimal level of output occurs through a shift in the 
cost function, as shown in equation 4.5 above. Together, the four 
experiments demonstrate the effects upon firm behaviour of changing 
the marginal cost of bankruptcy through the variance of firm specific 
prices and the level of equity. The specified parameter for the cost 
of bankruptcy, as included in the program through the specified 
expression 4.13, because of induced risk aversion, influences the 
level of both output and investment, in the fashion specified in the GS 
model8.
118
8 In the GS Model, investment refers to the expenditure on 
working capital to pay the wage bill.
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W e  conclude Section 4 . 4  on Firm level o p t im iza t io n  by s h o w in g  
th e  e f fe c t ,  changes in real w a g e s  and the  ra te  o f  in te re s t  h ave  upon  
th e  level o f  equ ity  and o u tput for a rep resen ta t iv e  f i rm ,  in th is  w a y  
w e  fu rth e r  s h o w  h o w  the s im ulation program  c a p tu re s  th e  principal  
fea tu res  o f  the  GS model. To  understand this e f fe c t ,  w e  refer ag a in  
to  th e  non-stochastic  exogenous variab les fo und  in exp re s s io n  4 . 1 4 ,  
n am ely  w a g e s  and interest rates. A ccord ing  to  G S , in creases  in real  
w a g e s  and the  real interest rate reduce equity  fo rm a t io n  and  th e re fo re  
o u tp u t  ( 1 9 9 3 ,  pages 9 0 - 9 1 ) .  A lth o u g h  th e re  are  no g enera l  
equilibrium  effec ts  upon interest rates in the  GS m o d e l,  w a g e s  p lay  
an im p o rtan t ro le .9 In the GS m odel, firms b o rro w  w o rk in g  cap ita l  
to  pay w a g e s ,  increasing real w a g e s .  W h e n  profits fall b e c a u s e  o f  
lo w  firm  specific  prices, the c o m m itm e n t  to  g re a te r  real w a g e s ,  
reduces profits and equity , low ering  o u tp u t.  C o m p a ra t iv e  s ta t ic  
Figures 7  to  1 0  sh o w  such behaviour, fu rth er  d e m o n s tra t in g  th a t  
M o d u le  I o f the  Program, as explic it ly  specified  an d  s im u la te d ,  
em b od ies  th e  spirit of the GS m odel. T h e  p rog ram  resu lts , g rap h ed  
in .F igures 7 and 8, s h o w  the e f fec t  o f  increasing th e  level o f  w a g e s  
in period t  by 5 0 % .  W hile  the  program  results, g rap h ed  in F igures 9  
and 1 0 ,  s h o w  w h a t  e f fec t  the rate o f in terest at w h ic h  th e  f irm  is 
fo rced  to b o rro w  to pay for w ork ing  capital, i.e . to  c o v e r  w a g e s ,  has  
upon static  ou tput. B e tw een  the  sim ulations found  in F igures 9  and  
1 0 ,  the  rate o f  interest charged is decreased from  1 0 %  to  3 % .  A s  
w e  see, th e  results predicted in the  GS m odel and a rt ic le  m a y  be  
s im u la ted  using M odule  i o f the  c o m p u te r  p ro g ra m m e . H av in g  
d e m o n s tra te d  th a t  in M odule  I, w e  have expressed in o ur spec if ied  
m odel and program  the features and requirem ents  o f  th e  f inanc ia l  
co nstra in t-f inanc ia l m arket im perfection  m odel of th e  s ty le  o f  G S  
M o d e !,  our next step involves ag gregation . T h e  m o d e ll in g  and  
s im ulation  o f aggregation  is expla ined in the  fo l lo w in g  s ec t io n .
9 In Chapter Six, we consider the effect of having interest 
rates change through an endogenous mechanism.
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4.5 Aggregation and General Equilibrium
Having explained the functional specifications and algorithms 
used in Module I, we may now turn to Module II, where the problem 
of aggregation and general equilibrium are addressed. Our plan is to 
review the general set-up of the GS model, along with its broader 
business cycle implications. We will explain its specification in the 
simulation algorithm, and how it relates to its behaviour. Like the 
previous sections, our approach is to combine the stylized general 
specifications found in the GS articles with received economic theory 
to specify functional relationships suitable for the construction of 
algorithms and calibration. We apply this approach over three sub­
sections. Firstly, we begin with aggregation and consider how it may 
be specified in a simulation program to create an aggregate supply 
function. In this respect, we also consider the implications of its 
shape. Secondly, we discuss how the equilibrium adjusts to changes 
in the variability of firm specific prices, o  on F { i/t+1) t and other 
exogenous model parameters. In this context we offer comments 
upon the nature of equilibrium in the GS model, its existence, 
uniqueness and stability and whether it is properly N e w  K e y n e s i a n .  
As general equilibrium in the GS model occurs in labour markets, in 
the third sub-section, we use the aggregate supply of output function 
to create an aggregate requirement for labour function which we 
solve simultaneously against the aggregate labour supply function 
which is assumed in the GS model to be an increasing function of 
wages. In addition to formalism, closing the system in general 
equilibrium against an upward sloping labour supply function has a 
role in the model's dynamics, because increases in aggregate output 
lead to adjustments in real wages, equity, profits, borrowing, 
investment, and the labour requirement function and so on.
4.5.1 Aggregation. In the GS Model it is assumed that all 
firms are identical, having the same cost function and production 
functions. In addition we have assumed that the distribution of initial
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equity levels across firms are identical, and not merely symmetrical 
as GS assume. Importantly, the price shocks to which the assumed 
population of twenty-five firms are exposed are firm specific. Such 
shocks we assume are normally distributed. We begin with the GS 
general function for individual output before explaining how the 
simulation program works to determine output in the aggregate.
q£=q(wt, r c, a ,  y)
(4.18)
Where a  is the variability in firm specific prices corresponding to 
distribution, F ( i / t+1) , as explained in Section 4.3 above. Subscripted 
at time t ,  w  is the level of wages and rthe rate of interest, which are 
both identical to all firms. Furthermore, as mentioned above, we 
assume, as per GS, that the rate of interest is time invariant, a 
constant. The distribution in equity across all firms, over time, as per 
GS (page 94) is symmetric, and its dispersion is specified by the 
parameter, y , although in the simulation program, over time, the 
dispersion of equity results endogenously. The level of equity, a/ is 
firm specific and together with the other parameters determines the 
level of output of the individual firm. These exogenous variables 
found in equation 4.18, may be investigated as sources of 
perturbation. According to GS, they uniquely determine the levei of 
output of the individual firm, as shown for a representative firm, 
previously in Figures 3 to 10.
In the simulation program, to implement the above set-up is 
straightforward and involves summing the outputs of the assumed 
population of the individual twenty-five firms, as expressed in 
equation 4.19 below:
Qc = ^ <?t
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(4 .19 )
Summing up the outputs of individual firms as per equation 4.19 
above, yields a quantity of aggregate output, along with the labour 
requirement given that output. In the simulation program, the GS 
parameter, y , for equity dispersion results endogenously, over time, 
although initially it is assumed to be identical for all firms. In the 
simulation program, individual firm specific price realizations are 
drawn from the same distribution. The normal distribution of such 
drawings combined with the size of the population, together satisfy 
the GS requirements with regard to symmetry in the distribution of 
equity across all firms. Such individual price realisations serve to vary 
the levels of equity across the population of firms over-time, however 
as per the GS assumption (page 94, GS 1993) around the average 
level of equity, the distribution is symmetrical.
Although knowing the aggregate quantity of output is sufficient 
to determine the required amount of labour (in terms of 0(q) or / and 
wages), in the simulation program we solve for general equilibrium so 
as to allow other experiments, and dynamic simulation. Although 
strictly only one corresponding point on the aggregate supply of 
labour (in terms of wages and quantity of labour) must be found to 
achieve general equilibrium, we have created in the simulation 
program, an aggregate demand for labour from the aggregate supply 
of output, as per equation 4.19, by summing horizontally the rising 
portions of the respective marginal cost curves, of the assumed 
population of twenty-five firms. Creating the complete aggregate 
output and aggregate demand for labour functions allows further 
insights into the nature of the GS model and its behaviour. The 
algorithm to accomplish this is found in Module II. Before moving to 
sub-section 2, we show how the specification and algorithm for 
Aggregate Supply behaves with respect to exogenous perturbations 
as suggested by GS in their article; we consider its n e u t r a l i t y  
(equilibrium is invariant with respect to changes in monetary units) 
arising from a vertical aggregate supply curve.
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In a neo-classical macroeconomic model, the quantity of labour 
employed is independent of the price level. The assumptions of 
perfectly flexible prices (including wages), no money illusion, and unit 
elastic p'rice expectations ensure that the quantity of labour employed 
is invariant to any change in the level of prices. In the GS Model, the 
quantity of output is driven by the amount of equity which results 
from individual firm level optimization, given the wage rate and 
interest rates. In the GS Model, the level of output is independent of 
the general price level, making it vertical as shown in GS Figure III, 
(page 91, 1993). Independence between output and the price level 
makes the aggregate supply function vertical, although shifts In 
aggregate supply can occur, for example through real changes in 
interest rates, wages, or changes in technology or the demographics 
of labour.
The shape of the aggregate supply function reveals a lot about 
a GS style model featuring a financial constraint and borrowing 
imperfections. The shape of the aggregate supply function indicates 
the effect that changing various exogenous variables along with 
various modifications involving financial innovation may have upon 
system dynamics. In the GS model, "uncertainty shocks" with regard 
to firm specific prices effects the returns to borrowed working capital 
directly, and over time, the equity levels of firms indirectly. The 
expected cost of bankruptcy arising from the variability in firm 
specific prices influences production decisions, leads to shifts in 
aggregate supply because firm specific price variability affects ex ante 
optimization behaviour involving the avoidance of the cost of 
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy arises ex post because of unanticipated 
changes in the firm specific stochastic price process. By implication, 
according to GS, for a given level of variability in firm specific prices, 
however, such shocks do not alter the long run steady-state in equity 
and output, as we will verify in Section 4.7 below (page 118, GS 
1988). Changes in real wages and real interest rates, however, do
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shift the aggregate supply curve as we show below. Although 
according to GS, uncertainty with regard to the general price level 
does not play an important role in their modei (page 86, GS, 1993), 
we see 'that the model behaves classically. In a manner typical of 
neo-classical models, changes in the price level, propagated through 
production and output decisions, as might result from an increase in 
the money supply, according to GS (page 107, 1993), would have no 
effect on real magnitudes. A nominal, monetary shock is a short-term 
effect which does not move the economy from the steady-state level 
of output of the economy, leaving the aggregate supply function 
unchanged.
Turning to the short-run, we see that the GS models behaves 
in a largely classical manner, notwithstanding its method of 
persistence. Shocks in the form of nominal price variability have only 
short-run effects, leaving unchanged the steady-state output level of 
the economy and differing only in the level of prices (page 119, GS, 
1988). Thus although the model is described as New Keynesian, it 
has classical features even in the short run because nominal shocks 
may only have an effect if they are not anticipated (hence the term 
"shocks"). Secondly their effect is propagated through the supply 
side. Thirdly in the long-run they do not affect the steady-state level 
of output. According to GS, only unanticipated shocks, for example 
in firm specific price variability, real wages, and real interest rates, 
have an effect and they arise through the supply side.
More generally the GS Model has New Classical features 
because it is through changes in aggregate supply that results are 
generated. Shocks from increased uncertainty surrounding the return 
on future investment in working capital resulting from changes to the 
variability in firm specific have long term effects upon the trajectory 
of investment and equilibrium output. increased uncertainty 
surrounding firm specific prices have a supply side effect because of 
imperfections in the way financial contracts are written, that is they
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are not indexed to real performance and they are in nominal terms. 
Unexpected lower prices do not, in the GS Model, have an aggregate 
demand effect. When firm specific prices are low, given the wage-bill 
commitment, equity falls. The net result is that the GS aggregate 
supply is vertical but is subject to non-neutral shocks because of the 
effect upon the firm's asset position. Due to the "wedge" which the 
fear of bankruptcy drives between the expected prices and 
"traditional" marginal costs, the modified marginal cost function rises 
at an increasing rate. The aggregate supply function thereby derived 
from the sum of the rising portion of the individual marginal cost 
curves, is vertically asymptotic in the simulation program and as per 
GS Figure 111 (page 91, 1993).
In light of the above, it is interesting to compare briefly the GS 
model with New Classical and Rational Expectations literature. The 
price shocks in the GS model result from unanticipated shifts in the 
demand curve and in some way resembles the short and long-run 
behaviour found in the "price surprise" literature of new classical 
macroeconomics, as for example in the Lucas "signal extraction 
problem" (Froyen & Waud, 1988). According to such literature, only 
unanticipated price surprises, operating through a redistribution of 
assets, have output effects, leaving anticipated policy ineffectual. 
A Lucas-Sargent aggregate supply curve is derived solely from 
equilibrium in the labour market. In a Lucas-Sargent model, the 
inability of agents to extract signal from noise originating from a price 
surprise, affects production decisions directly. In the GS model, 
aggregate supply is determined through equilibrium conditions in the 
labour a n d  credit markets. In the GS model real effects arise from the 
effect of different claims, debt and equity, upon the behaviour of 
firms.
4.5.2. To see how a version of the GS style model behaves in 
the aggregate various experiments are performed, notably changing 
the level of equity, the rate of interest, and the variability in firm
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specific price shocks F (u 't+1) , all of which effect the risk of 
bankruptcy. In Figures 11 to 16, we find graphs generated by the 
results of simulating the program with different sets of state 
variables. The results, as appear in the Figures, verify that aggregate 
supply computed in Module II behaves as conjectured by GS in their 
article with respect to changes in such variables, as shown in their 
Figure III, (page 91, 1993). As may be seen, by changing these 
variables, relating to the initial level of equity, slightly shifts the 
aggregate supply function in Figures 11 and 12, through its effect 
upon marginal bankruptcy cost, as shown for time t. (Comparing the 
shift in Aggregate Supply against the dotted vertical line assists in 
interpretation.) In Figures 13 and 14, the role of interest rates 
charged on borrowed working capital are shown to have a small 
effect on the aggregate supply according to the stylized predictions 
made by GS. According to GS "...the higher real interest rate means 
that firms must pay back more... ." (page 91, 1993). Increasing the 
real rate of interest has an effect upon the Aggregate Supply 
function, shifting it slightly to the left, because it increases the cost 
at which firms borrow to pay the working capital required for the 
wage bill. Lastly, in Figures 15 and 16, the aggregate supply function 
responds to changing the risk in firm specific price variability F ( i / t+J) ,  
increasing the risk of bankruptcy, as suggested by GS in their article. 
We see that a perturbation in the form of changing the variance in 
firm specific price shocks, as we did in Figures 5 and 6 above, as it 
increases marginal bankruptcy costs, raising the risk of bankruptcy, 
has an impact, because it shifts the aggregate supply function to the 
left. A rightward shift, in contrast, would occur because for a given 
level of investment using borrowed working capital, the returns would 
be greater and the chance of bankruptcy reduced. These results 
simulate the comparative statics discussed in the GS Model. Like 
Figure III found in the GS article (page 91, 1993), the aggregate 
supply functions resulting from the simulations, rises at an increasing
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rate into a vertical asymptote. Like GS Figure III, for different levels 
of equity, price variability, and interest rates, at time t , families of 
aggregate supply curves may be generated.
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4.5.3 Having specified in the simulation model an aggregate 
supply function of the style found in the GS article and verified that 
it behaves as they propose, we now consider the inclusion of a 
general equilibrium solution in the simulation program. As mentioned 
previously, in the GS model the labour requirement function is solved 
against the aggregate supply of labour schedule which is assumed in 
the GS model to be an increasing function of wages. Although 
aggregate output is simply the sum of the outputs of the individual 
firms, ensuring general equilibrium between the aggregate amount of 
labour required and the upward sloping supply of labour, over time, 
plays a role in the model's dynamics, because business cycle effects 
are propagated through the borrowing-investment-wages-equity- 
profits spiral. Unless an upward sloping aggregate supply of labour 
function is present, changes in the requirement of labour, given 
output, will not produce real wage effects.
In the final sub-section of Section 5.3, we explain how the 
aggregate supply of output function is used to solve for a general 
equilibrium solution in labour markets. To solve for general 
equilibrium, GS transform their aggregate supply function from output 
space into input space, as an implied requirement for labour. Using 
the labour required for a given level of output, the GS articles (1988, 
1993) formulate a general equilibrium solution using the aggregate 
supply of labour. The labour supply function it is assumed derives 
from the utility maximization calculus of consumers in the aggregate. 
Hence, general equilibrium in the GS Model arises from the interaction 
between microeconomic units of firms and households.
As per the GS article, we require in the simulation program a 
simultaneous solution in the labour market to solve for the equilibrium 
quantity of labour supplied and the consequent wage. Explaining the 
stylized structure found in the GS model will help to explain how it 
may be modelled in the simulation program. As mentioned, the 
aggregate supply of output function is transformed into input space,
13 4
as an "aggregate labour requirement function." In equations 4.2 and 
4.8 above, the production function and the cost function for the i ' t h  
firm at time t , were explicitly modeled as logarithmic and exponential, 
respectively. According to GS, the demand for labour is the sum of 
the demands of the individual firms. In the aggregate, a level of 
output given a functional relationship leads to an aggregate labour 
requirement function accordingly:
l t  = 2 1 *  = 2 e x p (+ )
4.20)
Using the labour requirement function, an equilibrium level of wages 
may be solved for by setting equation 4.20 equal to the supply of 
labour. For simplicity we assume that the supply of labour is an 
increasing linear function of wages with an intercept of zero and a 
slope calculated, as explained below:
1  =  s { w t )
4.21)
The shape of the labour requirement function is not stated in either 
1993 piece nor the appendices of the 1988 article to which the 
authors refer, leaving only the GS Figure V (page 95, 1993) as a 
guide. To generate an Aggregate Demand for labour, in Module ll, we 
iterate the program found in Module I itself to calculate the quantity 
of labour which would be required at different levels of wages, w {. 
According to GS the supply of labour is determined by the utility 
maximizing behaviour of an infinitely lived representative consumer 
who can borrow and lend at the rate of interest, r t, which is equal to 
the subjective rate of inter-temporai trade-off, 8 , and hence constant 
over time. (The assumption conveniently assumes away saving for
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the future or borrowing against a future income stream.) The 
assumption allows GS to make the supply of labour an increasing 
function only of the wage in the current period, w t (page 96, GS 
1993). The wage level at time t ,  w ,  along with the optimal quantity 
of labour to which the optimal ievel of output corresponds, are used 
to calculate the slope o’f the aggregate supply of labour function. 
Consumer behaviour in the GS Model requires that at a wage ievel of 
zero, no labour is supplied, making the slope intercept for aggregate 
supply of labour function the origin (0,0). General equilibrium in the 
GS model is specified as the simultaneous solution of the aggregate 
labour requirement function and the aggregate supply of labour 
function, in the simulation program, in Module ii, given the two 
equations and the two unknowns, real wages, w t, and the required 
quantity of labour, lv markets clear. The quantity of labour supplied 
by consumers corresponds to the amount required given the 
aggregate output at the real wage w v  or as expressed in general form 
by GS:
wc=w (q  c)
(4.22)
The first derivative shows that as output rises, so does wages:
w '= (-i-) >0 
s '
(4.23)
Finally, by substituting from the labour and capital market equilibria 
into the aggregate supply of output, q , connection to the level of 
equity is made:
qt=q(w(qt) , r c,a t )
(4.24)
which can be solved for equilibrium output, q t -  H ( a t).
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The algorithm used in Module II of the Program, ensures that 
at the optimal level of q t, the aggregate requirement for labour 
function intersects the aggregate supply of labour at wage level 
corresponding to the optimal level of output at time t, thereby solving 
for general equilibrium. In labour input space, this result is explicitly 
modelled in Module II and results, at time t, are illustrated in Figures 
17, 18 and 19. As we can see, changes in the real wage level shift 
both the supply and demand for labour. As wage levels are 
increased, ceteris paribus, general equilibrium occurs at a lower level 
of labour consumption (demand) by firms. Increasing wages leads to 
a shifts in both the aggregate labour supply curve, as per the GS 
article, as well as the aggregate demand for labour curve. In Figure 
19, we leave the real wage unchanged but assume less initial debt in 
the capital structure. Naturally with less chance of bankruptcy, 
investment is encouraged and the demand for labour increased. The 
algorithm found in Module II by using the profit maximizing level of 
individual outputs of Module I, to determine the aggregate labour 
requirement, ensures consistency between aggregate supply and 
demand for output and general equilibrium within the labour market.
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4.6 System Dynamics: Background
In the last four sections of Chapter 4, we turn to the problem 
of implementing and simulating the GS model dynamically as specified 
in Module 111. In Section 4.6, as background, we discuss the role of 
initial conditions in the form of micro-economic assumptions in 
determining the model's cyclic behaviour and dynamic qualities. In 
considering such dynamics, we find that initial conditions with regard 
to micro-economic assumptions, play a critical role in determining the 
steady-state stability, the inter-temporal trajectory, and the existence 
of attractors. Considering the GS model's micro-assumptions, we 
cover four connected sets of observations in Section 4.6. We begin 
with the role played by induced risk aversion arising from the 
stochastic process in prices. Thereafter we look at the role played by 
dividends and profit retention and the initial level of equity in 
determining the dynamic behaviour of the version of the GS model 
implemented for simulation along with the role played including 
whether oscillatory cycles will occur. In this context we mention the 
issues raised from the standpoint of capital structure theory of such 
dynamics. We conclude Section 4.6, with two sets of observations 
on the implications of non-linearity found in the model's first order 
deterministic autonomous difference equation and whether the model 
has random attractors. Section 4.6 forms the back-drop to Section
4.7 where we explain how the simulation algorithm was 
implemented. As an introduction, it involves dynamic aggregation: 
In the GS Model, changes to the level of output, including cycles are 
propagated through the level of equity. GS construct their inter­
temporal equilibrium in equity space rather than in output space, 
making the time path on real equity. For a given firm, according to 
GS and as specified in the various simulation Modules, the level of 
equity uniquely determines the level of output over time, as shown in 
their Figure VI.A {page 98, 1 993). For dynamic numerical simulation, 
as we will explain, the outputs and equity levels of individual firms
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are aggregated in Module II, for time t, and as we explain below, are 
used in Module III, to construct an inter-temporal trajectory on the 
level of equity and output. In this procedure, we will use their 
assumptions of symmetry in the distribution of equity across the 
population of firms (page 94, GS 1993). In Section 4.8, we conduct 
some experiments to show, that the computer program behaves 
according to the general requirements of the GS model, recognizing 
that the "results" found in their articles, are merely general 
descriptions of how such a system might behave if it were specified 
and simulated, as we have done. Lastly in Section 4.9, using 
numerical simulation, we explore such issues relating to inter-temporal 
behaviour, including chaos and bifurcations, as may exist in the GS 
style model.
We begin with some general observations on the dynamic 
implications of the aversion to bankruptcy assumed in the GS model 
and as specified in the modelled algorithm. As explained in Section
4.3, bankruptcy arises because of the relationship between firm 
specific price realizations and the threshold level, and aversion 
to bankruptcy is attributable, as per GS Proposition II, to the variance 
around firm specific prices. The induced aversion to bankruptcy 
arising from firm specific price variability, we will learn, has inter­
temporal effects. By understanding it, we can better see the effect 
its changes have upon the model's dynamics. Risk aversion is a key 
feature of the model because of the distinction made by GS between 
the risks of using equity and debt capital.1 To understand how risk 
aversion operates in the GS model, and how it effects inter-temporal 
dynamics, we consider the decreasing returns to scale exhibited by 
the relationship between equity and output. Through the one period 
lags between output decisions affecting real wages and dividends, a
'A lthough p ro d u c tive  c a p ita l ,  per se, does no t e n te r th e  
p ro d u c tio n  fu n c tio n , GS do use the  term e q u i t y  c a p i t a l  and 
w o r k i n g  c a p i t a l  to  denote the  f in a n c ia l assets used to  pay wages 
(pages 124-125, 1988) .
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firm's equity position is affected. Under such dynamics, a firm 's 
asset composition has non-neutrai output effects. Output increases 
less than proportionately with increases in assets (debt plus equity), 
or risk ‘aversion increases with the scale and profitability of the 
representative firm, as specified in the following condition:
d q  a
d a  q
(4.25)
The intuition behind assumption equation 4.25 is that the liquidation 
of a multi-national corporation costs more on a percentage of 
valuation basis than the corner grocer. As we recall from Section
4.3, equation 4.13, the cost of bankruptcy increases with output. 
The reason risk aversion has inter-temporal implications is because of 
the dynamic connection between output and equity. Both the initial 
condition of equity and the increases in equity arising from profit 
retention (net of dividends paid), affect the trajectory of long term 
output. According to the GS Modei, the greater the proportion of 
equity in the capital structure, the less chance of bankruptcy 
occurring. (Naturally, without debt, a firm can not go bankrupt.) 
Aversion to bankruptcy, the possibility that i / t+J < i/ r+ u  induces risk 
averse behaviour discouraging borrowing of capital for investment 
thereby reducing the level of output. Increasing the level of equity, 
or increasing the ievel of profit retention over time, increases the level 
of output, but less than proportionately, because of risk aversion. 
Thus from an inter-temporal standpoint, induced risk aversion, arising 
from the variance on firm specific prices, is important because it 
dampens the positive relationship between equity in the firms capital 
structure and output. Output is convex in equity.
The mathematics of risk aversion used in the GS model explain 
further our observations on the inter-temporal implications of equity 
levels. In the GS model (page 108, 1988), by assuming decreasing
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returns to scale, the second derivative of output is negative.
It follows that the elasticity of equity with respect to output is less 
than unity, as per equation 4.25. The value of equity in reducing the 
threat of bankruptcy must be decreasing as the scale of production 
rises, which is tantamount to increasing induced risk aversion.2 A 
given increase in equity increases output, but reduces the threat of 
bankruptcy at a decreasing rate. The dynamic implication of the 
above observations is that risk aversion serves to dampen the effect 
of greater equity on the time path of output: reducing the size of 
oscillations when and if they occur. Dynamically, greater equity 
means greater output, but at a decreasing rate, because of the 
induced, ex ante, risk aversion to bankruptcy displayed by firms 
arising from the possibility that firm specific prices may be below the 
threshold level, as modeled in the cost function. Simulation 
experiments, appearing below in Section 4.8, on variability of firm 
specific prices, verify this relationship, showing the inter-temporal 
nature of risk aversion.
The importance of the above results are shown by briefly 
contrasting them with how the GS model would behave if constant 
returns to scale prevailed, a point which is made in the footnotes to 
the 1988 GS article. With constant returns to scale, risk neutrality 
and constant risk aversion prevail, the GS Model generates different 
solutions. Specifically, output would rise proportionately with 
increases in equity.
a  d q _ 1
q  d a
(4.26)
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2. We use th e  te rm in o lo g y  in  the  sense o f J.W. P ra t t  (1964), 
a lthough  s t r i c t l y  speaking r is k  ave rs ion  re q u ire s  a u t i l i t y  
fu n c t io n ,  and none per se is  suggested by GS. I f  we id e n t i f y  the  
p r o f i t  fu n c t io n  as the  u t i l i t y  fu n c tio n  o f management, we must 
assume th a t  management and ownership are synonymous.
<J>//=0 , <j)/g=4)
(4.27) '
With constant returns to scale and no risk aversion, the optimal 
output is a linear function of equity, a, with a constant of 
proportionality q / a ,  (GS, page 133, 1988). A model with constant 
returns to scale • and no risk aversion would display different 
dynamics.
Turning to some observations on the dynamic properties of the 
GS model, we commence with the role played by dividends. At the 
micro-economic level, dividends together with wages lead to changes 
in equity and hence determine output, as depicted in Figure 3.1 of 
Chapter Three. Dividends and profit retention have inter-temporal 
implications in the GS model through their effect upon the level of 
equity. As GS caution, unless a sufficient amount of profits are 
distributed equity and output may grow explosively. To examine this 
conjecture, in the simulated version of the GS model, as explained in 
Chapter Three, we adopt a fixed percentage rule to investigate the 
effects of different levels of profit retention. In the GS Model, equity 
in time f + 1, consists of equity in period t  plus earnings on that equity 
plus new equity sales less dividends paid, the latter being an 
unspecified random process. These arguments appear in the non­
linear, autonomous, first order difference function, as specified by GS 
for nominal equity of the i ' t h  firm:
A ^ P ^ q t - d + R )  ( P twc<J) ( q * ) - A b ) - M f x
(4.28)
In the GS model, is a random variable representing the nominal 
value of dividends paid less new equity issued. The Equation shown 
in 4.28 is autonomous because time does not enter as a separate
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argument. Although for simulation we have assumed a constant for 
IV ft+ u we note that having an additional stochastic influence upon the 
model, through dividends, as per GS would introduce an additional 
dimensionality in addition to the additional dimensionality from the 
variability on firm specific prices. The effect of higher dimensionality 
is to transform the behaviour of the model away from that of a first 
order process. Equations 4.28 along with 4.24, a n d  the ex ante 
anticipated behaviour in relation to the stochastic firm specific price 
process, accordingto GS, completely describe the dynamic behaviour 
of the Model. The influence of these other variables we look at in 
subsequent sections. Modifying the model's dividend structure, we 
will see, reveals its interesting dynamic properties.
We will validate the GS observation concerning the dynamic 
implications of dividend structure using the calibrated model in 
Section 4.8. For now we offer some observations upon the systems 
dynamics and how they may be interpreted in a broader context. On 
the issue of convergence versus divergence when oscillations are 
present, with reference to the arguments of equation 4.28 we 
consider the effects of changes in equity arising from alternative 
dividend pay-out schemes. Although not proven by GS, when a 
positive margin exists between the cost of funds and the implied 
return on financial capital or "working capital" (page 125, 1988 GS) 
( P t+1/ P t >  r ) ,  increasing profitability and/or increasing the retention 
of net dividends, will render the system less convergent. Increasing 
the capital base encourages investment. A second set of 
observations concerns the nature of equilibrium. At a point in time, 
the GS economy is in equilibrium both on and off the steady state: 
Oscillations are from the steady state, not from equilibrium, giving the 
modei its neo-classical flavour. (Although as we will discover, 
multiple steady-states are possible.) At each point in time, markets 
clear in equilibrium. With regard to the model's cyclic dynamics and 
consequent laws of motion, the firm's internally generated capital lies
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at the heart of its dynamics. With greater profits and possibly 
unrealistic, unchanged profit distribution, dividends in absolute terms, 
increase. Conversely, when profits decline, because of poor firm 
specific prices, with the dividend pay-out rate unchanged, internal 
funds fall, reducing output. In the GS model and in the numerical 
simulation program, such behaviour arises because the level of equity 
affects the "base" from which the dividend dynamics may occur. 
Increases in equity lead to increases in output, with greater 
employment and real wages. Fixed dividends and greater real wages 
reduce profits, decreasing equity, leading to a decline in output... to 
wit, cycles. Equity increases the level of output, while with greater 
gearing (more debt), because of induced risk aversion found in the 
cost function, the result is to render the system more stable. 
Increasing equity relative to debt, reduces the fear of bankruptcy, 
reduces risk aversion, and, if sufficient, allows the dynamic trajectory 
of equity and output, to grow explosively, as expressed in Figure 3.1 
of Chapter 3. Cycles in the GS model, and the consequent laws of 
motion, are autonomous, and are not the result of forcing variables, 
although changes in the latter may alter the trajectory. Such cycles 
are deterministic, autonomous, and self-driven oscillatory phenomena.
To summarize the second set of observations found in Section 
4.6, the dynamic trajectory and model's laws of motion are very 
sensitive to initial conditions in the dividend pay-out ratio, 
profitability, the initial level of equity for a given firm, and firm 
specific price variability. In aggregation the effects may be seen. 
Using the symmetry assumption of GS in the distribution of equity 
across firms, the difference equation for the i ' t h  firm shown in 
equation 4.28 may be aggregated to the following:
a t+1 = <grt - ( l + r )  ( wt<\> ( g t ) - a t ) - m ( a t ) = G ( a t )
(4.29)
if the slope of first order non-linear difference equation, found in
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equation 4.29, as it crosses the 45° line found in a phase diagram 
(logistic space), is negative, the economy represented by the model 
may exhibit single or multiple period cyclic behaviour in output under 
any or ali of the following circumstances:
•  if the firm is insufficiently profitable;
•  If an insufficient level of profits are retained; and
•  If the initial level of equity is sufficiently low and thereby the 
ratio of debt to equity sufficiently high;
In the GS model, when oscillations do occur, they are more likely to 
be convergent, under the following circumstances:
•  if the ratio of debt to equity is high, rendering the phase line 
less steep absolutely;
•  If initial debt is sufficiently great, or if sufficiently large profit 
distribution, occurs; and
•  If, because of induced ex ante risk aversion, firm specific 
price variability is sufficiently large.
Hence, if no new equity were raised and profits were fully distributed, 
the effect on firms forced to borrow increasing amounts of debt to 
support the assets necessary for output growth, would be to dampen 
oscillations, when they are present. (Whether such oscillations are of 
a single period or display multiple periodicity depends upon the non- 
linearity displayed by equation 4.29.) Owing to induced risk aversion 
on the part of firms, the existence of debt dampens oscillations, or 
makes the system more convergent when the trajectory is monotonic, 
a point we show in simulations of Section 4.8. In the model 
developed from the GS articles, we find that low profit retention and 
greater gearing (the ratio of debt to equity) are associated with 
oscillations, and they have a dampening effect upon such dynamic 
behaviour when it occurs because of aversion to bankruptcy. With 
sufficiently greater equity or low conditional probabilities of 
bankruptcy, if oscillations are present, cycles may be explosive. 
Although the dynamics of the GS style model are deterministic, 
increasing the initial condition on the mean of firm specific prices
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(F fu 'J ) or decreasing the variance in such prices, leads to a dynamic 
trajectory in output at a higher level, rendering the system less 
convergent, and possibly divergent in an explosive manner, ceteris 
paribus. A further result which we show below in Section 4.8.
Reconciling such results with received financial theory of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) (hereafter, MM) and neo-classical 
economics, presents a variety of interesting issues relevant to our 
larger concerns of the effect of risk and its management upon macro 
dynamics. In the literature, such issues have received limited 
attention (see, R.Krainer, Chapter 4, 1992). According to MM 
theory, a firm's valuation is unrelated to how its assets are funded. 
Relatediy, in Neoclassical theory dichotomy holds, money is a veil. 
Whereas, in the GS model, the level of equity and the threat to 
changes in valuation, viz bankruptcy, drive output. Secondly, 
according to MM theory a firm's valuation is unrelated to h o w  its 
returns to shareholders are divided between capital gains and 
dividends. The valuation of a firm is determined by the riskiness of 
its net operating income, not its return structure. Increasing debt 
within a firm's capital structure increases systematic (the /? of Capital 
Asset Pricing theory), and hence the rate at which enhanced earnings 
are capitalized. To the extent that such "discounting" occurs, the 
effect upon firm valuation of gearing-up, adjusted for taxes and 
interest deductibility, is minimal or non-existent. In the GS model, the 
special "cost" of debt, versus equity, leads to an adjustment in 
behaviour adding to the model's convergent qualities, stabilizing 
profits and returns. If the stylized result of GS merely derive from a 
reduction in systematic risk, moving downward along the security 
market line; we have a problem from the standpoint of received 
financial theory: Since no change in valuation has occurred, there can 
be no change in the threat of bankruptcy. In contrast, in the 
literature, several explanations for MM non-neutrality arise: In one 
article, it lies with the higher cost of internally generated funds
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(Nance, Smith, and Smithson, 1993); while in another it is seen as 
means to lower the variability of the shadow value of internal funds 
(Froot, Sharfstein, and Stein 1993).3 None of these MM non- 
neutrality perspectives sits well with the GS model. An alternative 
construction might be that the risk aversion in the GS model leads to 
a reduction in company specific risk, such as a change in the cost of 
financing (to the extent that its assets are valued more highly) 
lessening the threat of bankruptcy. Management of risk, through the 
use of options and futures for example, to reduce or eliminate the 
downside implications of the stochastic behaviour of firm specific 
prices, may be viewed as a company specific action to protect 
company specific assets, although it involves market risk, and 
requires certain assumptions regarding the behaviour of such markets. 
Arguably, a construction of risk aversion and risk management as 
applied to the GS model which is consistent with financial theory and 
offers useful insights is found in the William's inter-temporal asset 
allocation paradigm, already mentioned in Chapter Three. As 
described, using the paradigm of William's, risk management might 
be viewed as inter-temporal asset allocation, leading to improved use 
of assets and greater output. In the William's paradigm, r i s k  
m a n a g e m e n t  is not about reducing risk, but rather concerns ensuring 
that returns are commensurate with risk inherent to the firm and its 
business. We explore these issues further in Chapter Five
The last set of observations found in Section 4.6 concern the 
dynamics of the GS model. We begin with model's "conditions" for 
oscillations to occur and thereafter address the issue of non-linearity 
as found in the first-order nature of the difference equation on equity. 
We compare how GS handle non-linearity analytically versus how it 
may be evaluated using dynamic simulation. In the GS model, several
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3 Such arguments are in  a d d it io n  to  the  fo llo w -u p  work by 
M o d ig lia n i and M i l le r  on the e f fe c t  o f taxes upon c a p ita l 
s tru c tu re  (1963).
"conditions" are presented in order for oscillations to occur. Some of 
these are mentioned by GS while others merit clarification. The non- 
linearity of the GS difference equation, we will see, makes the path 
of equity over time, a t, sensitive to the initial value, a 0, along with 
other initial conditions as found in equation 4.29. The slope of the 
difference equation, drawn in phase space, may change, through an 
inflection, one or more times, being positive or negative in one or 
more regions. Furthermore, the point(s) of inflection may be to left 
or right of the 45° line. Depending upon the initial condition on the 
level of equity, for a given firm (which we assume to be equal), will 
tell us whether we are in a region of the phase line where oscillations 
may occur. The second condition relates to the growth in equity, 
arising from retained profits. If the initial amount of equity is small, 
for example, and net dividend distribution, m , is sufficiently large, or 
conversely profit retention is small, and when because of the first 
order conditions on profit maximization the following holds:
( l + r )  <j>V<l
(4.30)
an oscillatory trajectory over time, may arise. For such cycles to 
occur, the increased output must lead to greater wages, leading to a 
sharp fall in profits on the back of a fall in realized firm specific 
revenues. With less equity, and hence more debt, investment in 
working capital falls, leading to less labour, and a fail in real wages. 
In the generation of cycles profit distribution is also important. Over 
time, m ,  as GS explain, the level of dividends, net of new equity 
issued, must be sufficiently large, so that the firm's equity base does 
not grow too fast, leading to an explosive growth in output, and 
producing a trajectory which is non-cyclic, and monotonically
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divergent.3 Such a condition may also arise when there is little debt 
in the firm's capital structure. These observations we confirm in the 
simulations of Section 4.8.
Understanding merely when oscillations occur as per the GS 
article, however, tells us little about the nature of its dynamic 
trajectory because the system modelled is non-linear. By way of 
comparison, for linear systems, a negative sloped phase line implies 
that oscillations will occur, and they will be divergent, if the slope is 
less than minus one in the neighbourhood of the steady-state; and 
convergent if greater than minus one. For a linear phase line, for 
example, a uniform oscillatory path can be produced iff the slope of 
the phase line is Such cycles would oscillate with one iterate 
below and one iterate above the steady-state, and not exhibit the 
multiple periodicity (page 100, GS, 1993) which they claim. But the 
first order difference equation model presented in the GS article, as 
per equation 4.29, is not linear as may be shown. Although GS begin 
their discussion of the models dynamics with reference to the total 
derivative of equation 4.22 above (as found, page 100, GS 1993), 
and as shown in equation 4.31, below, mentioning that its slope as 
it crosses the 45° line must be negative for the trajectory to be 
oscillatory, this statement is somewhat mis-leading, and is only true 
as a tautology. Using G (a t) referring to equation 4.29, we have the 
total differential:
G '=  (1+r) - m l -  ( (1 +r) (Tjrty+^V) -1) H 1
(4,31)
Inspecting the slope of equation 4.31 using a linear approximation
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3 An a l te rn a t iv e  to  a llo w in g  growth in  e q u ity  to  ge ne ra te  an 
e xp lo s iv e  t r a je c to r y  in  o u tp u t, would be to  make th e  n e t d iv id e n d  
p a y -o u t r a t io  an endogenous fu n c tio n  re la te d  to  c a p ita l  s t r u c tu r e  
and th e  o p p o r tu n it ie s  and r is k s  fa c in g  sha reho lde rs  and deb t 
h o ld e rs . Such an approach would be grounded in  a c o n s id e ra b le  
body o f th e o ry  (M o d ig lia n i & M i l le r ,  1961; John L in tn e r ,  1961; 
o r Gordon & Gould, 1979).
around the equilibrium steady state, as GS suggest, provides only 
limited insight. With a non-linear difference equation the dynamic 
behaviour may be much more complex than merely convergent or 
divergent one period oscillations around the steady-state. Cycles of 
two or more periods may occur. Before explaining why, we review 
the approach adopted by GS.
. There are two method of qualitative interpretation of the 
dynamic qualities of non-linear systems, when calibrated simulation 
is not available both involving linearisation in the neighbourhood of 
the steady state. The two most well known are: 1) Applying
Taylor's formula to linearise the function within the neighbourhood of 
the steady state; and 2) Liapunov's direct method which defines an 
energy like function for the dynamical system (Azariadis, pages 58- 
62, 1993). Method one may be used to determine whether or not 
the steady-state is stable. Their use are justified when the system's 
equilibrium is asymptotically stable (pages 469-471, Intrilligator, 
1971).
The mathematics to support the linearisation approach, 
however has several requirements regarding stability which itself can 
be defined in various ways. In Azariadis (pages 58 -59, 1994), we 
note that for systems involving steady long-run equilibrium, there are 
three definitions of stability for a fixed point (a" in the GS article), 
namely:
1. A stationary state is s t a b l e  of a dynamical system 
if all orbits that start near it, stay near it;
2. A stationary state is a s y m p t o t i c a l l y  s t a b l e  if all orbits 
tend to the steady state asymptotically; and
3. A stationary state is s t r u c t u r a l l y  s t a b l e  if the qualitative 
properties of orbits are invariant to small perturbations in the 
continuously differentiable map (G ( a ') in GS). Structural 
stability is concerned with perturbations to initial system 
conditions.
Although GS do not suggest in their article into which definition of 
stability their system would correspond, it is the case that for ail three
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possibilities, a linear approximation of G  in the neighbourhood of an 
equilibrium steady state, may be constructed, so long as the said 
equilibrium is hyperbolic (the generic case), an issue also not pursued 
by GS in either of their articles (1988, 1993). According to such 
theory, in the vicinity of the steady state, a Taylor expansion in the 
form of a linear polynomial of equation 4.29 is a good approximation, 
provided the Jacobian [D g ( a ') ]  matrix is invertible. Topologically 
equivalent systems have the same qualitative dynamical properties4.
Before discussing how numerical simulation of the GS model 
may be undertaken, we consider further the limitations of their 
analytic method, and thereby justify the approach we will utilize. 
Consider the nature of the dynamics found in the GS model and as 
will be performed through numerical simulation. In Section 4.5, we 
explained how expression 4.18, the aggregate supply of output, q ,  
and expression 4.29, the first order non-linear difference equation on 
the level of equity, completely determine the dynamic behaviour of 
the modei. According to the GS article, in order for their model to 
generate cycles, that is not converge to a monotonic state "...the 
level of net equity outflows must be sufficiently large so that the real 
level of equity in the economy does not increase without bound." 
(page 100, GS 1993). Sufficiently large net equity outflows from 
firms may arise because of individual firm level profit distribution 
policies. Cycles may also arise, that is non-monotonic convergence 
to a steady-state may occur, because of sufficient price variability, 
through the risk of bankruptcy, discouraging investment and leading
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4We r e fe r  here to  the  Hartman-Grobman Theorem (A z a r ia d is , 
page 59, 1994) which s ta te s  th a t  i f  a steady s ta te  is  a
h y p e rb o lic  f ix e d  p o in t o f a n o n lin e a r system, then the  n o n lin e a r 
system is  e q u iva le n t up to  a continuous change o f c o o rd in a te s , 
to  a l in e a r  system w ith  a c o e f f ic ie n t  m a trix  from th e  T a y lo r 
expansion.
to unbounded growth in the aggregate level of equity.5 In the GS 
Model, when cycles do take place, with sufficient equity levels, such 
cycles may be divergent and explosive. For deterministic periodic 
cycles to occur requires the slope of the equation 4.29 to be 
negative, for some values of a t. GS base these analytic results on the 
signs found in the total differentia! of equation 4.31 repeated below:
G'~ ( 1 + 8 )  -m/- ( ( 1 + 8 )  ( il r t y + ^ V )  - 1 )  H.'
(4.33)
This expression, as a differential, represents the slope of the first- 
order difference equation on the level of equity. Evaluated at the 
steady-state equilibrium, if it is negative, a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the model to generate cycles, arises when the 
following holds:
( 1 + 8 ) c j/w d
(4.34)
Where, the individual rate of time discount 8  = r, the constant real 
rate of interest. (We note in this context, the sign of derivative 
evaluated at a given point is not, in of itself, a sufficient condition for 
determining whether a system will generate cycles.) Secondly, it 
requires that the profit distribution m r to be sufficiently large or that 
the increased output increases real wages w t sufficiently. According 
to GS, these are the necessary analytic conditions for cycles to occur 
in their modei. (The conditions for when cycles are convergent or 
explosive and whether they exhibit multipie-periodicity is discussed 
in Section 4.7.)
Without clarifying any of the above issues, GS in their article 
appeal to linearisation around the equilibrium steady-state as an
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5A vers ion  to  r is k  a rise s  from the  re la t io n s h ip  between f irm  
s p e c if ic  p r ic e s  and the  th re sho ld  bankruptcy le v e l o f  p r ic e s ,  u [t+I 
and v4,, re s p e c t iv e ly .  Money n e u t r a l i t y  is  no t cons ide red .
approximation of the phase slope, and thereby as a qualitative 
method to describe dynamic behaviour and the possible path to a 
steady-state solution. The asymptotically steady-state interpretation 
for linearisation of the model, as used in the 1993 article (page 100- 
101). By referring to the slope of the total differential, GS appeal to 
the technique of approximating the behaviour of a non-linear system 
in the neighbourhood of the asymptotically steady state by a closely 
related linear system (in footnote 28, page 100, 1993 in which they 
refer to the technique adopted by Grandmount, 1985), Furthermore, 
they note (page 135, 1988) that when " . . . c tf ( u t +}) is linear in a t 
[equity] and that the valuation function for the multi-period decision 
problem is linear in af."; then the "...multi-period decision problem is 
qualitatively identical to the single-period problem...." If this holds, 
the initial level of equity and the next period level of equity, may be 
used as an approximation of the long term dynamic solution. Or, 
formally, Bellman's dynamic programming applies and the principle of 
optimality holds (Chiang, 1992). In this fashion, GS draw their 
observations on the model's dynamics from studying the stability of 
a linear system corresponding to their non-linear system. We replace 
this approach in Section 4.7, explaining how proper numerical 
simulation was undertaken, to examine the model's dynamics by 
calculating the values for equity and output over time. Using the 
developed methodology, in Section 4.8, alternative trajectories are 
computed to reveal general laws of motion along with the sensitivity 
of dynamic solutions to initial conditions. In Section 4.9, we explore 
the dynamic implications of non-linearity still further, showing how 
and when aperiodicity may arise.
In order to appreciate the merits of numerical simulation of non­
linear models, it helps to further discuss the short-comings of the 
linearisation method we have described as used by GS. Linearization 
obscures whether the slope of the non-linear phase line as plotted by 
equation 4.29 changes slope before o r  after it crosses the steady
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state line. Sharp inflection points in logistic maps, so called "tent 
diagrams", may depict chaotic trajectories {Chapter 2, Baker and 
Gollub, 1990). A phase line may cross the steady-state 45° line 
more than once, in a series of piece-wise linear mappings (Section
1.4, Chapter 1, Gulick, 1992). Moreover, non-linearity means that 
with different initial condition, a Q, alternative dynamic trajectories may 
be generated. Considering the slope of the phase line as it crosses 
the 45° obscures these issues. For example, difference equations, 
for example, besides those having a slope of - 1 , may still give rise to 
uniform oscillations (Hoy, et al. pages 672-675, 1996). A phase line 
of sufficient degree, may also change slope more than once. Thus 
the slope of the total differential, as per equation 4.31 above, as 
shown by GS (page 100, 1993} offers insight, subject to many 
qualification: The dynamics implied by a non-linear difference
equation, for example whether a path to a steady state exists, 
whether multiple steady-states solutions exist, bifurcations occur, and 
whether the trajectories are aperiodic or chaotic have several 
requirements. These requirements include the slope it displays before 
or after it crosses the steady state 45° line (d a / d t  — 0 ) ,  how often 
it changes slope, and the initial conditions, our a 0, are all relevant to 
dynamic numerical simulation. As a necessary condition, a one 
dimensional logistic mapping, as a first-order non-linear difference 
equation must be n o n - in v e r t ib le  in order to generate chaotic solutions 
(C h a o s  in  D y n a m i c a l  S y s t e m s ,  page 24, Ott, 1993), but such 
dynamic behaviour demands simulation in order to investigate it. 
Informally, chaos is associated with sensitive dependence to initial 
conditions and aperiodic motion (page 9, Kelsey, 1988).6 
Notwithstanding the complex non-linear dynamics, as noted above, 
it is questionable whether the GS system should be described as first
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6There are seve ra l d e f in it io n s  o f chaos in  use in c lu d in g  
p o s it iv e  to p o lo g ic a l en tropy, p o s it iv e  Liapunov exponents, and 
the  e x is te n ce  o f strange a t t ra c to rs  (page 9, K e lsey, 1988).
order, given the existence of random inputs, notably, the variability 
in firm specific prices. (In which case, the dynamic behaviour of the 
system will exhibit neither steady-states nor periodic cycles.) These 
observations, we will see, imply that in the GS model, the path to 
divergence or convergence may not be uniform, the amplitude of 
oscillations may vary, a steady-state (one period cycle) may never be 
reached, and the dynamic behaviour may resemble, at least, a second 
order system. To understand the models potential dynamic behaviour 
requires specification and simulation of the non-linear difference 
equation to learn how it responds to various forcing variables, and 
initial conditions. Numerical simulation is required to understand the 
dynamic behaviour of non-linear difference and differential equations 
of even first order, as equation 4.29, because analytic solutions, 
generally, do not exist and linearization is of limited interest.
Using the linearization around a single steady-state solution, 
and appealing to the slope found in equation 4.31, as GS have done, 
therefore, is somewhat misleading. As the difference equation model 
is non-linear, equation 4.31 as a differential, is only an approximation 
of the phase line, at a point in time, and depending upon from what 
initial conditions it is evaluated, may not be in the neighbourhood of 
the steady state, or there may be multiple steady-state solutions. 
Linearization around the steady-state, as GS invoke may obscure the 
possibility of slope changes and whether they occur before or after 
the phase line crosses the 45°. The slopes of tangent lines 
evaluated in the neighbourhood of the steady state may be very 
different, especially if one or more inflections occur (Chapter 1, 
Gulick, 1992). Depending upon where the linearized form is 
evaluated, the implied dynamics may be very different. As may be 
shown through numerical simulation, given certain initial conditions, 
sharp sign-changing inflections in the phase line may occur, which is 
the motivation for using numerical simulation rather than analysis. 
Equation 4.31 as a differential of equation 4.29, depending upon
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where it is evaluated, tells us about a slope at a point along the 
curve, not about the slopes of all tangent lines along the curve, 
especially when a discontinuity or sign-changing inflection exists. 
The only information that a derivative evaluated at a steady-state 
gives is whether that particular state is stable or not. Using equation 
4.30 to tell us about the general nature of the system's trajectory 
when it crosses the 45° degree line, is justifiable subject to extreme 
qualification: It may be only an approximation of the slope of
equation 4.29 in the neighbourhood of a stationary state, it ignores 
the issue of whether a sign change, if any, has occurred above or 
below the 45°, and it ignores the importance of initial conditions. 
Moreover, given the implied higher-dimensionality of the GS model, 
it simplifies matters drastically. As is well-known, other deterministic 
trajectories and even multiple equilibria may arise, depending upon 
initial conditions and changes in forcing parameters.7 Introducing 
random inputs introduces further complications.
Apart from the higher order issues, the problem with the 
linearization method adopted by GS is that it ignores the rich 
dynamics found in such non-linear models, Non-linearity and initial 
values affect the GS style model's cyclic periodicity, that is the 
number of period in a cycle and whether such iterations occur above 
or below the steady state. The qualitative linearisation approach used 
by GS side-steps the rich dynamics revealed through numerical 
simulation, because, as mentioned, investigating the dynamic 
properties of non-linear difference equations using analytic 
techniques, is generally not possible. GS assert, without 
substantiation, that their model m a y  generate cycles of multiple 
periodicity (page 100, 1993). Although the GS claim that their model 
exhibits such patterns, is not knowable from the general functions
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A c c o rd in g  to  A z a ria d is , m u lt ip le  e q u i l ib r ia  may a r is e  from  
" . . . m iss ing  i n i t i a l  c o n d itio n s ; s u b je c tive  s ta te  o r param eter 
spaces; . . . .  o r la c k  o f homeomorphism." (page 449, 1993)
presented and the method proposed. According to GS their first order 
difference equation on equity, as shown in equation 4.29 above, is 
non-linear (page 100, 1993); and accordingly the specified functions 
used to model it in the simulation program, involving two 
transcendental functions on wage costs and bankruptcy costs, as 
explained in Section 4.3, are also non-linear. Complex dynamic 
trajectories involving multiple periodicity are important because they 
give the model its business cycle flavour. According to GS, rather 
than the usual single-period, oscillatory type motion with alternating 
values above and below the steady state, they allege that more than 
one observation, over time, may occur above or below the steady 
state. Achieving business cycles featuring multiple periodicity, as GS 
suggest, that is repeated solutions above or below the steady state, 
however, are not observable using linearisation, as the implied 
trajectory merely would oscillate around the steady-state 45° line, 
precluding the possibility of multiple period cycles as they claim for 
their model.8 While an abstract model as GS present, without 
specified functional forms, may exhibit such behaviour in theory, 
linearisation as they appeal to for analytic results, makes it 
unprovable. In point of fact, a key implication of non-iinearity of the 
phase line is that even if the implied trajectory were unstable, the 
path on equity, a t, does not necessarily diverge endlessly to infinity 
or zero. Instead, the trajectory may never converge to the steady- 
state, oscillating within a bounded range or even converge to regular 
multiple periodic behaviour, as we show and discuss below in Figure 
20. Such oscillations, neither convergent nor divergent, may lead to 
fluctuations around the steady state of varying amplitude, producing 
stable limit cycles (Hoy, et al. pages 670-672, 1996).
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8For comparison, we note th a t fo r  second o rd e r d if fe re n c e  
equa tions such dynamic behaviour may occur when th e  ro o ts  are 
complex. The p e r io d ic i ty  may be determ ined u s ing  a m o d ifie d  
c i r c u la r  fu n c tio n  (Sargent, pages 177-179, 1979).
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S t y l i s e d  L o g i s t i c  P h a s e  P l o t  a n d  O r b i t
Figure 20 a t
Expanding, a further problem with the claims made by GS using 
the linearization method relates to the role of initial values. Using 
numerical simulation allows us to see how, for a given phase line, the 
periodicity of the cycles produced depends upon the initial value, that 
is a Q from which the trajectory commences. For certain initial values, 
the dynamic system may bifurcate, that is switch from, say, two 
period oscillation around the steady-state to, for example, a four 
period cycle between bounded values (Azariadis, I n t e r t e m p o r a l  
M a c r o e c o n o m i c s ,  pages 98-99, 1993). Figure 20 below, depicting 
a stylized Phase Diagram we use to illustrate such observations and 
possibilities. Looking at the stylized phase portrait of Figure 20, the 
trajectory is oscillatory explosive for initial values in proximity of the 
steady-state point, since it is less than minus one. Plotting the phase 
line shows us what happens globally, rather than merely making 
observations around the steady-state. From a very small initial 
condition the plotted trajectory first exhibits monotonic convergence, 
however as the neighbourhood of a steady-state is approached, 
bounded oscillations occur. In the Figure, we initially see 
convergence behaviour followed by a limit cycle with upper and lower 
bounds. Following the arrow around the phase portrait reveals the 
following pattern of solutions above and below the steady-state 
(denoting "A" for above, and "B" for below), as shown in Exhibit 4.3 
below. For the quadratic family as depicted in Figure 20, for certain 
initial values, the trajectory may oscillate around the steady-state later 
bifurcating into an aperiodic or chaotic orbit (Hoy et al., pages 674- 
675, 1996). Moreover, sixteen iterations are required until we return 
to where we began. Formally, we would say that such a phase plot 
exhibits a cycle of sixteen periods. For similar phase plots, but with 
different initial conditions we may not see convergence to the steady- 
state but rather a stable limit cycle, with oscillations between these 
two iterates occurring. Cycles having a different number of periods 
may arise. We can see from Figure 20 that by changing the initial
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condition, very different trajectories may be generated.
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ITERATE NUMBER RELATION TO STEADY-STATE
1 B
2 B
3 B
4 A
5 B
6 B
7 A
8 B
9 A
10 B
11 B
12 A
13 B
14 B
15 A
16 B
Exhibit 4.3 Iterates in relation to Steady-State
Since a non-linear phase line may change direction, and because it 
may change direction above or below the 45° line, the possibility for 
repeated equilibrium solutions above or below the steady state is 
created... multiple periodicity, that is cycles of varying length. 
Moreover, it is possible, given certain functional forms as those 
specified for use for the first-order autonomous difference equation
in the GS style model, and appropriate initial values, a t, to generate 
cycles which are bounded around the steady-state and are of varying 
length, or even aperiodic. Such apparently random but actually 
deterministic trajectories, generated by bounded cycles of varying 
length, are known as c h a o s . Chaotic solutions are extremely 
sensitive to initial values and can be described as exhibiting aperiodic 
motion. Chaos is opposite to periodic motion. A requirement for 
chaos is that the first order difference equation, as a one-dimensional 
map, be n o n - i n v e r t i b l e  (page 24, Ott, 1993). The difference equation 
found in equation 4.31, as we see from the above discussion may 
change sign, implying that equation 4.29 is not monotonic, and the 
necessary condition for chaotic solutions, non-invertibility exists. 
Although as we will amplify upon below, in addition to the potential 
from deterministic chaos, the GS model contains a random attractor, 
which further modifies its dynamic behaviour. Applying such theory 
to understanding a GS style model in which micro-economic 
imperfections and constraints are investigated for their effect upon 
dynamic economic behaviour in the aggregate, we see that numerical 
simulation of a non-linear dynamic business cycle model is necessary 
in order to capture the model's rich dynamics, including aperiodicity 
and chaos.
4.7 Modelling Dynamic Simulation
In Sections 4.7 and 4.8 of Chapter 4, we explain how the 
stylized analytic observations found in the GS article relating to 
dynamic behaviour, may be used to explicitly model and simulate 
dynamic solutions. In these Sections, to simulate the GS model, as 
introduced earlier, we iterate the optimization and aggregation 
specifications of Modules I and II, to compute aggregate equity and 
output over time. These procedures and algorithms constitute 
Module III. By simulation of the G (a t) function over time, as appears 
in equation 4.29, we improve upon the linearization approach
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suggested by GS, for the reasons discussed in Section 4.6. As 
explained, we know multiple periodicity cannot be determined using 
linearization around the steady-state, that is, from merely knowing the 
slope of the phase line as it crosses the 45°. Rather to learn the 
behaviour of the entire trajectory, in contrast, a simulation method 
using Modules I, II, and III of the computer program must be used in 
order to learn about the model's rich dynamics. The computer 
program and algorithms used, as we wiii show, behave according to 
the requirements specified in their article, and reveals the model's 
sensitivity to initial conditions. We leave to Section 4.9, investigation 
of the model's order and dimensionality, as well as period doubling 
and aperiodicity as arise from its non-iinearity.
Simulating a version of the GS model dynamically, we 
implement the procedures specified in Module 111 which reiies upon 
the results of Modules I and II to find aggregate solutions for equity 
and output over time. Iterative computation of the simulation 
program of Module I is necessary because no closed form solution to 
the G (a t) exists. Rather, it must be computed by re-optimizing 
Module I, using for example G f a j )  to compute a'2, and using G (a !2) to 
obtain a '3, and so on. Although this could be unde/taken for all 
twenty-five firms over time, for computational simplicity, we have 
relied upon the GS assumptions of symmetry in the distribution of 
equity across the population of firms (page 94, GS 1993), to 
determine an average G ( a ')  relationship over time, for a given firm, 
based upon the average level of equity among the population of 
twenty-five firms in period two. For the selected firm alone, 
successive a 't are calculated through re-optimizing Modules I for forty- 
eight periods further, giving a total trajectory of fifty iterates. The 
result is a vector of G t values which are then applied forward from 
period two to the remaining population of twenty-four individual 
firms. Although the dynamic trajectory for aii firms uses a functional 
average G ( a J ,  price shocks remain unique to each firm. The dynamic
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results for the twenty-five firms are aggregated in Module ii. The 
Module II! algorithm also plots the iterates of a t, and q v  in the manner 
described above, as per the difference equation 4.29, to generates a 
trajectory over time as well as the phase line in logit space. As 
required for simulation, the intercept on the a t axis represents the 
initial amount of equity in period one, which is assumed. After period 
one it is computed internally through the profit maximization process. 
In the simulations, for all periods, we assume a net level of profit 
retention over time, a standard deviation in firm specific prices, and 
a level of technology. As we will discover, the model's dynamics are 
very sensitive to changes in initial values. As we change the 
aforementioned exogenous variables inputs to Module I, so changes 
the aggregate trajectory on equity and output. Using these results, 
we will verify the GS claim that their model's dynamics exhibit cycles 
of exceeding two periods ("multiple periodicity"), that is repeated 
solutions above or below the steady state.
A final point regarding to procedures concerns aggregation. 
According to GS, the level of equity over time, uniquely determines 
the level of output. As introduced in Section 4.5 above, to determine 
the aggregate level of output, we summed the outputs of the 
individual firms. Although the initial level of equity in the simulation 
program is assumed to be the same for all firms, and the successive 
G ( a t) are based upon that of the average firm, over-time with 
individual price shocks, individual equity and output levels per firm 
vary. To simulate the model dynamically, levels of individual firm 
equity and output are summed. Although this procedure arises from 
the aggregation of the outputs of the individual firms, the result 
resembles the functional form found in Figure 6A, of the GS article, 
mapping equity to output. As we will observe in the figures below, 
the dynamic trajectory of output follows that of equity, with a slight 
dampening arising from the functional relationship between equity and 
output at the individual firm level. Lastly, in this context, we note
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that the dynamic trajectories shown are not u n i q u e .  As we will 
show, exposing the population of twenty-five firms to a new set of 
price shocks will generate similar but different trajectories, in terms 
periodicity and convergence. Moreover, different combinations of 
exogenous parameters may produce similarly behaved trajectories.
Before turning to Section 4.8 and showing the dynamic 
behaviour of the GS Model with respect to key parameters, we 
conclude Section 4.7 by ensuring that the approach explained above 
generates dynamic trajectories and such trajectories responds to 
exogenous variables in the manner required by the GS article. Figures 
21, 22, and 23, using different levels of profit distribution over time 
are illustrative. Although GS assume that net dividend outflows are 
stochastic, they still must be sufficiently large to produce cycles. We 
have used, as explained in Section 4.6, a fixed distribution rule on 
dividend polices to see their effect upon the level of equity, as it 
drives output. Although the authors conjecture that higher dividend 
pay-outs net of new equity sales, may determine when and how the 
model will generate cycles, this observation is verified using the 
simulation model. Reviewing the results below, we see that 
simulation validates the analytic claims made by GS on the role of 
dividends in their model. We observe that for particular state 
variables assumed, and as noted in each figure respectively, some of 
the cyclic trajectories generated by the algorithm are of m u l t i p l e  
p e r i o d i c i t y  (cycles are greater than two periods) as conjectured by GS 
in their article (page 100, 1993). In Figure 21, we see a quick 
convergence to a one period cycle, i.e. the steady-state, however, in 
Figure 23, we observe a six period cycle. Figure 24, also shows a six 
period cycle, which if iterated further might converge to an attractor. 
These four simulations validate the observation by GS of the effects 
of dividend retention upon the systems dynamics: Through
sufficiently increasing the level of profits retained, the amplitude of 
cycles will increase, and may even become explosive, because with
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greater equity firms are keen to borrow and invest. Greater equity 
leads to a reduction in ex ante aversion to bankruptcy. Greater 
output leads to higher real wages and with stochastic firm specific 
prices, sudden and unexpected fails in profits and investment. If 
dividend payments are sufficiently small, the oscillations in the 
system may even become explosive, in contrast, increasing profit 
distribution, because it reduces the level of firm equity, stabilizes the 
system because firms exhibit ex ante aversion to bankruptcy. Less 
borrowing, leads to smaller increases in real wages, stabilizing profits 
when prices are lower than anticipated. Paying dividends from the 
profits of investment in working capital over time, serves to reduce 
the level of firm equity, and because of risk aversion, has a 
dampening effect upon output fluctuations. Lastly, in Figure 24, we 
maintain the same level of profit distribution, but expose the 
population of twenty-five firms to a new price shock. As we can see, 
the trajectory is similar in nature, with the largest differences during 
the transient portion, in the beginning. Over-time its path is toward 
the same steady-state solution. Such results resemble the stylized 
trajectory found in Figure 20. The affect of changing other 
exogenous variables, which GS suggest in their article, but do not 
analyze, upon the dynamic trajectory, we consider in the simulations 
found in section 4.8. The simulations reveal the effects of changes 
in the exogenous variables mentioned by GS and which account for 
the model's dynamic characteristics, and show that the developed 
simulation program behaves according the general requirements 
specified in the GS article.
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F i g . 21 .  15% P r o f i t
D is t r ib u t io n ,  I n i t i a l  D/E = 
3.5,  Tech = 4.5,  Sigma = 20%
F i g . 22. 10% P r o f i t  
D is t r ib u t io n ,  I n i t i a l  D/E = 
3.5,  Tech = 4.5,  Sigma = 20%
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F i g . 23. 8% P r o f i t  
D is t r ib u t io n ,  I n i t i a l  D/E = 
3.5,  Tech = 4.5,  Sigma = 20%
AGGREGATE OUTPUT TRAJECTORY
70 600
F i g .  24 .  8% P r o f i t
D is t r ib u t io n ,  I n i t i a l  D/E =
3.5,  T = 4.5,  Sigma = 20%
4.8 Simulations with a GS Style Model
In this next section of Chapter Four, we show further results 
of using the computer program for simulation, relying upon the 
dynamic numerical simulation procedure introduced in Section 4.7. 
In this way we verify that the program responds as claimed by the 
analysis found in the GS article. Again, we note that these 
simulations are not u n i q u e  because of the variability in firm specific 
prices. Dynamic behaviour which is similar, for example convergent 
or of a certain periodicity, but which follows a slightly different 
dynamic trajectory may be generated through new simulations, as will 
be shown.
Turning to the simulations performed, three different sets of 
trajectories of output are computed from the proposed dynamic 
simulation algorithm of Module III, each relies upon changing initial 
conditions of a different exogenous variables, while holding all others 
constant. In addition for some we have shown the effect of a firm 
specific price variability, leaving the parameters unchanged. By 
modifying such state variables, different dynamic trajectories on 
equity and output may be generated. We will see how under certain 
conditions, oscillatory patterns, or cycles, exhibiting both 
convergence and divergence, may be generated. According to GS, 
the rate of profit distribution {dividend retention), uncertainty on firm 
specific prices, and the initial level of equity, all account for cyclic 
fluctuations in the model (page 90, 1993). To verify their 
Propositions, the three sets of simulations conducted, for each of 
which a graph of the dynamic trajectory from simulation is shown. 
The three sets of simulations are the following:
•  The Variability in Firm Specific Prices, Figures 25,26,27 & 28;
•The Initial Amount of Equity, Figures 29,30 and 31; and
•The Level of Technology (Figures 32 and 33).
The three sets of simulations are instructive of how changes in 
various initial conditions for state variables affect the system's
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dynamics as well as illustrating the role of calibration in successful 
simulation. Firm specific price variability, we note is important 
because it affects the anticipated relationship between realized prices 
and the threshold level of bankruptcy. According to GS, the 
"...degree of uncertainty..." is one of the state variables having an 
effect upon the level of investment and output {page 93, 1993), and 
which they suggest "... account for cyclic fluctuations in the model". 
When price variability is greater, it should discourage investment, 
reducing dynamic output. Although the initial conditions on equity 
levels of individual firms will vary over time with individual price 
realizations, the initial level of equity may have an affect which we 
investigate in Figures 29, 30 and 31. Technology is not mentioned 
by GS, however, we have added it via the production function, and 
the results of simulations appear in Figures 32 and 33. Critically, the 
technology parameter allows us to validate one of the GS claims of 
when cycles occur as shown in equation 4.34 above.9 We will also 
discover that by including technology in New Keynesian financial 
market imperfection model, a useful insight will be gained regarding 
when an economy is prone to cyclic behaviour.
We begin our observations on these experiments with those 
relating to the variability in firm specific prices of Figures 25 to 27. 
As suggested, as firm specific price variability increases, investment 
and equity growth is discouraged, dampening the economic cycles. 
The simulations show what happens when the variability in firm 
specific prices is changed. Although all three simulations involve 
osciliatory convergence, we see that the larger the variability in firm 
specific prices, the more quickiy the convergence to a steady-state 
transpires. Holding ail other exogenous parameters constant in the
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A c c o rd in g  GS, in  o rd e r fo r  o s c i l la to r y  cyc les  to  occu r, th e  
c o n d it io n  0 'w  < l / ( l + r ) ,  th a t  is  va lue o f th e  m arg in a l
p r o d u c t iv i t y  o f la bo u r must be le ss  than the  re c ip ro c a l o f th e  
ra te  o f  in te r e s t  p lu s  one. The m arg ina l p ro d u c t iv ity ,  <p' , cannot 
be in v e s t ig a te d  w ith o u t a param eter fo r  techno logy.
three simulations we see the effect of Increasing the standard 
deviation from 15% to 17.5% to 20% has a dampening effect upon 
the cyclic oscillations. With greater variability in firm specific prices, 
risk aversion leads firms to reduce their output, rendering the 
trajectory increasingly stable. Although investigated in detail later, for 
interest, Figure 28 show the effect of a firm specific price shock, 
holding price variability unchanged from 20%. Given a new set of 
firm specific price shocks across the population of twenty-five firms 
a new unique trajectory may be generated, displaying similar Laws of 
Motion, however.
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700
Figure 25. 15% Sigma, Tech = 5, 
P r o f i t  D is t r ib u t io n  = 8%,
I n i t i a l  D/E = 3 . 5
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F igu re  26. 17.5% Sigma, Tech = 
5, P r o f i t  D is t r ib u t io n  = 8%,
I n i t i a l  D/E = 3.5
AGGREGATE OUTPUT & EQUITY
TRAJECTORIES
TOC
F igu re  27. 20% Sigma, Tech -  5, 
P r o f i t  D is t r ib u t io n  = 8%,
I n i t i a l  D/E = 3 . 5
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P r o f i t  D is t r ib u t io n  = 8%,
I n i t i a l  D eb t/E qu ity  = 3.5
Experiments on the initial amount of equity, Figures 29 and 30 
confirm the effects of greater equity on investment and cyclic 
periodicity. In Figure 29, after the transient phase, we see cycle of 
six periods in length. In Figure 31, we use the same state variables 
as Figure 30, but with a different firm specific price shock, that is a 
different drawing of normally distributed firm specific prices was 
used. Importantly, we see that the trajectory is similar, but not 
exactly. (As we take-up in Section 4.9, even for a given trajectory, 
the variability in firm specific prices serves to introduce a higher 
dimensionality to the GS system.) With insufficient levels of equity, 
the risk of bankruptcy from greater borrowing discourages 
investment, dampening equity creation, as the results show. The 
initial level of equity is important because it is from this base, 
optimising over time, that the model solves for an new optimal 
amount of debt of i ' t h  firm, given the initial level of equity and the 
firm specific price shocks. Over-time because of firm specific price 
variability, levels of equity of individual firms will vary and hence no 
assumptions may be made, but as we see because the cycles are
i
deterministic (apart from the additional dimensionality introduced from 
firm specific price variability), initial conditions play an important role. 
In systems exhibiting aperiodic motion, that is deterministic chaotic 
behaviour, the trajectory is very sensitive to changes in initial 
conditions. The initial conditions on the population of twenty-five 
firms has persistent effects upon output and employment decisions 
which affect wages and ultimately profitability which may reduce 
output in the next phase of the business cycle. We see that equity 
increases the level of output, while with greater gearing (more debt), 
because of induced risk aversion found in the cost function, the result 
is to render the system more stable. Increasing equity relative to 
debt, reduces the fear of bankruptcy which may occur because of the 
relationship between firm specific prices and the threshold level, as 
explained earlier in Chapter Four. With sufficiently greater equity, risk 
aversion may be reduced, allowing the dynamic trajectory of equity 
and output, to grow explosively, as shown in Figure 3.1 of Chapter 
Three.
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From  the  s im ulations w e  see th a t  th e  c o m p u te r  p ro g ra m  
b e h a v e s  accord ing  to  the an a ly t ic  c la im s m ade  by G S using g en era l  
fu n c t io n a l fo rm s. Aii o f  these  s im ula tion  results correspo nd  w i th  and  
v a l id a te  w h a t  GS claim  in th e ir  artic les as to  h o w  th e  m od el should  
resp o n d , w h ile  calibration s h o w s  th e  sharp sens it iv ity  o f  in te r ­
te m p o ra l  d ynam ics  to  initial co nd it ions , as w e ll as th o s e  held c o n s ta n t
o v e r  the  tra jec to ry , such as the variability in firm spec if ic  prices and  
th e  p e rcen tag e  o f profits d istributed. Particularly in terest in g  is h o w  
f irm  specific  price shocks m odify  the tra jectory  w i th o u t  c h a n g in g  its 
over-a ll d yn am ic  quality . An  im portant intuition th ro u g h o u t  is th a t  
w ith  greater eq u ity , because the fear of b an kru p tcy  is re d u c e d ,  
grea te r  in v e s tm e n t leads to  higher real w a g e s  and  in creas ing  
e m p lo y m e n t  w h ic h  in th e  nex t phase of the business c y c le ,  re d u ces  
profits  and o u tp u t .  W ith  greater equity and less fea r  o f  b a n k ru p tc y ,  
in v e s tm e n t is en cou raged , creating a demand-pul! e f fe c t  upon  real 
w a g e s .  U nder such dynam ics , the size of oscillations in c rease . W i th  
v e ry  little deb t in th e  capital s tructure, the g row th  in e q u ity  m a y  e v e n  
render th e  d y n a m ic  sys tem , explosive.
Turn ing  lastly to experim ents  on the level o f  te c h n o lo g y ,  
Figures 3 2  and 3 3 ,  w e  report some interesting results w h ic h  in itia lly  
m a y  appear coun ter- in tu it ive , but upon reflection m ake  c o n s id e ra b le  
sense. In these  tw o  experim ents  the only change is th e  te c h n o lo g y  
p a ra m e te r  used in the production function as exp la ined  in S e c t io n  
4 . 2 .  A ltho ug h  GS do not include a technology p a ra m e te r  in th e ir  
production  fun ction , one w as  required for calibration  and it is 
in teresting for its e ffec ts  upon the m odel's  dynam ic  qualit ies . U s ing  
various coeff ic ien ts  on the  tech no logy  coeffic ient, holding o th e r  s ta te  
variab les  co n s tan t,  the  model w as  simulated to d e te rm in e  th e  e f fe c t  
upon th e  m o d e l's  o u tp u t tra jec tory  (see, foo tnote  8 a b o v e ) .  B e tw e e n  
Figures 3 2  and 3 3 ,  th e  tech no logy  coeffic ient w a s  increased  f ro m  4  
to  5 as s h o w n . Surprisingly, w e  see that w ith  a h ig her leve l o f  
te c h n o lo g y  or p roductiv ity , th e  econo m y is m o re  s tab le . H o w  is th is  
possible? O ne m ight have th o u g h t that as th e  e c o n o m y  as 
represented  by the  model, becom es more p ro d u c t iv e ,  t h a t  is 
producing  g reater  levels of ou tpu t from the  s a m e  in p u ts ,  
accu m u la t in g  equ ity , it w ou ld  becom e less stable ab so lu te ly  ca u s in g  
g rea te r  am plitude  in equilibrium output, but w e  find th a t  th is  is not  
th e  case. O th er  e f fec ts ,  h o w e v e r ,  appear to dom ina te .
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Recalling the  nature of determ in istic  cyc les  in th e  G S e c o n o m y ,  
as depicted  in Figure 3 .1 ,  will help to  expla in  w h y .  C y c le s  in th e  G S  
m odel, and th e  con seq u en t law s of m otion , are a u to n o m o u s ,  s e lf ­
driven , determ in istic  oscilla tory  p h en o m en a . T h e y  a re  n o t  th e  resuit  
o f forc ing  variables or exo g en o u s  s tochastic  p e r tu rb a t io n s ,  a lth o u g h  
ch anges  in the  fo rm er m ay a iter the  t ra je c to ry ,  in th e  G S  e c o n o m y  
all capita l b o rro w ed  in t im e t  m ust be used as w o rk in g  cap ita l to  pay  
w a g e s  and d ividends out o f  profits w h ich  has a lre a d y  b e e n  c o m m it te d  
to  in th e  previous period. T h e  tim e lag b e tw e e n  th e  b o rro w in g  o f  
w o rk in g  capital and its use plays a critical role in th e  G S M o d e l .  
W h e n  profits are s trong, f irm s are e n c o u ra g e d  to  in crease  th e ir  
bo rrow ing  o f w o rk ing  capital to  hire and p ay  n e w  w o r k e r s ,  increasing  
real w a g e s .  A n increased w a g e  bill, h o w e v e r  w h e n  p ro fits  are b e lo w  
antic ipated  levels has pers is tent e ffec ts .  If p rofits  a t  t im e  t  a re  b e lo w  
w h a t  w a s  antic ipated  w h e n  the  capital w a s  b o rro w e d  to  p a y  w a g e s ,  
it m ay  crea te  a situation w h e re  higher real w a g e s  lead to  lo w e r  
profits. Thus  cycles in th e  GS m odel arise b e c a u s e  o f  th e  
com bina tion  of suff ic iently  large distribution o f  p ro fits  w i th  g rea te r  
in v e s tm e n t leading to  g reater real w a g e s .  G re a te r  real w a g e s  reduces  
profits, decreasing equity , especially  w h e n  realized f irm  sp ec if ic  prices  
are lo w , leading to a decline in o u tp u t . . .  to  w i t ,  c y c le s .  But w h y  
should m ore productive  tech n o lo g y  stabilize th e  e c o n o m y ?  T h e  
reason appears  to  lie w ith  th e  implied labour - te c h n o lo g y  t ra d e -o f f  
arising fro m  alternative  levels of p ro du ctiv ity . W e  u n d e rs ta n d  th a t  GS  
m odel cyc les  are driven by th e  lag and u n c e r ta in ty  w i th  regard  to  
bo rro w in g  w ork ing  capital and using it to pay real w a g e s .  U n d e r  such  
cond it ions, greater g ro w th  and o u tp u t will raise real w a g e s  w h e n  
realized profits are b e lo w  antic ipated  levels. T h e  fall in profits  leads  
to  less borrow ing  of w o rk in g  capital and in v e s tm e n t ,  red uc ing  real 
w a g e s  in the  next period, if th e  tech n o lo g y  level o f  an e c o n o m y  w e r e  
very  productive , achieving the  sam e level o f  o u tp u t  w i th  less labour  
w o uld  be possible. Given the  level of eq u ity ,  w ith  b e t te r  te c h n o lo g y ,
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th e  sam e  level o f  o u tp u t m ay  be ach ieved  w ith  less resort to  
b o rro w in g . Reducing the  need to b o rro w  w o rk ing  cap ita l in order to  
pay  a w a g e  bill because of m ore productive  te c h n o lo g y , lessens th e  
th r e a t  o f  raising real w ag es  possibly w h e n  it is unsusta inab le . In 
c o n tra s t ,  an e c o n o m y  w ith  a lo w  level o f p roductive  te c h n o lo g y  m ust  
b o r ro w  th a t  m uch more in w o rk in g  capital to pay its w a g e  bill, 
increas ing  real w a g e s  and entering into co m m itm e n ts  w h ic h  m ay  not  
be susta inab le  if th e  eco n o m y turns sour. For these  reasons, w e  see  
th a t  w ith  m ore productive  tech n o lo g y , the  e c o n o m y  is m o re  s table; 
and w i th  less productive  tech n o lo g y , the ec o n o m y  is le s s  s tab le , as 
s h o w n  a b o ve  by com paring  Figures 3 2  and 3 3 .  A lth o u g h  m ore  
p ro d u c t iv e  tech n o lo g y  does increase the return to b o rro w ed  w o rk in g  
cap ita l ,  it w ou ld  appear th a t  the labour p ro du ctiv ity  t ra d e -o f f  
d escribed  above  appears to do m ina te ,  as s h o w n  in th e  Figures. By  
ad d ing  th e  tech n o lo g y  co effic ien t to the  production fun ction  found  in 
th e  GS M o d e l,  specify ing it explic it ly  and including it in th e  d y n a m ic  
s im u la t io ns , w e  add to kn o w led g e  about the  dynam ics  o f such N e w  
K eyn es ian  models and s h o w  its re levance to  other c o n te m p o ra ry  
research .
T h e  results, for exam p le , m ay  explain w h y  a highly p rod uctive  
e c o n o m y  such as the  United S ta tes  appears to  exhib it less oscillations  
f ro m  around trend , w h ile  the labour intensive econ om ies , for e x a m p le ,  
in th e  develop ing  w orld  are more prone to cyclic oscillations. A  
fu r th e r  im plication o f the  ab o ve  results w ou ld  be th a t  cyc les  in a 
deve lo p in g  cou ntry  w ith  lo w  levels of productiv ity  have  en d o g en o u s  
so urces  w h ic h  m ay  be in addition to  or in ter-ac t w ith  ex o g e n o u s  
sh o c k s .  Such observations relating to h o w  levels o f p ro d u ctiv ity  
in f lu en ce  econ om ic  stability h ave counterparts  in c o n te m p o ra ry  
research . Referring to developing econom ies, accord ing  to  th e  
research  s u m m ary  on the topic  o f stability and a g g re g a te .e c o n o m ic  
a c t iv i ty  found in Lai & M y in t  (page 2 1 6 ,  1 9 9 6 ) ;  " . . . in s tab il i ty  in 
g ro w th  rates does not necessarily lead to poor overall g ro w th
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p e rfo rm a n c e ."  The  techno logy  param ete r  results are a lso  in te re s t in g  
f ro m  th e  standpoint o f th e  N e w  Classical K y d la n d -P re s c o t t  
" tech n o lo g y  shocks" literature, as it a llow s one to  co n s id e r  th e  e f fe c t  
o f  a "shock" or perturbation in the  level o f  te c h n o lo g y ,  b u t  here  
applied in a N e w  Keynesian setting, involv ing m ic ro -m a r k e t  
im perfectio ns  and endogenous cycles . In a f in an c ia l  m a rk e t  
im p erfec t ion  N e w  Keynesian model, such  shocks  m ig h t  h a v e  
asym m etr ica l effects . A  "shock" to  a N e w  Keynes ian  e c o n o m y  o f  th e  
G S fo rm u la t ion , involving an increase in p ro d u ctiv ity ,  m ig h t  re n d e r  th e  
e c o n o m y  more stable, as it reduces the  im p o rtan ce  o f  th e  b o r ro w in g -  
in v e s tm e n t - real w a g e  bill - profit  spiral. W h ile  if th e  p ro d u c t iv i ty  o f  
te c h n o lo g y  suddenly fell, necessita ting  more labo ur in te n s iv e  
te c h n o lo g y  to sustain output, the  e c o n o m y  m ay  be re n d e re d  less 
stab le  and more prone to  cyclic oscillations o f  g rea te r  a m p l i tu d e .  W e  
see fro m  these  results th a t  including the  te c h n o lo g y  p a ra m e te r  in th e  
sim ula ted  GS model provides several insights w ith  re s p e c t  to  th e  
d y n a m ic  behaviour of this N e w  Keynesian model.
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4 . 9  Cycles , Chaos and D im ensionality  in a Non-L inear S ys tem
In the  last section o f C h ap ter  Four w e  exam ine  fu rth er  th e  rich 
dyn am ics  found in the  GS style model w h ich  has been modelled  and  
sim ula ted  using the c o m p u te r  program . As explained in Section  4 . 6  
ab o v e ,  analysis relying upon linearization around the  s tead y  s ta te ,  as 
ad o p ted  by GS in their article has its uses, but ignores such  
possibilities as sign changes in the  phase line, multiple equilibria, the  
im p ortan ce  of initial conditions, and such phenom enon as b ifurcation  
and chaos. In addition, in Section 4 . 9  w e  address the  question o f  
order and d im ensionality  in the  GS m odel, considering w h e th e r  it is 
properly  first order, and if not w h a t  the  implications are for dynam ic  
behav iour. W e  begin by enlarging upon our previous discussion o f  
th e  dynam ics  o f non-linear first-order d ifference equations.  
W h e re a f te r ,  w e  apply our rem arks to  the dynam ics generated  by  
sim ulation o f  th e  GS style model.
In Section  4 .6 ,  w e  noted the  stability conditions for s tead y-  
sta te  equilibrium are th a t  the  slope of the  phase line in abso lu te  value  
as eva lua ted  for the  derivative , G j  as per equation 4 .3 1  ab o ve , m ust  
be less than  unity  at the  s tead y-s ta te .  A n  unstable tra jec to ry  arises  
if th e  absolu te  value o f the  derivative, G j  as per eq uation  4 .3 1  
ab o v e ,  is g reater th an  unity at th a t  point. W hile  this result is useful 
for qualita t ive  analysis o f linearized system s, as it a llow s one to  
dete rm in e  the  ex is tence  and assess the stability o f a s tea d y -s ta te  
equilibrium; it has its limitations. Firstly, as a s te a d y -s ta te  
equilibrium , it represents only local stability not global stability .  
S eco n d ly ,  linearization ignores a m odel's  co m p lex  d ynam ics , in 
particu lar such phenom en on  as period doubling (b ifurcations),  
aperiodic  tra jectories and chaos. Further, linearization ignores the  
im po rtance  o f initial conditions outside the ne ighbourhood o f the  
s te a d y -s ta te .  For exam p le , a system  m ay display oscillatory  
c o n v e rg e n c e  to  a s tead y -s ta te  point, call it a *, from  a point in the  
neighbourhood o f  it, but m ay  not necessarily converge  to  it from  a ll
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initial conditions. Deciding w h e th e r  linearization is justif ied , h o w e v e r ,  
is co m plica ted  by the  fa c t  th a t  no tes t  exists for global stability  exists  
(H oy , page 6 6 8 ,  1 9 9 6 ) .  Linearization around the s tead y -s ta te  o f n o n ­
linear f irs t-order d iffe ren ce  equation , as appealed to by GS, obscures  
such possibilities.
To  exp an d  fu rther upon this th em e, a key prob lem  w ith  
l inearization around a s teady-s ta te  equilibrium is th a t  it obscures the  
possibility o f sign changes in the  derivative , G 7 found in expression  
4 .3 1  o f the  non-linear d iffe rence  equation , 4 . 2 9 .  A  ch an ge  in sign 
m a y  lead to  very  com plex  dynam ics w h e re  the  system  displays both  
oscilla tory and m onoton ic  phase line segm ents  (Hoy, page 6 7 4 ,  
1 9 9 6 ) ,  as w e  first sh o w ed  above in Figure 2 0 .  Non-linear d if fe rence  
equ atio ns  w h ic h  produce parabola shapes m ay display d yn am ic  
behav iour, such as cycles w h ich  repeat them selves  a fte r  t w o  or more  
periods, and even ergodic chaos, in w h ich  there  is no a p p a re n t  
regu larity  in th e  behaviour o f the  tra jec tory , as w e  s a w . Such phase  
lines w h ic h  changes  slope m ay display a peak either to  right or to the  
left  o f th e  4 5 °  axis. A n  exam ple  of the fo rm er w e  s h o w e d  in the  
stylized Phase D iagram  o f Figure 2 0  in Section 4 .6 ,  w h ic h  begins  
w ith  m on oton ic  co n verg en ce , fo llow ed  by multiple period oscillations  
in th e  neighbourhood o f the  s teady  state . In Figure 2 0  o f Section  
4 . 6 ,  w e  s a w  it to o k  s ixteen iterations until the  cycle  w a s  co m p le ted .  
O n e m ay  also constru c t o ther non-linear phase lines exhibiting  
oscillations w h ich  never co nverg e  to  the  s teady-s ta te ,  but instead  
oscillate w ith in  a bounded range or limit cycle of tw o  periods or 
longer. D yn am ic  simulation of the  GS M odel, m ay gen era te  plots in 
phase space featuring  limit cycles or a lternatively  plots w h ich  do not 
d isplay cycles o f any length but remain bounded. W h e n  such orbits  
and tra jectories  display no regularity  and are very  sensitive to  chan ges  
in initial values a 0, the  tra jec to ry  m ay be c h a o t ic ,  (page 4 2 ,  Baker &
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Goliub, C h a o tic  D y n a m ic s ,  1 9 9 0 L 10 A final reason w h y  linearization  
is inad eq uate  relates to  th e  n o n - in v e r t ib i l i ty  o f  the map generated  by 
G fa J . As m ay be s h o w n  from  our description o f the  GS sys tem ,  
a lth o u g h , apart  from  the  variability  in firm specific prices (as w e  
explain  b e lo w ),  one m ay  predict a t+1 from  ay, there  is a m b ig u ity  in 
try ing  to  re trodict a t from  a t+1. A  necessary condition for a n y  one  
dim ensional m ap to exh ib it  chaotic  behaviour is th a t  it be non-  
invertib le  (page 9 0 ,  Baker &  Gollub, 1 9 9 0 ) . 11 As a useful 
i l lustration, such chaotic  tra jectories m ay occur w ith  the  so-called  
te n t-m a p , as expla ined b e low .
W e  can see from  Figure 2 0  o f Section 4 . 6  h o w  the  orbit around  
th e  s te a d y -s ta te  w ou ld  be very  sensitive to changes in the  initial 
condit ion  on equity . T h e  com plex  dynam ics arose from  th e  parabolic  
shape described by the  phase line. In the  so-called te n t-m a p  w e  see  
even  g reater sensitiv ity  to initial conditions in w h ich  chaos is readily  
o b served , as s h o w n  b e lo w  in Figure 3 4 .  A nalytically , th e  te n t  fam ily  
m ay  be said to  consist o f functions Tp defined accordingly:
T^ (a t ) = 2|iat f o r  0<.at<>0.5
T^ (a t ) = 2| i, ( l-a t) f o r  0 .5 < a t^ l
( 4 .3 5 )
As m a y  be s h o w n , increasing p  lifts the height o f the  te n t  graph. In 
Figure 3 4 ,  th e  represented ten t  graph has a p  o f  5 /6  and has tw o
fixed points, one at zero and the  second w h e re  the  phase line crosses
th e  4 5 °  line. For a given te n t  style phase line, w ith  p iece -w ise  linear 
seg m en ts , depending  upon from  w h e re  the orbit begins, very  d if fe ren t  
tra jec tories  m ay be p lotted , w ith  vary ing  num ber o f periods per cyc le .
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10We a re  r e f e r r i n g  t o  o b s e r v a b le  o r  e r g o d i c  chaos  as 
c o n t r a s t e d  w ith  t o p o l o g i c a l  chaos in  th a t  we c o n s id e r  th e  
f r a c t i o n  o f  a l l  p o s s ib l e  i n i t i a l  c o n d i t io n s  g e n e r a t in g  c h a o t i c  
o r b i t s  ( L i  & Y o rke , 1975 ). See, pages 106-107, A z a r i a d i s ,  1994.
nSee F o o tn o te  6 above on th e  d e f i n i t i o n s  and c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  
chaos based  on K e ls e y  (1 9 8 8 ).
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The Tent Map with Aperiodic Orbit
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F ig u re  34. Ten t Map (page  54, 
Chaos, A . V. Holden , E d i t .  1986)
O th er  phase lines of the  ten t  style m ay display not one but m any  
sharp inflection points, w ith  consequently  m any fixed points, th a t  is 
w h e re  the  4 5 °  is crossed (C hapter 2 , D. Gulick, 1 9 9 2 ) .  S tretch ing  
and fo ld ing, as is found in the ten t  style map, is co m m o n  to m an y  
non-linear d iffe rence  equations and is associated w ith  chaotic  
b ehav iour, and the  sensitiv ity  of trajectories to initial conditions  
(pages 3 3 - 3 6 ,  D .G u lick , 1 9 9 2 ) .  From consideration o f  such  
p h e n o m en o n , w e  see th a t  linearization around the  s tead y -s ta te  
obscures such possibilities as global instability, multiple s tead y -s ta te  
equilibria, and chaos (page 9 1 ,  D .G ulick , 1 9 9 2 ) .  D eterm in is tic  
dynam ica l system s can generate  chaotic  dynam ics, appearing very  
irregular (Boldrin & W o o d fo rd ,  1 9 9 0 ) .  Phase portraits w ith  sharp  
inflection points, as the  ten t  m ap, are useful in understanding  the  
d yn am ic  behaviour derived from  simulating the GS style m odel,  
because  the  plot o f G (at) is not sm ooth  and changes signs. T h e  
m ethod  developed  in Sections 4 .7  and 4 .8  for s imulation o f  th e  n o n ­
linear d if fe ren ce  equation will a l lo w  us to exam ine som e aspects  of  
th e  non-linear, d ynam ic  behaviour found in the specified version of  
th e  GS m odel. Below , w e  will s h o w  th a t  the simulated GS m odel is
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non-linear d if fe rence  equations and is associated w ith  chaotic  
behav iour, and the  sensitiv ity  o f trajectories to  initial conditions  
(pages 3 3 - 3 6 ,  D .G u lick , 1 9 9 2 ) .  From consideration o f  such  
p h en o m en o n , w e  see th a t  linearization around the  s tead y -s ta te  
obscures such possibilities as global instability, multipie s tead y -s ta te  
equilibria, and chaos (page 9 1 ,  D .G ulick , 1 9 9 2 ) .  Determ in istic  
dynam ica l system s can generate  chaotic  dynam ics, appearing  very  
irregular (Boldrin &  W o o d fo rd ,  1 9 9 0 ) .  Phase portraits w ith  sharp  
inflection points, as the  ten t  m ap, are useful in understanding  the  
d y n a m ic  behaviour derived from  simulating the GS sty le  modei, 
because  th e  plot o f G (a )  is not sm ooth  and changes signs. T h e  
m ethod  developed in Sections 4 . 7  and 4 .8  for simulation of th e  n o n ­
linear d iffe rence  equation  will a l lo w  us to exam ine som e aspects  of  
th e  non-linear, dynam ic  behaviour found in the specified version of  
th e  GS model. B elow , w e  will s h o w  th a t  the simulated GS m odei is
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The Tent Map with Aperiodic Orbit
F ig u r e  34. T en t Map (page 54, 
Chaos , A .V . Holden , E d i t .  1986)
O th er  phase lines o f th e  te n t  style m ay display not one but m any  
sharp  inflection points, w ith  consequently  m any fixed points, th a t  is 
w h e re  the  4 5 °  is crossed (C hapter 2 , D. Gulick, 1 9 9 2 ) .  S tre tch ing  
and fo ld ing, as is found in th e  te n t  style map, is c o m m o n  to  m any  
non-linear d iffe rence  equations and is associated w ith  chaotic  
behav iour, and th e  sensitiv ity  of trajectories to initial conditions  
(pages 3 3 - 3 6 ,  D .G u lick , 1 9 9 2 ) .  From consideration o f  such  
p h en o m en o n , w e  see th a t  linearization around the s tead y -s ta te  
obscures such possibilities as global instability, multiple s tea d y -s ta te  
equilibria, and chaos (page 9 1 ,  D .Gulick, 1 9 9 2 ) .  D eterm in is tic  
dyn am ica l system s can generate  chaotic  dynam ics, appearing  very  
irregular (Boldrin & W o o d fo rd ,  1 9 9 0 ) .  Phase portraits w ith  sharp  
inflection points, as the  ten t  map, are useful in understanding  the  
d yn am ic  behaviour derived from  simulating the GS sty le  m odel,  
because  the  plot o f G (a )  is not sm ooth  and changes signs. T h e  
m eth o d  developed in Sections 4 .7  and 4 .8  for simulation o f th e  no n ­
linear d if fe ren ce  equation  will a l lo w  us to exam ine som e aspects  of  
th e  non-linear, dynam ic  behaviour found in the specified version o f  
th e  GS m odel. Below , w e  will s h o w  th a t  the simulated GS m odel is
cap ab le  o f  generating , such dynam ics as aperiodic ch ao tic  orbits  
around a s tead y  state  and sensitiv ity  to initial conditions.
A  fu rther set o f observations about the dynam ics o f non-linear  
phase w h ic h  will assist us in interpreting the sim ulated results  
con cerns  bifurcations o f dynam ic  trajectories. Formally, w e  can  
describe bifurcations accordingly: If w e  consider a fam ily  of
dynam ica l system s as those  generated by changing the  initial values  
or exo g en o u s  param eters  as found for exam ple , in equation  4 .3 1  
a b o ve , w e  have the  fo llow ing  general form:
x t+1=F(xt;a) F :R nx Rm^ XxQ-+X
( 4 .3 6 )
Equation 4 . 3 6  is indexed upon the  param eter a  E  Cl. As a  varies, so 
will the  d ynam ic  solutions o f the  system . Small changes in initial 
values  or o ther param eters  m ay not a f fec t  the qualitative s tructure  of  
th e  s y s te m 's  orbits, a lthough as w e  sh ow ed  in Section  4 .8 ,  for  
suff ic ien tly  large changes, qualitative changes in dynam ics  will occur.  
W h e n  suffic iently  large changes w h ich  lead to qualitative ch anges  in 
th e  s y s te m 's  orbit s tructure  and dynam ic  tra jectory , such as the  
periodic ity  o f the  cycle  doubling, a bifurcation is said to  have  
occurred . B ifurcations of dyn am ic  trajectories arising from  changes  
in s tructural param eters  or initial values, m ay produce changes in the  
n u m b er o f  s teady  states, and the  nature of orbits in the  
neighbourhood  of a given equilibrium. Even if a s tead y -s ta te  solution  
co ntinues  to  ex ist and respond sm ooth ly  to changes in structural  
param eters ,  as the  exogenous variables used for s imulation in Section  
4 . 8 ,  th e re  can still be changes in the  type  of s teady-s ta te  equilibria. 
W h e th e r  such changes occur, depends upon the  m odulus o f its 
e igenva lues  (Azariadis, page 6 3 ,  1 9 9 4 ) .  T hree  well k n o w n  types  of  
b ifurcations are the  fo llow ing:
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• T h e  Sadd le -N od e Bifurcation;
• T h e  Flip Bifurcation; and
• T h e  H o p f Bifurcation.
Illustrating th e m , in Figures 3 5 ,  3 6 ,  and 3 7  w e  s h o w  som e stylized  
exam ples  o f these  bifurcations involving o n e-p aram eter  fam ilies o f  
discrete  system s. T h e  Sad d le -N o de Bifurcation o f Figure 3 5 ,  w e  see  
t w o  hyperbolic  equilibria, one stable and one not, a t  th e  b ifurcation  
point a0, producing a fold pattern . The  Flip Bifurcation o f  Figure 3 6  
has a single real e igenvalue on the  boundary o f the  unit circle w ith  
va lu e  o f -1 .  For small perturbations to the  p aram eter  a, th e  stability  
ty p e  o f  the  dynam ical system  changes. In Figure 3 7  w e  illustrate the  
H o p f B ifurcation w h ich  arises w h e n  eigenvalues are co m p lex  
con jug ates  w ith  modulus 1 . 12 As w e  have seen from  plots o f the  
tra jec tories  o f  the  GS m odel, changes in the num ber of periods per 
cyc le  m ay  occur, w ith  a change in a param eter va lue . Such  
p h en o m en o n  will be sh o w n  be lo w  in the phase portraits arising from  
fu r th e r  sim ulation.
Tho Flip Bifurcation
 ^ Pcrtod Tvyc pu.
/)C>C /
1 Peitod Ono PU.
1 ^ PertotpTVro Pt*.
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F ig .  3 5 Sadd le  Node F ig .  3 6 The F l i p
B i fu r c a t i o n  B i fu r c a t io n
I2That i s ,  \j - a + i b  and \2 = a -  i b  w i th  d e t  -  \ ,\2 =  a2 + 
b2 = | X j2 = 1 which r e q u i r e s  th a t  \a\ < 1 ,  and t h e r e f o r e  th a t  th e  
t r a c e  = \7 + \2 =  2a e (-2,2) .
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Ttw Hopf Bifurcation
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F ig .  3 7 The Hopf 
B i fu r c a t i o n
As presented , the  GS model is a first order a u to n o m o u s  
d iffe ren ce  equation  system , w h ich  because of non-linearity  m ay  
exh ib it  quite com plica ted  d ynam ics. In the  1 9 9 3  article, GS present  
the ir  d if fe ren ce  equation  as th e  fo llow ing , from  equation  4 .2 9 :
<3fc+l =  G ( & t )
( 4 .3 7 )
But is this an accu ra te  specification o f their system? W e  k n o w  th a t  
th e  functiona l relationship G (a t) is non-invertib le, but are th e re  o ther  
reasons w h y  a non unique m apping does not exist. In the  GS model,  
no unique trans fo rm atio n  from  a t to  a t+1 exists because o f  the  
variab ility  in firms specific prices, d t, making another reason w h y  it 
ca n n o t be invertib le. Properly understood, the  GS sys tem  as 
m odelled  in the  s imulation program , is really a tw o  d im ensional 
sy s te m , w h ic h  m ay  be specified in general form  as the  fo llow ing:
^t+i ~ G (<3£t u£)
( 4 .3 8 )
In th e  GS model, because of the  exogenous stochastic  param ete r ,  d t, 
th e  phase plot can n o t lie on a single curve. No unique tran s fo rm atio n  
from  t im e  t  to  t im e  t +  1 is possible. Th e  random  p aram ete r  a ffec ts
th e  co n v e rg e n c e  to the  s tead y-s ta te .  A lthough  there  m ay  ex is t a 
G ( a * v u it) such th a t  u [  has no e ffec t ,  this w ou ld  appear unlikely as w e  
still h ave  a random  perturbation capable o f disturbing the  s tead y-  
s t a te .13 In such c ircum stances to speak of the behaviour o f th e  GS  
m odel as exhibiting either periodic cycles or chaotic  cycles is only half  
th e  s tory . T h e  presence o f a ra n d o m  a t t r a c to r  in the fo rm  o f firm  
specific  price variability  m eans th a t  the  GS system  should beh ave  like 
a second order sys tem , rather than  one w h ich  is first order. S up po rt  
fo r this point is found in the  1 9 8 8  GS article w h ere , in th e  version of  
th e  m odel having firm specific prices and dividends net o f  n e w  equ ity  
sales exo gen ou s  and random , the authors remark, " . . . th e  behav iour  
o f  th e  m odel is described by a th ird-order nonlinear d if fe ren ce  
e q u a t io n ."  (page 1 1 8 ,  1 9 8 8 ) .  Replacing the  random  behav iour of  
d iv idends from  the  model and using a tim e invariant co n s ta n t  as w e  
h ave , still leaves greater d im ensionality  than  w ould  be implied if the  
m odel w e re  first order and had no stochastic  param eters . Presenting  
sim ulations of the  GS model as dynam ic  trajectories over t im e  
obscures th e  higher d im ensionality  o f the GS system . Properly a 
v e c to r  space  o f R 3 is necessary to  s h o w  the  co m p le te  p icture, 
a lthough  graphing the  iterates o f the  simulated GS style m odel a t 
ag a inst a t+1, as appear b e lo w  in the  phase portraits b e lo w  is very  
usefu l, as th ey  s h o w  th a t  no unique transform ation  from  t im e  t  to  
t im e  if +  1 exists. As w e  will see, w ith o u t  changing p a ra m e te rs ( 
a llow ing  only random  perturbations to the system , should produce  
tra jectories  resembling a determ inistic  system  in w h ich  a range o f  
initial p a ram ete r  values had been selected (page 12 , Kelsey, 1 9 8 8 ) .  
W ith o u t  changing  initial param eter  values, such as equ ity  and in terest  
rates, th rou gh  repeated  random  perturbations should g enera te  a cyclic  
orbit w h ic h  is broad band rather than  points. The  points a t  w h ic h
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^ I n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  such p o s s i b i l i t i e s  would r e q u i r e  a t  l e a s t  
d ou b le  p r e c i s i o n  ( f o u r t e e n  d ec im a l p la c e s )  and many more 
i t e r a t i o n s  than undertaken  f o r  s im u la t io n  o f  th e  GS m odel.
ch an g es  in p aram eter  values will produce d iffe ren t periodicities, points  
o f b ifurcation , will also be less ev ident. Finally, w e  can e x p e c t  by  
sp ec ify ing  th e  random  attrac to r ,  chaotic  behaviour should b ecom e  
m ore co m m o n  in simulation results (ibid, 1 9 8 8 ) .
T h e  abo ve  observations s h o w  th a t  the variability  in firm  
specific  prices in the  GS model w o rks  in tw o  w a y s ,  as w e  will reveal 
th ro ug h  sim ulation. On th e  one hand, firm specific price variability  
th ro ug h  marginal bankrup tcy  cost enhances  the  c o n verg en t  qualities  
o f th e  GS style sys tem , w hile  on the  other hand, it increases the  
variab il ity  o f  orbits, should th e y  arise. In addition it increases the  
ch an ces  o f  chaotic  behaviour. As the  variability in ran do m  firm  
specific  price perturbations is increased, chaotic  behav iour can be 
e x p e c te d  to  be more co m m on  (page 14 , Kelsey, 1 9 8 8 ) .  T h e  in ter­
p lay in the  GS model b e tw e e n  endogenous propagation m echan ism  
for cycles w ork in g  in conjunction w ith  random  exo g en ou s  
perturbations , adding energy to  the  system , in the  fo rm  o f  f irm  
specific  price variability , harkens back to  the w o rks  of Frisch ( 1 9 3 3 ) ,  
as m entioned  in C h ap ter  T w o .
H aving  set the  stage w ith  the above , w e  consider the  co m p lex  
dynam ics  found in the  s im ulated version of the  GS style m odel by 
exam in ing  several figures in w h ich  the  o rb its  are p lotted in phase  
space . T h e  depiction o f orbits such appears in the  literature and are  
referred to as a p h a s e -p o r t ra it  (see, S. Krasner, editor, C h ap te r  11 ,  
"Chaos and the  Business C yc le" , The U b iq u ity  o f  C h a o s , 1 9 9 0  or A .  
M ullin eux , e t al. C h ap ter  5, B u s in e s s  C y c le s , 1 9 9 3 ) .  Such portraits  
are useful in seeing the  role o f random  attractors on the behav iour o f  
th e  GS sys tem  and its e ffec t ive  d im ensionality . T h e  orbits are the  
plotted iterates generated  by s imulation, through the  m odel, o f  th e  
d iffe ren ce  equation  4 . 2 9  and resemble the phase line, s h o w n  ab ove  
in Figure 2 0 .  W e  observe the  richness o f the m odel's  d ynam ics . A  
given non-linear phase line, itself, m ay display various periodic  
structures  depend ing  upon initial conditions,
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as d iscussed above  w ith  re ference to  the  te n t  fam ily  o f functions.  
W ith  a phase d iagram  having suffic iently  sharp and high inflection, 
using th e  s imulation program , w e  can s h o w  th a t by vary ing  th e  initial 
condit ions on various param eters , a great var ie ty  o f phase portraits  
m ay  be con struc ted , o ften  w ith  quite d iffe ren t dynam ic  behaviour.  
In fac t ,  a non-linear phase line exhibiting ergodic chaos, possesses an 
infinite va r ie ty  o f d iffe ren t cycles, according to  Sarkovsk ii 's  1 9 6 4  
th e o re m  (see, Collet &  Eckm ann, 1 9 8 0 ) .  As w e  s h o w  b e lo w , for very  
small ch ang es , for exam ple , in the  variability  of firm specific  prices, 
dividend policy, a ffec ts  the  m odel's  dynam ic  behaviour sharply . In 
addit ion  to  the  chaotic  dynam ics found in the  GS model, its sensitiv ity  
to  initial conditions and aperiodic trajectories, w e  have the  presence  
o f  ran d o m  inputs. W ith in  the  c o n tex t  of the GS m odel, even  holding  
initial conditions th e  sam e, the  orbit m ay  be changed by exposing  the  
populations o f  firms to n e w  random  and individual price perturbations,  
fu r th e r  illustrating th e  e f fe c t  of random  attractors . T o  illustrate such  
observa tio ns , w e  s h o w  th e  results of seven simulations using the  
phase portra it-orb it techn ique  w h ich  are sum m arized in the  fo l lo w in g  
tab le ,  Exhibit 4 .3 .  (W e  note, th a t  in each phase-portra it ,  for  
re fe rence , the  4 5 °  is s h o w n .
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FIGURE T E C H . D IV ID . D eb t/E q u ity S IG M A ,P !t
Figure 3 8 4 1 0 % 3 .7 5 1 1 %
Figure 3 9 4 8 % 3 .7 5 1 1 %
Figure 4 0 4 8 % 4 . 0 1 1 %
Figure 41 4 .5 8 % 4 .0 1 1 %
Figure 4 2 4 .5 8 % 4 . 0 8 %
Figure 4 3 4 .5 9 % 4 .0 8 %
Figure 4 4 4 .5 1 0 % 4 .0 6 %
Exhibit 4 .4
Looking at the  first tw o  sets o f d iagram s, Figures 3 8  and 3 9 ,  
w e  see th a t  the  orbits display quite chaotic  dynam ics, not behaving  
in a regular m anner. Com paring  the  tw o ,  decreasing th e  a m o u n t  of  
profit  d istribution over t im e, from  1 0 %  to 8 % ,  th a t  is a llow ing  each  
o f th e  assum ed population of tw e n ty - f iv e  firms to retain a g reater  
p ercen tag e  o f profits over t im e, in the  aggregate , leads to  s lo w er  
co n v e rg e n c e  to  the  s tead y -s ta te .  As supposed by GS, the  result  
occurs  because w ith  greater equity , firms are encouraged  to  be less 
risk averse , favouring  borrow ing  and investm ent, increasing exposure  
to  th e  business cyc le . Both phase portraits s h o w  th a t  w h ile  th e  first 
a rg u m e n t  in G (atru J  is con vergen t, the  orbits retain the ir random  
c o m p o n e n t ,  because o f u v Holding everyth ing  else the  sam e ex c e p t  
th e  initial level o f equ ity  and the  implied ratio of debt to equ ity , w e  
see in Figure 4 0 ,  th a t  w h e n  the initial condition on the  a m o u n t  of  
eq u ity ,  and the  ratio o f  deb t to equity  is increased, the  orbits are  
t ig h te r  and the  te n d e n c y  to con vergence  is greater because o f the  
g reater th rea t  o f ban kruptcy  from  more debt in the capital s tructure .  
A lth o u g h  the  capital s tructure  will vary  over tim e w ith  profitab ility  and  
dividend retention, changing the  initial conditions w ith  respect to  
having greater debt in th e  capital s tructure, has a persistent e f fe c t  
because it de term ines  from  w h ere  the  dynam ic  tra jec tory  begins. As  
w e  have seen, very  d iffe ren t d ynam ic  behaviour can arise from  such  
small ch an ges . By increasing the  th rea t o f bankruptcy  arising from  
f irm  specific  prices being b e lo w  the threshold level for so lvency , a 
d am p en in g  o f the  orbits occurs, w hile  still leaving th em  sub ject to  the  
ran do m  c o m p o n e n t s h o w n  in equation 4 .3 8 .  Risk avers ion , leads  
firm s to  reduce their borrow ing o f w o rk ing  capital to fund th e  w a g e  
bill, w ith  the  result th a t  the system  is stabilized and th e  c o n verg en ce  
to  the  s tead y -s ta te  is hastened. D ynam ics, w e  see, are d e p e n d e n t  
upon both initial conditions and the  random  input, u t . In Figure 4 1 ,  
again holding o ther param eters  constan t, w e  change the  level o f  
te c h n o lo g y  used by the  population o f tw e n ty - f iv e  firms from  a value
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of 4  to a vaiue of 4 .5 .  As discussed in Section 4 .8  ab o ve , w ith  
bette r  tech n o lo g y , firms are less labour intensive. W ith  a smaller  
exp o su re  to  the  w a g e -p ro f i t  spiral as discussed in C hap ter  T h re e ,  the  
e c o n o m y  is m ore stable, converg ing  to a s teady-s ta te  m uch  more  
quick ly . Like o ther changes in s tate  variables, reducing th e  variability  
o f firm  specific  prices, as s h o w n  in Figures 4 2  and 4 3 ,  has th e  e f fe c t  
o f m aking  the  e c o n o m y  less stable. U ncerta in ty  is reduced w ith  
regard to  the  returns on borrow ed  w ork ing  capital, encourag ing  
in v e s tm e n t and increasing exposure  to  cyclic e ffec ts .  In these  
f igures, rather than  co n verg en ce  to a s tead y-s ta te ,  w e  see a limit 
cyc les  w h ich  behave  random ly because of the s tochastic  c o m p o n e n t  
o f express ion  4 . 3 8 .  W ith  reduced firm specific price variab ility , the  
th re a t  o f  b ankru p tcy  as arising from  the relationship b e tw e e n  firm  
specific  prices and the  threshold level, as per equations 4 . 1 5  and  
4 . 1 5 ' ,  is lessened, encourag ing  firms to expand borrow ing  and invest  
in w o rk in g  capital to pay w a g e s ,  th ereby  accum ulating  equ ity  and  
increasing outpu t. Figures 4 2  and 4 3  only differ by th e  p e rcen tag e  
o f profits d istributed as d ividends. W e  see th a t  by changing  
div idends from  8 %  o f  profits to 9 %  o f profits, a very  small ch an g e ,  
th e  d yn am ics  are a f fec ted . As per our earlier observation  o f the  
e f fe c t  o f  increasing equity  through retaining profits continues to hold: 
It lessens the  stability of the GS style model, because w ith  g reater  
e q u ity  accu m u la t ion  over t im e, borrowing and investing is 
en co u rag ed , increasing the  exposure  to business cycle  e f fec ts .  T h e  
stochastic  c o m p o n e n t o f equation 4 . 3 8 ,  in this simulation continues  
in Figure 4 3  to  m ake the  orbits random . In the  final Figure, 4 4 ,  w e  
increase div idends w h ile  at the  sam e tim e decreasing th e  risk 
surrounding firm  specific prices, u (  as an initial condition . By 
reducing the  variability  in firm specific price still fu rther to  6 % ,  risk 
avers ion  to  b ankrup tcy  is reduced, encouraging the  bo rrow ing  of  
w o rk in g  capital and in ves tm ent.  Such practices increase th e  
expo sure  to the  business cycle  dynam ics. Increasing dividend
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distribution from  profits over t im e, h o w ever ,  is stabilizing to  firm  
o u tp u t ,  b ecause w ith  less equity , borrow ing w o rk ing  capital and  
in v e s tm e n t is d iscouraged, creating greater risk o f bankru p tcy . As w e  
see com paring  Figures 4 3  and 4 4 ,  by a small change to an initial 
condit ion  through  adjusting a dividend policy and firm specific  price  
variab ility , the  num ber of periods per cycle m ay be ch anged .  
C om b in ed  and som etim es amplified by the random  c o m p o n e n t  o f  
equation  4 . 3 8 ,  w e  see small changes in initial conditions have a large  
e f fe c t  upon dyn am ic  trajectories and orbits. W e  see th a t  th e  phase  
portra it n o w  does not display con vergence , but rather appears  to  
oscillate in a tw o  or th ree  period cycle around the s teady  s ta te . As  
o b served , because o f the  random  co m p on ent,  the am plitude  in 
f lu c tua tio ns  rem ains. In an eco n o m y in w h ich  the  m arginal cost of  
b a n kru p tcy  enters  into the  f irm 's  optimal decision m aking, reducing  
risk has the  potentia l for increasing oscillatory behaviour, w h ile  at the  
sam e tim e , in the  GS system , decreasing the  role of the  random  
a ttra c to r .  T h e  results serve to fu rther validate GS Proposition 2, 
(page 9 2 ,  1 9 9 3 )  th a t  increased uncerta in ty  leads to lo w er inves tm ent.
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11%
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= 10%, I n i t i a l  D/E = 4, Sigma 
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In com paring  the  phase portraits, resulting from  s im ulations of  
th e  GS style m odel, w e  see th a t  numerical s im ulation rather th an  
linearization around the  s tead y -s ta te ,  is needed to  reveal th e  e ffec ts  
of com bin ing  co m p lex  non-linear dynam ics w ith  h ig herd im ension a lity ,  
arising from  a random  attractor. Through  simulations involving at a 
m in im u m  single precision (seven decimal points), and m a n y  m ore
i terations, such dynam ics could be investigated in dep th . The  
sim ulation program  has a llow ed us to study the  dynam ics  o f a GS  
sty le  m odel w ith  respect to  sensitiv ity  o f initial conditions, changing  
periodic ity  per cycles, aperiodic cycles or c h a o s , and the e f fe c t  o f  
greater  d im ensionality  in the fo rm  o f a random  input. As w e  have  
observed  th rough  sim ulation, for exam ple , very  small ch anges  in the  
assum ed p aram eter  for the  variability of firm specific prices w h ich  
enters  into the  firm optim isation problem through the  m arginal 
b an kru p tcy  aspect of the  cost function , has the e f fe c t  o f  changing  
th e  d yn am ic  behaviour o f the model. H igher d im ensionality  ensures, 
h o w e v e r ,  th a t  th e  relationship b e tw e e n  a given a t and a t+1 is not a 
bijection. Even if, for exam ple , a 5 =  1 0  and a 15 = 1 0 ,  th e re  is no 
reason to  believe th a t  a 6 =  a 16. In addition to the d im ensionality  
issue, w e  have also seen th a t  o ther small changes in initial conditions  
have  large e ffec ts  upon d yn am ic  behaviour.
C haotic  dynam ics in w h ich  the  orbits are e ither acyclic  or 
aperiodic , w e  have s h o w n , can arise in the  GS m odel. Orbits around  
the  s te a d y  sta te(s) (c fa /d t =  0 ), w e  have seen are sensitive to initial 
condit ions. A lth oug h  there  are necessary conditions for chaotic  
tra jec tories  to  occur in first order non-linear system s, non-invertib ility  
as discussed ab ove  and in Section 4 ,6 ;  there are no su ff ic ien t  
conditions telling w h e n  chaotic  solutions m ay arise. H ence , num erical  
sim ulation is necessary in order to learn the laws o f m otion for such  
system s (Azariadis, page 1 0 7 ,  1 9 9 4  and O tt,  1 9 9 3 ) .  As w e  have  
learned fro m  the  above  discussion, simulation o f the  GS sys tem ,  
g en era tes  phase portraits or orbits displaying, at t im es, aperiodic  
b ehav io ur w h ich  is influenced by the presence of random  a ttrac to rs ,  
as per expression 4 . 3 8 .  T h e  dynam ics of the  im plem ented  GS style  
s ys tem , m ay appear random  because of the non-linear dyn am ics  
producing chaotic  iterations as well as the  truly random  processes  
arising fro m  firm  specific price variability. If not for the  random  
attrac to r ,  the  dynam ics o f  the GS model w ould  be co m p le te !^
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determ ined  by th e  d iffe rence  equation found in equation  4 . 2 9  and  
sim ulated  th rou gh  the  m odel. As w e  kn o w , non-s tochastic , n on­
linear dynam ics  m ay  produce chaotic  orbits, and display sensit iv ity  to  
small changes  of initial conditions. Changes in initial condit ions,  
ch an g e  the  periodicity  o f  the  GS style m odel's  dynam ics , as w e  have  
seen, by vary ing  the num ber o f periods per cycle. A ltho ug h  GS  
d ep ic t  the ir cycles as four-period cycles (see, GS Figure V I ,  page 9 9 ,
1 9 9 3 ) ,  w e  have s h o w n  through simulation o f the  m odel, th a t  a 
grea ter  n um ber o f iterations per cycle m ay occur, confirm ing  our  
earlier observations in Section 4 . 6  on m ultip le-periodic ity . Both  
c o n v e rg e n t  and d ivergent tra jectories and orbits m ay  be c reated  as 
w ell tho se  having a chaotic  nature occur, by varying the  p aram eters  
o f  the  s im ulated GS model. From the  above  w e  can see th a t  the  
in ter-tem pora l behaviour the GS m odel is s ignificantly  richer than  as 
supposed in the ir article. It m ay  display chaotic  dynam ics and behave  
accord ing  to g reater d im ensionality  than  first order.
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C H A P T E R  FIVE. S T A T E  C O N T IN G E N T  A S S E T S  IN A  M O D E L  W IT H  
F IN A N C IA L  IM P E R F E C T IO N S
5 .0  In troduction
In this chap ter  w e  undertake  m odifications to  the  sim ulation  
program  expla ined in C h ap ter  Four to  address the questions raised in 
C h a p te r  Th ree  o f  w h e th e r  and h o w  the  ex is tence and use o f  s ta te  
co n tin g e n t  assets m ay e ffe c t  business cycles. W e  build upon the  
results o f C h ap te r  Four w h e re  w e  s a w  h o w  a GS style M o de l m ay  be 
specified  in a c o m p u te r  s imulation program . In order to s im ulate  the  
m odel, a population of tw e n ty - f iv e  firms having initially th e  sam e level 
o f eq u ity  w a s  assum ed. Individual firms w e re  exposed to  unique  
price shocks, over-t im e , w h ich  w e re  assum ed to be norm ally  
distr ibu ted . As per the  GS m odel, the probability of b a n kru p tcy  w as  
d eterm in ed  by the  relationship b e tw e e n  firm specific  price  
realizations, uft+1 and the  threshold level, v 't+1. B ankruptcy  occurs, 
w h e n  L/t+1 is b e lo w  W e  s a w  through its a f fe c t  upon th e
d im ensiona lity  o f the  model, th a t  random  firm specific  price  
variab ility , has the  e f fe c t  o f m aking a first order model behave  as one  
w h ic h  is of a second order. W e  further assumed for purposes of  
s im ulation , given the  relatively small population o f firm s, th a t  firms  
are r e - f lo a te d  w h e n  bankru p tcy  occurs, as explained in C h ap te r  Four. 
T o  s im ulate  a version of the  GS style m odel, a variability  in firm  
specific  prices w a s  assum ed. Lastly, in order to learn ab o u t the  
e ffe c ts  o f  dividend structure  upon the  m odel's  dynam ics, and reduce  
th e  d im ensionality  of the  system , the stochastic  approach to  profit  
distribution assum ed in the  GS 1 9 9 3  article w as  replaced w ith  a fixed  
rate o f profit  retention. Using these assum ptions in th e  specified  
m odel, experim en ts  w e re  perform ed upon exogenous variab les to  
verify  th e  styiized observations m ade in the  GS article relating to  
co m p a ra t iv e  statics. In addition, the informal remarks m ade by GS in 
the ir  artic le  regarding dynam ics w ere  investigated, shedding light 
upon the  m odel's  co m p lex  in ter-tem poral behaviour. Im po rtan tly ,
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using s im ulation, experim ents  perform ed to  investigate  the  m odel's  
non-linear dynam ics , sh o w ed  the  claim by GS (page 1 0 0 ,  1 9 9 3 )  th a t  
th e  m odel m ay  exhib it cycles of multiple periodicity, is sub ject to  
m a n y  qualif ications. Using certain  initial param eter values, cyc les  of  
vary ing  periodic ity , along w ith  chaotic  behaviour, w e re  o bserved .  
N um erica l analysis sh o w ed  th a t  the  dynam ic  behaviour around the  
s te a d y -s ta te  solution(s) w e re  particularly sensitive to assum ptions  on  
initial conditions for exo geno us param eters , including th e  level o f  
eq u ity ,  th e  variab ility  in f irm  specific prices, the level o f te c h n o lo g y  
and the  dividend pay -ou t ratio. Finally by plotting the  phase portraits  
o f th e  s im ulated  GS model, along w ith  related discussion, it w a s  
s h o w n  th a t  because o f random  attractors , the d ynam ic  behav iour can  
best be described as a second order system  rather than  one w h ich  is 
f irst order, as it is presented . Building upon the  above results w e  turn  
to  C h a p te r  Five.
In C h ap te r  Five, w e  begin by explaining m odifications to  the  GS  
m odel fro m  an abstract perspective , discussing sta te  c o n t in g en t  
assets and risk m an ag em en t.  In the next section, w e  discuss and  
re v ie w  both th e  theoretica l basis for risk m a n ag em en t,  a long w ith  
spec if ica tion  o f the  functional form s required for its modelling in the  
sim ulation  program . In Section 5 .3 ,  w e  turn to the  pricing o f  
deriva t ives , a requ irem ent of the  previous sections 's  risk m a n a g e m e n t  
sp ec if ica tion . H aving specified the  modified GS style m odel w ith  the  
risk m a n a g e m e n t  m odule, in Sections 5 .4 ,  and 5 .5  c o m p u te r  
sim ulation  is used, like C hapter Four, to  determ ine  the  m odified  
m o d el's  co m p ara tive  static  and dynam ic  behaviour. T h e  results are 
discussed in Section 5 .6 .  The  exogenous variables investigated  
include financial s tructure , interest rates, dividend policy, and firm  
specific  price variability . Experim ents w ith  regard to initial conditions  
upon th e  tra jec to ry  reveal th a t  the  law s o f m otion w ith  regard to  the  
w a g e -d iv id e n d  spiral found in the  GS model are modified w h e n  risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  is available to  p e r fe c t  capital m arkets. T h e  random
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a ttra c to r  firm specific price variability , is particularly interesting in the  
m odified  m odel, as adjusting exposure  through risk m a n a g e m e n t ,  
relates d irectly  to  the  m odel's  d ynam ics. Like C hapter Four, w e  use 
num erica l s im ulations rather than  inspection o f the  analytic  results o f  
reduced fo rm  equations to  learn h o w  the  m odel's  law s of m otion  are  
e f fe c te d  by changes  in both initial conditions and con stan t.
5 .1  Risk M a n a g e m e n t  in the  A bstrac t
W h ile  explic itly  specify ing and simulating a GS style m odel has 
provided useful insights into its dynam ic  behaviour, it is useful to  
recall our original purpose in selecting it. Em bodying  a N e w  
K eynesian  p erspective  in the  fo rm  o f im perfect capital m arke ts , the  
GS m odel displays a financial constra in t in the  availability  o f  n e w  
equ ity  and a capital m arke t im perfection: N am ely , th a t  th e  cost of  
b o rro w ed  w o rk in g  capital is not perform ance  related but a t  a fixed  
rate  o f  interest. Faced w ith  uncerta in ty  about the  firm specific  prices  
to  be received and w h e th e r  th e y  will exceed the  threshold  level to  
avoid b an kru p tcy , individual agents b o rrow  w ork ing  capital to  pay  
w o rk e rs ,  unsure of its fu ture  return. Further, it is explic itly  assum ed  
by GS in the ir m odel th a t  fu tures m arkets , or o ther m eans o f  hedging  
do not exist (page 7 9 ,  1 9 9 3 ) .  T he  com bination  o f the  co nstra in t,  the  
im perfect io n  and the  assum ption o f no state  con tin g en t assets,  
options or fu tures  to  m an age  risks, are toge th er the  sources o f the  
co m p a ra t iv e  statics and interesting dynam ics investigated in C hap ter  
Four. But w h a t  if s ta te  co n tin gen t assets w e re  introduced into the  
model in order to  m an ag e  risk, h o w  would  the model behave? Or, 
m ore broadly , w h a t  are the  m acro  econom ic im plications, if an y , o f  
risk m an ag em en t?  Paraphrasing Bacchetta  and Cam inal (page 3 ,  
1 9 9 6 ) ,  th a t  financial factors m atter  for individual f irms does not imply  
th a t  th e y  m atte r  at the  m acro eco nom ic  level. W e  return to  th e  
d iffe ren t schools o f th o u g h t related to risk m an ag em en t or hedging,  
first discussed in C h ap ter  T hree , in order to see w h e th e r  and h o w ,
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fro m  a micro perspective  th ey  m ay be incorporated w ith in  NK  
assum ptions  used in the  GS model and th ereby  investigate  their  
m acro eco n o m ic  im plications, if any.
In C h ap te r  T h ree , w e  found tha t  r is k  m a n a g e m e n t  has m an y  
pro ponents . A ccord ing  to som e authorities, using deriva tives  for risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  is beneficial to  the  firm and m oreover, th rou gh  simple  
a g greg atio n , m ust be beneficial to the econo m y. Surprisingly, 
h o w e v e r ,  according to  o ther authorities, an accepted  and received  
persp ective  on w h y  firms hedge, does not exist (page 121 6, Leland, 
1 9 9 8 ) .  W ith o u t  understanding the use of derivatives a t  th e  micro-  
th eo re t ic  level, it is doubtfu l w h e th e r  sense m ay be m ade o f  its m acro  
im plications. Looking a t these  m icro-theoretic  exp lanations , w e  find  
th a t  in the  earliest schools of thou gh t,  risk m a n a g e m e n t  using 
d eriva t ive  m arkets  w a s  likened to insurance, or properly r is k  tra n s fe r .  
In this school o f th o u g h t,  fu tures  m arkets and options on fu tures  
m arkets  exist in order to  price and sell system atic  risk b e tw e e n  risk 
averse  hedgers and risk loving speculators. A  fully hedged position  
represents  th e  purchase o f certa in ty  equ ivalence using fu tu res  or 
options. This school o f  th o u g h t has a long lineage, dating at least to  
K eynes ( 1 9 2 3 ,  1 9 3 0 ) ,  and later reinforced by Kaldor ( 1 9 4 0 ) ,  and  
Hicks ( 1 9 4 6 ) .  In the  K eynes /H icks  perspective , the requ irem ents  for  
deriva t ive  m arkets  are th ree  fold: Firstly, there m ust be risk averse  
hedgers; secondly , in order to transfer risk, there m ust be su ff ic ien t  
corre la tion  b e tw e e n  fu tures /options  prices and spot prices, i.e. the  
b a s is  m u st not be too large; and thirdly, th a t  there  be su ff ic ien t  
variab ility  to  m ake  hedging and speculation justified (H o u th akker ,  
N e w  P a ig ra v e  D ic t io n a ry  o f  E c o n o m ic s , 1 9 8 7 ) .  T h e  essence o f  the  
K eynes /H ick s  perspective  is tw o -fo ld .  Firstly, the  notion th a t  fu tures  
m arkets  are biased d o w n w a rd s  w ith  regard to estim ates  o f prices in 
th e  fu tu re  to re flect th e  prem ium  earned by the  speculator for bearing  
risk; and second ly , th a t  fu tures m arkets  behave system ically  v is-a-vis  
th e  greater securities m arket.
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A lth ou gh  the  K eynes /H icks  perspective offers an e leg an t and  
appealing  paradigm ; it is inadequate  for several reasons. In order to  
iden tify  speculation w ith  the  accep tan ce  of a risk prem ium , fu tures  
prices along w ith  options on futures prices m ust be corre la ted  
sys tem atica lly  w ith  the m arke t portfolio. If this w e re  th e  case, then  
specu lation  w ou ld  represent the  accep tan ce  of s y s te m a t ic  or m arke t  
risk in exch an g e  for a risk p re m ia .1 Evidence of fu tures  m arkets  or 
options on fu tures  m arkets  being correlated to a m arke t portfo lio , 
h o w e v e r ,  is ve ry  am biguous (Dusak, 1 9 7 3 ) .  A  further req u irem ent o f  
th e  K eyn es /H icks  paradigm  is th a t  aggregate  hedging positions m ust  
be short and ag gregate  speculative positions long, for w h ic h  th ere  is 
no ev idence . It is impossible, m oreover, to identify  th e  use o f  a 
particu lar p roduct, for exam p le  buying futures, w ith  taking a particular  
m a rk e t  position, such as h e d g in g  or s p e c u la t in g  (W illiam s, 1 9 8 6 ) .  
W h a t  deriva tive  product is used, and h o w  it is used are not  
necessarily  implied by an underlying activ ity , such as hedging versus  
specu lating  (Haar, 1 9 9 8 ) .  In the  aggregate , hedgers need not be 
short. In fac t ,  long asset positions m ay  be hedged th ro ug h  both  
buying and selling derivatives . Furtherm ore, participants m ay  o pera te  
across products and m arkets , w rit ing  options in a foreign e xch an g e  
m a rk e t  and selling options in an agricultural co m m o d ity  m arket;  or 
f inding arb itrage b e tw e e n  futures against synthetic  fu tures  created  
o ut o f  options. A ltog eth er  such observations underm ine a parad igm  
o f  fu tu res  m arkets  based upon the  Keynes/H icks perspective .
T h e  parad igm  o f Keynes /H icks  presents problems fro m  the  
stan d p o in t o f  o ther aspects  o f received financial th eory , no tab ly  the  
C apita l A sse t Pricing M odel (C A P M ) and M odig ilian i-M iller (M M )  
capita l s tructure  T h eo ry . From the  perspective of such theories , the  
hedging and risk tran s fe rence  v ie w  canno t be explained readily: From
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1 In fa irness, the  distinction b e tw e e n  system atic  risk and id iosyncratic  risk 
found  in th e  F inance literature gained currency several decades a f te r  the  Keynes-  
Hicks contr ibu tions to  understanding fu tures  m arkets.
a Capita l A sse t Pricing perspective , if the risk being hedged ,  
presum ab ly  th rough  the  purchase o f a derivative , w e re  purely m arke t  
or sys tem a tic  risk, a m o v e m e n t  along the s e c u r ity  m a rk e t  lin e ,  as it 
t ra d e s -o f f  risk and return, does not change the  m arke t cap ita lization  
o f  th e  user, and hence generates  no gain to shareholders, leaving the  
question - w h y  h e d g e ?  From the  s tandpoint o f M M  capital s tructure  
th e o ry ,  the  m icro -theoretic  m otivation  to use derivatives  is also 
troubling . D eriva tives , because th ey  are a form  o f  lending and  
b o rro w in g  asset positions, m ay  be utilized to change the  com posit ion  
o f capita l s tructure . M a rk e t  capita lization, according to th e  th eo ry ,  
adjusted  for in terest rate deductib ility  and non-neutra lity  o f  taxes ,  
h o w e v e r ,  should be invariant to  changes in the  com position  o f  capital  
stru c tu re .  In light o f M M  th eo ry , w e  again face  the question- w h y  
h e d g e ?  From the  perspective o f received financial th e o ry ,  in 
equilibrium , hedging, as a m eans o f risk transference  should not occur  
as no gains to shareholders arise. Such a conclusion suggests  an 
a lte rn a tive  v ie w  th a t  h e d g in g  is not about m o vem en ts  a long the  
security  m arke t line but a m eans by w h ich  firms remain a t a point  
along th e  line, by ensuring th a t  th e y  genera te  returns co m m e n s u ra te  
w ith  the ir m arke t r isk.2
In terest in reconciling risk m an ag em en t or hedging w ith  the  M M  
T h e o ry  on th e  irrelevance o f financial structure  policy, has led to  other  
parad igm s to explain  hedging, notably  the  research by Johnson  
( 1 9 6 0 ) ,  S ch rock  ( 1 9 7 1 ) ,  and Jerom e Stein ( 1 9 8 6 ) .  Their  
contribu tions  have relied principally upon portfolio th eo ry  to  justify  
hedging as a risk o ff-se tt ing  activ ity . These critics of the  K eynes-  
Hicks m odel reject th e  risk trans ference  perspective in favo u r  o f  a 
divers ifica tion  perspective . Related justifications for hedging include  
the  c o n v e x ity  o f ta x  schedules, the m inimization o f the  exp ec ted
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2ln this c o n te x t ,  th e  article "Is the  Risk o f Bankruptcy  a S ys tem ic  Risk" by I.D .  
D icheu , The J o u rn a l o f  F in a n c e , vol 5 3 ,  No. 3 , June 1 9 9 8 ,  is o f interest.
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costs o f financial distress, or even  to  reduce stockho lder-bon dh o lder  
confl ic t  (M ayers  and Sm ith , 1 9 8 2 ;  Sm ith and Stulz, 1 9 8 5 ) .  In Froot, 
S harfs te in , and Stein ( 1 9 9 3 ) ,  the  purpose of hedging is to reduce the  
cost o f  external f inancing . A dopting  a portfolio approach to modelling  
fu tu res  m arkets , th e y  argue th a t  assym etries w ith  respect to  risk 
to le ran ce  arise because o f the  d iffe ren t cost of internal versus  
extern a l f inance . In o ther research, m anagerial risk aversion is seen  
as a m otive  in both Sm ith  and Stulz ( 1 9 8 5 )  and T u fa n o  ( 1 9 9 6 ) ,  
a ltho ug h  it is doubtfu l w h e th e r  adding a quasi-utility th e o ry  to  
f inancia l issues has m uch practical application. H edging leads to  
g rea te r  leverage and greater tax  advan tages  in Ross and O tto  (1 9 9 6 ) .  
A lth o u g h  such m odels provide insights under limited c ircum stances ,  
none o f  th e m  are suff ic iently  robust to provide a general th e o ry  o f  
w h y  fu tures  m arkets  exist. Portfolio theo ry  has intuitive appeal as 
m eans o f explaining hedging, h o w e v e r ,  it requires, as a m eans o f  
divers if ica tion , th a t  derivative  and underlying asset positions to  be 
inverse ly  corre lated and to  constitu te  non-diversifiable, id iosyncratic  
risk. S ys tem atic  risk itself can n o t be diversified. Benefits  to  
divers if ica tion  only arise th rough  the  com bination  o f assets w h ic h  are  
inverse ly  corre lated from  an id iosyncratic  s tandpoint. M a rk e t  risk, 
itself, c an n o t be diversified a w a y .  For hedging to be a fo rm  o f  
portfo lio  d iversification w ou ld  imply th a t  derivatives , options or 
fu tu res , behave  id iosyncratically  v iz -a-v iz  the  m arket. Like bur  
observa tio ns  ab ove  on system atic  behaviour ab ove , th ere  is no 
ev id en ce  to this e f fe c t  (M arcus  & M o d es t,  1 9 8 3 ) .  M o reo ver  returning  
to  M M  th eo ry , even  if derivative  instrum ents behaved  idio­
syncratica lly , investors m ay  just as easily purchase and use such  
ins trum ents  them se lves  to  m odify  exposure. W h y  should o w n e rs  o f  
equ ity  r e w a rd  or place any positive value on w h a t  th e y  m ay  do for  
th em se lves  as easily? Based upon the  above, risk m a n a g e m e n t  
w ith in  a corporation , as opposed to investor level, w o u ld  appear to  
have no m erit. In addition to the  theoretica l short-com ings posed by
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m ost m odels  o f fu ture  m arkets , the  empirical support for an y  o f the  
a b o ve  paradigm s is w e a k  (M ian , 1 9 9 6 ) .  Sum m arising th e  ab o ve , it 
is not surprising th a t  the  m acro econom ic  implications o f deriva tives  
and risk m a n a g e m e n t  are inadequate ly  understood.
A  third paradigm  regards futures and options on fu tures  
m arkets  as a fo rm  o f  inventory  m an ag em en t and has been v igorously  
prom oted  by W illiam s ( 1 9 8 2 ,  1 9 8 4 ,  1 9 9 4 ) .  Rejecting th e  r is k  
m a n a g e m e n t  parad igm , W illiam s builds upon the ignored research of  
H albroke  W o rk in g  ( 1 9 4 8 ,  1 9 4 9 ,  1 9 5 3 a ,  1 9 5 3 b ,  1 9 6 2 ) .  Rather than  
risk tran s feren ce  or the  portfolio approach, a not necessarily  
incom patib le  third paradigm  describes futures m arkets and options on 
fu tu res  m arkets  as means o f borrow ing  and lending inventory  
positions to ensure profitable utilisation of assets. A cco rd ing  to  
W illiam s, fu tures  m arkets  are a m eans o f improving in ter-tem pora l  
asset a llocation. W illiam s begins from  the  perspective o f  w h y  firms  
hold inventories. In his v ie w , precautionary  dem and along w ith  
t ran sac tio n  dem and explains w h y  businesses m ay use deriva tives  as 
a fo rm  o f syn thetic  inventory  borrow ing. In his line of reasoning,  
d eriva tives  are a form  o f inventory  m an ag em en t,  th e  purpose o f  
w h ic h  is to ensure good asset utilization, improving profits and  
increasing o u tpu t.  By improving inter-tem poral asset a llocation , firms  
m a y  increase outputs  and profits. In this light, like the  carry ing cost  
arising from  physical s torage o f inventory , a derivatives position, as 
a fo rm  of lending or borrow ing inventory  has an implied in terest cost  
in te rm s o f the co m m o d ity  itself, kn o w n  as the  basis spread .  
A c k n o w le d g in g  th e  observation  first m ade by Sraffa  ( 1 9 3 2 3) on 
c o m m o d ity  s p e c if ic  ra te s  o f  in te re s t,  W illiam s argues th a t  th e  basis 
in fu tu res  m arkets , th a t  is the d ifference b e tw een  the  cash price and  
fu tu re  de livery price implies a rate o f  interest w h ich  is related to  the
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3 S ra ffa ,  Piero. 1 9 3 2 .  "Dr. H a y e k o n  M o n e y  and C apita l."  E c o n o m ic  J o u r n a l4-2: 
4 2 - 5 3 .
op p o rtu n ity  cost of physical storage and cannot necessarily  be 
identified w ith  a risk premia.
In th e  m odei developed by W illiam s, derivative m arkets  ex is t to  
b o rro w  and lend positions, be th e y  in com m odities , foreign e x ch an g e ,  
equities , or T reasury  Bills. Accord ing  to W illiam s, the  m otives  for  
holding an inventory  position explains the  use o f deriva tives  for  
hedg ing . His model also gives insight into the  depth and breadth  of  
fu tu res  and options on fu tures  m arkets. In his m odel, eco no m ic  
viability  d e term ines  the  ex tensiveness of derivative m arkets . M a rk e ts  
do not fail, rather at t im es, th e y  m ay be uneconom ic. For exam p le ,  
if the  o p p o rtu n ity  cost o f physical storage w ere  very  lo w , having  
access to s y n th e t ic  s torage via futures  or options, m ay  not be 
justif ied . H en ce , a m arke t for all s ta te  contingent assets, a t  all t im es,  
is not necessarily  optim al. It should be noted th a t  the  W il l iam 's  
m odel is com patib le  w ith  C A P M  and M M  theo ry , unlike o th er theories  
o f fu tu res  m arkets: C om bining a long position in options com bined  
w ith  a short position in the  underlying security  or c o m m o d ity ,  for  
ex a m p le ,  m ay  be used to  produce a risk free rate o f return. Empirical 
investigation  o f a m odei based upon the  W ill iam 's  parad igm  w a its  to  
be done. Like o ther theories o f fu tures m arkets, generating  tes tab le  
propositions based upon the  W il l iam 's  paradigm  remains non-triv ia i. 
Evidently , a general theory , capable  of reconciling th e  d if fe ren t  
th eo re t ica l perspectives  has y e t  to be created and tes ted . (Leiland, 
1 9 9 8 ) .  Nonethe less , w e  will argue b e lo w  tha t the  W il l iam 's  parad igm  
is a source of useful insights relevant to  expla in ing the  
m acro eco n o m ic  im pact o f  r is k  m a n a g e m e n t  in a NK business cycle  
m odel.
5 . 2  Risk M a n a g e m e n t  in a GS Style  M odei
W ith  the  above  background on risk m an ag em en t in m ind, w e  
turn  to  h o w  it m ay be incorporated into the  GS style m odel presented  
in C h ap te r  Four. In this section w e  discuss specification o f th e  risk
207
m a n a g e m e n t  m odule along w ith  its potential im pact from  the  
stan d p o in t o f th e  m od e l's  com p ara tive  statics and dyn am ic  behaviour.  
W e  discuss as well w h a t  the m odifications m ean fro m  th e  s tandp o in t  
o f risk aversion and its m an ag em en t.  To investigate  th e  in ter­
tem p o ra l e f fec ts  of risk m a n ag em en t,  or asset a llocation in the  
W ill ia m 's  sense, and th e reb y  address the financial m arke t  
im perfections  found in the  GS style model of C hapter Four, w e  have  
added  a m odule to represent the use of derivative products  for  
hedging in th e  fo rm  o f put options. As described abo ve , d if fe ren t  
m otives  for using fu tures  m arkets  have appeared in the  literature,  
h o w e v e r ,  w e  ad opt th e  paradigm  prom oted  by W illiam s, th a t  fu tures  
m arkets  or op tions-on-fu tures  resem ble a precautionary  m eans of  
bo rrow ing  or lending inventory  and as such represent a m eans o f  
im proving in ter-tem pora l asset allocation (pages 1 1 8 - 1 3 0 ,  W ill iam s,
1 9 9 4 ) .  In exploring the  behaviour of the modified GS m odel, w e  will 
find th a t  the  W ill iam 's  paradigm  is useful in explaining w h y  risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  yields m icro -econom ic  gains and has m acro -eco n o m ic  
e ffe c ts .  In the  modified GS style model, w e  use risk m a n a g e m e n t  to  
reduce or e lim inate  d o w n -s id e  exposure  by ensuring th e  return to  
b o rro w ed  w o rk ing  capita l, a t the m argin, is at least su ff ic ien t to  m ake  
th e  firm  so lvent. In the  remarks be low , w e  explain h o w  the  
m odifica tion  w a s  undertaken.
T h e  stylized d iagram  found in Figure 4 5  is a good place to  
begin as it sh o w s  h o w  a put option operates in the  m odified  GS  
m odel by ensuring a m in im um  return. T he  inflection point in the  
d iag ram  corresponds to  the  respective strike price of the  put option  
w h ic h  w e  m ake equal to the  bankruptcy  threshold, o f As w e
observe  in th e  d iagram , the  option ensures th a t  a firm specific  price  
realisation will at least equal the  bankruptcy  threshold lev e l .4 T h e
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4 In practise, a f irm  w o u ld  settle  the  option con trac t  for its intrinsic va lue , if 
any , and use th e  am o u n t gained to  o ff -se t  the  loss in the  cash m arke t.  Risk is not  
elim inated  but rather o ff -se tt ing  risk has been undertaken.
p a y -o f f  line for the  put option begins b e lo w  the  break -even  line, as 
th e  firm  m anaging  risk o w n s  or is lo n g  the contract, and has a cost.  
T h e  larger the  cost, the  further the  vertical d istance o f th e  horizontal 
section  o f th e  put line from  the  horizontal axis. W ith  the  put option,  
as prices fall, once the initial cost of the  option has been reco vered ,  
th e  co n trac t  becom es increasingly in - th e -m o n e y .  W e  s h o w  the  
underly ing asset position as the  straight diagonal line rising to  the  
right. In th e  modified the  GS m odel, the  net exposure  o f the  firm , if 
fu lly  hedged is the  v e r t ic a l  sum  o f the tw o  lines. By purchasing the  
put option , f irm  specific  prices at least equal to the  threshold  level are  
ensured . G iven uncerta in ty  over the  relationship b e tw e e n  exp en d itu re  
{on w a g e s ,  for exam ple ) and the receipts from  fu ture  sales, the  put  
position ensures a m in im um  d ifference b e tw e e n  the  cost o f b orro w ed  
w o rk in g  capital and th e  revenues from  fu ture  sales, at t im e t  +  1. In 
th e  m odule  added to  the  program , the strike price on the  purchased  
put option (the right to sell) is set in order th a t  firm specific  prices 
received  a t  least equal the  bankruptcy  threshold level, u 't+1 =  v'f + / .5 
In e f fe c t ,  th e  put option creates  a hedge against inso lvency, and as 
such represents a means o f  synthetica lly  adjusting the  cost o f  
b o rro w ed  w o rk ing  capita l, th e reb y  improving the  d yn am ic  a llocation  
o f  assets.
In including a risk m an ag em en t m odule into the  s im ulated GS  
style  m odel, w e  adop t the  approach favoured  by W illiam s w ith  regard  
to  the  decision to  hedge. Accord ing  to  W illiam s (1 9 9 4 ) ,  th e  decision  
o f w h e th e r  to  hedge and o f w h a t  e x te n t  to hedge is an e c o n o m ic  one  
d eterm ined  by m arke t forces: W e  argue th a t  in equilibrium , the
m arginal benefits  o f hedging should equal the  marginal ban kru p tcy  
co st arising from  not hedging. In the  added m odule, risk m a n a g e m e n t  
is purchased up to  the  point w h e re  the va lue  o f the  last cu rren cy  unit
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5 Recalling equations ( 4 .1 1 )  and (4 .1 2 )  o f Chapter Four, by sett ing  th e  strike  
price o f  the  put option a t  the  threshold level, options are a t- th e -m o n e y ,  th a t  is have  
no intrinsic va lue  upon se tt lem en t.
spen t upon it to  ensure th e  return to  the  "inventory" o f capita l e q u a ls  
th e  exp ec ted  and d iscounted do w ns ide  cost o f inadequate  equ ity , viz  
ban kru p tcy . Since the  occurrence  of bankruptcy  arises from  firm  
specific  prices b e lo w  the  threshold levels, by purchasing risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  d o w n -s id e  exposure  is reduced to the  e x te n t  th a t  the  
exp o su re  is com ple te ly  covered , w hile  the  up-side for returns in 
excess  o f those antic ipated  remain, w ith  their c o n seq u en t cyclic  
e ffe c ts  via real w a g e s  and dividends. As modelled, risk m a n a g e m e n t  
is de te rm in ed  endogenously  by first solving for the  price o f  risk
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reduction  and then  deciding to  w h a t  ex te n t  it should be used, as 
expressed in th e  profit m axim ization  problem and first order  
condit ions rev iew ed  be lo w , w h ich  is modified from  th e  equation  4 .8  
o f  C h ap te r  Four. In practise, as w e  explain b e low , to be co m ple te ly  
hedged m akes  econom ic  sense.
For purposes o f com parison , to understand the  m odifications  
to  th e  GS model in its structural co n tex t ,  w e  begin by recalling  
eq uation  4 .5  o f C h ap ter  Four, used for the profit m ax im ization  
problem , and w ith  its first order condition in the  m odel w i th o u t  the  
risk m a n a g e m e n t  m odule. Our C h ap ter  Four results on th e  b a n k ­
ruptcy  param ete r  w e re .
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5.1)
w h e re ,  c '  is th e  marginal bankrup tcy  cost o f firm /  at t im e  t. If the  
m arginal cost o f  b an kru p tcy  w e re  zero, the first order condit ion  w ou ld  
revert  to a standard  micro econom ic  result o f equating th e  m arginal  
pro du ct to w a g e  costs, w (1  + r ) .  W e  fu rther note for purposes o f  
com parison  th a t  the  marginal cost o f b ankruptcy  equals:
N o w ,  let us in troduce param eters  for expend itu re  upon risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  into the  profit m axim ization  problem , equation  5;1  
ab o v e .  W e  include in equation  5 .3  be lo w , the  price o f the  put option  
MJ, th e  hedging ratio A, th a t  is the required position in th e  d er iva t ive  
secu rity  needed to m anag e  a given exposure , and q  th e  exposure .  
(The  strike price o f the  put option is set so th a t  fu ture  revenues  
satis fy  th e  threshold  criteria o f equation 4 . 1 2  of C hap ter  Four.) Fully 
h ed g ed , w h e n  A equals unity, the  level o f return is su ff ic ien t to ensure  
so lven cy  is g uaran teed . T h e  expression (1-/1) is determ ined  from  the  
hedge ratio, as fu rther  explained in Section 5 .3 .  it is co m p u te d  from  
th e  option  pricing fo rm ula , and tells us by h o w  m uch risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  has reduced the  M arginal Bankruptcy Cost, accord ing  to  
the  exp osu re  w h ich  has been covered . It modifies the  reduction  in 
the  risk o f  b an kru p tcy  w h ich  results from  using put options, so th a t  
in a fu lly  hedged firm  the  th rea t  of specific prices falling b e lo w  the  
th reshold  level is e lim inated. W e  have the  n e w  objective  fu nction  for  
profit  m ax im ization  including risk m anag em ent:
5 .2 )
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As modelled for s imulation, the cost o f bankruptcy  is modified by the  
in troduced param eters  for hedging ratio, A, so th a t  as th e  f irm 's  
e xp en d itu re  upon risk m a n ag em en t increases, the  fo rm er declines.  
Fully hedged , the locked-in strike price equals the threshold  price  
level, ©  and is suff ic ient to  m eet the  w a g e  bill as w ell  as the  
exp en d itu re  on the  put given the  option A ratio, thus e lim inating the  
co st of b an kru p tcy  as appears in equation 5 .3 .  T h e  n e w  first order  
condit ion , corresponding to the  n e w  m axim ization problem  o f 5 .3 ,  for  
an interior m ax im u m , is:
5 .4 )
T h e  m ost right hand term  in the  num erator gives the  marginal cost o f  
risk reduction as ou tp u t is increased. Under the  n e w  specif ication , if 
th e  marginal bankrup tcy  cost w e re  zero, the  incentive to risk m anage  
w o u ld  d isappear and w e  w ou ld  have the standard result th a t  th e  
m arginal product is increased to the point w h ere  it equals th e  w a g e .
To  understand the  potential e ffec ts  of introducing the  risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  m odule into the  GS M odel, w e  rely upon the ir stylized  
graph, s h o w  b e lo w  in Figure 4 6 .  The  graph resembles GS Figure II 
(page 8 3 ,  1 9 9 3 ) ,  ex c e p t  th a t  a third curve has been d ra w n  to  
represent the  M arginal Cost o f Production w h en  the risk m a n a g e m e n t  
m odule  has been added to  the  program . The relative strength  o f the  
t w o  e f fec ts ,  the  cost of bankruptcy  and the  cost o f risk m a n a g e m e n t  
will depend  upon the sensitiv ity  of their param eters . If th e  m arginal  
cost to  the  firm  of risk reduction using put options to ensure a 
m in im um  return to  borrow ed  w ork ing  capital w e re  a lw a y s  less than
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reducing the exp ected  marginal cost of bankruptcy  via o u tp u t  
reduction  and reduced borrow ing , expenditure  upon risk reduction  
w o u ld ,  on net, result in a greater equilibrium outp u t, and w ou ld  
a lw a y s  be justified. C onversely , a lthough unlikely, if th e  marginal  
co st o f risk reduction via lowering the optimal scale of o u tp u t,  as it 
reduces the  need for borrow ed  w ork ing  capital, w e re  un iform ly  less 
th an  th e  marginal costs o f risk reduction, it w ou ld  never pay to  
purchase options and m anage risk. If neither o f  these  situations m ay  
be assum ed, a cross-over point exists, such th a t  a profit m axim ising  
o p tim u m  will arise w h e n  the  marginal benefit  o f risk reduction  equals  
th e  reduction in exp ected  marginal cost of b ankru p tcy . Or, in 
standard  m icro -econom ic  fra m e w o rk ,  th a t  the marginal rate o f  
substitu tion  b e tw e e n  expend iture  on marginal bankruptcy  costs and  
exp en d itu re  upon marginal risk m an ag em en t cost as used to  ensure  
m in im u m  returns on borrow ed  w ork ing  capital m ust equal the  ratio of  
the ir respective  costs. (A lthough in all likelihood, the  cost o f risk
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m a n a g e m e n t  to  a firm is less than  the  cost of going bankrupt, hence  
m aking it optim al to be fully hedged.)  T o  form alize these  points, w e  
consider b e lo w  h o w  th ey  m ay be specified analytically .
In th e  modified GS model o f C hapter Five, there  are th ree  
aspects  to  cost: The  cost o f borrow ed w ork ing  capital, the  exp ec ted  
co st o f  bankrup tcy , and th e  cost o f risk m a n a g e m e n t using put  
options. U nderstand ing  their respective  argum ents  relate to  over-all  
cost, will help us understand h o w  th e y  m ay inter-act in th e  GS m odel  
w h e n  risk m a n a g e m e n t  has been added. W e  recall our rem arks of  
C h a p te r  Four, w h e re  w e  s a w  th a t  the expected  cost o f b a n kru p tcy  is 
c o n v e x  in o u tp u t  because o f risk aversion. In addition, w e  have  
va lidated  the  GS assertion th a t  increasing the variability  of firm  
specific  prices raises the  th rea t  o f bankruptcy  and cost, th e reb y  
reducing th e  level o f ou tp u t. In Section 4 . 4  w e  noted th a t  the  
probability  o f b ankru p tcy , F ( \ / t) w a s  a function o f the  fo llow ing  
param eters ,  repeated from  equation 4 . 1 4 ,  as per GS {page 8 8 ,  1 9 9 3 )  
and its relation to  th e  density  function  on firm specific prices i / t + f .
W e  have noted th a t  uncerta in ty  surrounding the relationship b e tw e e n  
f irm  specific  prices and the  threshold level, w as  the source  o f risk 
aversion because low er than  expected  firm specific prices are w h a t  
drives th e  risk o f  ban kru p tcy , as per Equation 4 . 1 4  o f C h ap te r  Four. 
As specified in th e  GS m odel and as used in the simulation program ,  
th e  cost o f b an kru p tcy  is a function o f ou tpu t (c / =  c q () .  T h e  th rea t  
of b a n kru p tcy  is influenced by the initial level o f equ ity  and w o rk ing  
capita l arising from  retained profits, but its generation is risky because  
of th e  one period lag b e tw e e n  the  t im e w h e n  capital is bo rro w ed  and  
c o m m itte d  to a w age-b il l ,  and w h en  the  returns are realized in the  
sale o f o u tpu t.  N o w  turning to  the  risk m an ag em en t m odule added
5 .5 )
to  th e  program , w e  specify  the  price o f risk reducing puts, as a 
fu nc tion  o f  four param eters , nam ely  the  a s s e t p r ic e , e x e rc is e  p r ic e f 
t im e  to  e x p ira t io n , in te re s t  ra te s , a n d  v o la t i l i ty  o r  v a r ia b i l i ty  in  f irm  
s p e c if ic  p r ic e s  (as w e  explain b e lo w  in Section 5 .3  on option  
va luation  th e o ry ) .6 W e  note th a t  all o f these param eters  are 
end o g en o u s  to  th e  program  and are a lready utilized for o ther results.
H aving  rev iew ed  the  various aspects o f cost in th e  m odified  GS  
style  m odel, w e  return to the question, o f h o w  introducing risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  will a f fe c t  optimal firm behaviour. From an analytic  
p erspective , the  question involves the three aspects o f  cost. It 
involves h o w  th e y  in ter-act and depends upon the  relative s treng th  o f  
th e  to ta l d ifferentia ls  o f marginal bankruptcy  costs and th a t  o f  the  
express ion  for expend itu re  upon risk m an ag em en t.  W e  h ave the  
b an k ru p tc y  com po nen t:
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5 .6 )
and th e  to ta l d ifferentia l o f the risk m an ag em en t p aram eter  6:
q / _ 30 3i|r + ^0 
3+  dX dX
5 .7 )
Return ing to  our earlier rem arks, the size of the relative s trength  of  
th e  tw o  e ffec ts  depends upon h o w  th ey  respond to the ir respective  
cost a rgu m en ts . Practically, the cost of risk m an ag em en t to  a given  
f irm  is likely to  be less than  the cost of going bankrupt. A  c ro s s -o v e r  
point w o u ld  only occur under unlikely conditions relating to th e  price  
of put options, for exam ple  u n d e r  e x tre m e  volatil ity . It p a y s  to  
m an ag e  risk b ecause the  price of put options w h ich  enters into the
6 Recalling from  GS, there  is little uncerta in ty  about the  general price level.
co st o f  risk m a n a g e m e n t ensuring the return on b o rro w ed  w o rk in g  
capita l is m uch less than  the  cost of going bankrupt. O ptions  
positions co n fer  a significant am o u n t of gearing, th a t  is for a relatively  
small price ("p rem iu m ", in industry parlance), a position having a large  
v a lu e , m ay  be contro lled . C om pared  to reducing o u tp u t  in th e  face  
o f b a n kru p tcy  risk, or going bankrupt, m anaging risk is very  
a t trac t ive .
W ith  positive real bankruptcy  costs, depending upon firm  level 
optim isation , the  equations as specified w ith in  the sim ulation model  
dete rm in e  to  w h a t  e x te n t  the  underlying asset positions will be 
hedg ed . Such decisions occur at the firm level and th e y  are d yn am ic ,  
as expressed in the  equation . As will verify  through s im ulation, since  
th e  cos t to  the  firm o f  risk m an ag em en t,  using derivatives is nearly  
a lw a y s  b e lo w  the  cost of bankruptcy , it p a y s  to  be fully hedged .  
Expenditure  upon risk m an ag em en t,  th a t  is ensuring the  return on 
b o rro w ed  w o rk ing  capital, through purchasing options at prices  
d eterm ined  end ogenously  by the  eco n o m y represented  by the  
s im ulated  GS style model, increases the level o f o u tpu t and a ffec ts  
th e  econ om ies  law s of m otion under certain conditions. Risk 
m a n a g e m e n t ,  m ay  reduce or elim inate the  "w e d g e  "  w h ich  the  ex  ante  
ex p e c te d  marginal bankrup tcy  costs drove b e tw e e n  w a g e s  and  
trad itional marginal cost, leading to an increase in o u tpu t.  In order for  
th e  level o f m acro  o u tp u t to increase, via increases in equ ity , a net  
cost saving m ust arise, through im proved inter-tem poral a llocation o f  
assets, in the  spirit o f the  W ill iam 's  paradigm . Since the  marginal 
ex p e c te d  cost o f b an kruptcy  generally exceeds the additional cost of  
ensuring a return to b orrow ed  w ork ing  capital via put options, a net  
gain in o u tp u t should arise from  risk m anag em ent.
T h e  abo ve  discussion is useful in seeing the  direction o f  e f fe c t
)
from  including risk m a n a g e m e n t in the  GS model. T h e  size o f  the  
e f fe c t  upon equilibrium o u tpu t of risk reduction along w ith  the  im pact  
upon th e  m odel's  dynam ics , h o w e v e r ,  cannot be de te rm in ed
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analy tica lly . It requires considering h o w  firm level profit m ax im ization  
involv ing th e  marginal exp ected  cost of bankruptcy  and h o w  the  
marginal cost o f risk m a n a g e m e n t respond to their respective  
a rg u m en ts , and in ter-ac t to d eterm ine  the net gain in o u tp u t ,  along  
w ith  ch anges  to dynam ic  behaviour.
Discussing the  m echanics  o f h o w  risk aversion opera tes  in the  
m odified  GS sty le  m odel will help to understand its likely d yn am ic  
im pact.  T o  this purpose, w e  com pare  it w ith  the specification  of  
C h a p te r  Four. In the  GS model o f C hapter Four, risk aversion takes  
th e  fo rm  o f reduction in ou tpu t to reduce the  th rea t  o f  b an kru p tcy .  
In th e  m odified  m odel, w e  retain the  fear of bankruptcy  arising fro m  
f irm  specific  prices b e lo w  the  threshold level, but firms m ay purchase,  
in add ition , risk m an ag em en t.  Rather than  reduce the  optim al level 
o f o u tp u t  as a precaution against realized firm specific prices b e lo w  
th e  b a n kru p tcy  level, th a t  is returns, be lo w  those an tic ipated  w h e n  
w o rk in g  capital w a s  co m m itted  to w a g e  expenditures , firms purchase  
th e  right to a p recautionary  sale of output, at the  threshold  price  
ensuring so lvency . In adopting the  above  specification w e  argue th a t  
th e  approach  to risk m a n a g e m e n t remains consistent w ith  th e  GS  
m odel as well as the  adopted  paradigm  of w h y  deriva tive  m arkets  
exist. A ltho ug h  risk aversion continues to  drive the  modified GS style  
m ode! o f C h ap te r  Five, it is not a requirem ent for the  added m odule  
per se.
W e  adopt the  W ill iam 's  paradigm  of risk m a n a g e m e n t,  rather  
th an  th e  insurance paradigm  o f Keynes and Hicks to inform  w h y  risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  occurs along w ith  its likely e ffec ts . Risk m a n a g e m e n t  
as w e  have noted in Chapters  Three  and Four, is an essential property  
o f investor behaviour in the  GS model (page 8 8 ,  1 9 9 3 ) .  T h e  m odified  
GS style m odel retains the  assum ption of bankrup tcy  avers ion ,  
a ltho ug h  this only a ffec ts  risk m an ag em en t indirectly, th a t  is th rough  
the  m odel. W e  em phasize  this point because only the  K eyn es /H icks  
m odel o f  hedging re q u ire s  risk aversion per se, and not the
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p recau tio nary  capital inventory  m an ag em en t approach o f W illiam s.  
In adding th e  risk m a n a g e m e n t module to the  GS style m odel, w e  
th us  rem ain  fa ithfu l to its original features . T he  W il l iam 's  parad igm  
does not n e e d  the  assum ption  of aversion to  bankrup tcy , per se, 
h o w e v e r  in the  present GS style m odel, such behaviour does lead 
indirectly  to risk m an ag em en t.  A lthough  risk aversion is utilized in the  
GS sty le  m odel, it is not a requ irem ent, per se, for risk m a n a g e m e n t  
to  occur in the  added m odule. Thus risk aversion a ffe c ts  risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  only indirectly through aversion to bankru p tcy  as per the  
GS m odel: It is neither a necessary nor a suffic ient assum ption  for  
risk m a n a g e m e n t  itself to occur, as found in the b a ckw ard a t io n /r is k  
prem ia literature. Even if firms k n e w  the probability th a t  firm specific  
prices m ight be b e lo w  the  threshold level, e ffec t ive ly  having perfec t  
fo res ig h t on th e  fu tu re  returns to  their borrow ed  w ork ing  cap ita l, (that  
is, possessed M u th  Rational Expectations), th ey  w ould  be unwilling  
to  a c c e p t  actuaria lly  fair gam bles if th e y  w e re  risk averse .
In the  m anner described above , w e  have ad op ted  the  
persp ective  th a t  risk m an ag em en t is a form  of d y n a m ic  a s s e t  
a llo c a t io n  o r  c a p ita l in v e n to ry  m a n a g e m e n t, undertaken to ensure the  
returns from  borrow ed  w ork ing  capital. By purchasing risk 
m a n a g e m e n t ,  firms m ay reduce or elim inate the  th rea t o f inso lvency,  
w h e n  firm  specific  prices are b e lo w  the  threshold requ irem ents .
T h e  ap proach  w e  have adopted  to  risk m an ag em en t behav iour is 
d ic ta ted  by the  econom ics of firm profit m axim ization . As assum ed  
and specified , if it is e c o n o m ic  to hedge to w h a te v e r  d egree , a m arke t  
for risk m a n a g e m e n t  exists and further. Only through the  GS model  
does th e  ex is tence  of a positive risk premia justify  indirectly  
exp en d itu re  to  reduce or elim inate the expected  cost o f b an kru p tcy ,  
w h ile  the  econom ics  o f such expend itu re  depends upon endog eno us  
param eters . Using an e c o n o m ic  approach to hedging in w h ich  s ta te -  
c o n tin g e n t  assets enter into the  firm level optim ization prob lem ,  
a llo w s  for asset positions to  be partially as well as co m ple te ly
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hed ged . As a marginal decision rule, a fully hedged position ensuring  
th e  return on borrow ed  w o rk in g  capital and co m p le te ly  e lim inating th e  
e x p e c te d  cost o f b an kru p tcy , depending  upon the  cost o f  risk 
m a n a g e m e n t ,  m ay not be justified. As w e  d iscover, h o w e v e r ,  
th ro u g h  s im ulation, for reasons m entioned earlier, under normal  
m a rk e t  conditions, as the  cost to  the  firm o f risk m a n a g e m e n t  in the  
fo rm  o f  options, is less than  the  expected  marginal co s t o f  
b a n kru p tcy , elim inating com ple te ly  the  cost o f b an kru p tcy , p a y s .  
Lastly, w ith  regard to the  specification of risk m a n a g e m e n t ,  for  
realism  in th e  modified GS style m odel, because th e  va lue  o f an 
e xp osed  position arising from  borrow ed w ork ing  capita l, m ay  not  
respond to  a ch an ge in the  rate o f  interest charged a t  th e  sam e rate  
at w h ic h  the  va lue  o f the  put option ensuring the  va lue  o f  w o rk in g  
capita l does (as per, Equations 5 .3  and 5 .4  o f C hap ter  5 ) ,  the  added  
m odule  determ ines  the  size o f the  risk m an ag em en t position, A, 
required to  a d eq u a te ly  hedge the  position, will be specified b e lo w  in 
S ection  5 . 3 . 7
Further insights into the potential e ffects  of m odify ing  th e  GS  
style  m odel by introducing a risk m an ag em en t module m ay  be gained  
th ro u g h  looking at firm level decision m aking. In troducing  risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  into the  GS style model, w e  will see, produces e ffec ts  
as d em o n stra ted  through  co m p ara tive  statics at the  firm level along  
w ith  having ag g reg ate  d yn am ic  im pact. In the  GS M o d e l,  the  
e x p e c te d  cost o f b an kru p tcy  drove a w e d g e  b e tw e e n  the  va lu e  o f  th e  
m arginal p roduct and w a g e s .  In C hap ter  Four, w e  verif ied th e  GS  
assertion th a t  as marginal cost o f b ankruptcy  g re w  larger, th e  optim al  
o u tp u t  declined. In term s o f neo-classical investm ent th eo ry , a capital 
con s tra in t  along w ith  uncerta in  returns to borrow ed w o rk in g  capital 
co m b in ed  w ith  the  th re a t  o f bankruptcy , as found in th e  GS m odel,
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7ln th e  D e r iva t ive 's  literature such practices are k n o w n  as co nstructing  a 
n e u t ra l  hedge. T h e  size o f the  derivatives  position required to  be neutra l, is 
co m p u ted  using the  option pricing m odel presented in Section 5 .3 .
crea tes  im p erfec t  capital m arket conditions, th a t  is the  s p a n  o f  
securities  availab le  does not corresponds to  all states o f th e  w o rld .  
A cco rd ing  to  N ickel, the  notion of capital m arket perfection  in a w orld  
o f u n certa in ty  does not apply and is w ith o u t  m eaning (page 1 5 9 ,  
1 9 7 8 ) .  T h e  e f fe c t  o f introducing the  risk reduction param eter ,  6, in to  
th e  G S  m o d e l,  is to  reduce the  size of the w e d g e  accord ing  to  the  
relationship b e tw e e n  th e  cost of bankruptcy  function and th e  cost o f  
th e  risk reduction function . W ith in  the c o n tex t o f in ves tm ent th eo ry ,  
rem oving  u ncerta in ty  from  in vestm ent decision m aking reduces  
capita l m arke t im perfection: Firms can b o rrow  increased a m o u n ts  at  
a g iven rate o f interest w ith o u t  greater risk o f de fau lt  (Layard &  
W a lte rs ,  page 3 2 7 ,  1 9 7 8 ) .  In the  GS model, since g reater b orrow ing  
given th e  equ ity  constra in t,  is necessary to expand o u tp u t ,  such  
e ffe c ts  should im pact both its com para t ive  statics as w ell as its 
d yn am ic  behaviour.
In addition to the  com p ara tive  static  results arising fro m  firm  
level decision m aking, introducing risk m an ag em en t in to the  GS  
m odel also has implications w ith  regard to dynam ic  behav iour and  
stability  w h ich  are less readily in terpreted. In the  modified GS model,  
the  size o f the  o u tp u t e f fe c t  depends upon the  cost of risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  relative to  the  exp ected  marginal cost o f  bankrup tcy  
and h o w  th e y  to g e th er  e f fe c t  the accum ulation  of equ ity . A ltho ug h  
th e  in ter-tem pora l relationships b e tw e e n  investm ent in w o rk in g  
capita l,  the  w a g e  bill and dividend paym ents  remain, exp en d itu re  
upon risk m a n a g e m e n t,  in the  aggregate , m ay change the  econom ies  
law s o f  m otion , such as the periodicity , and w h e th e r  the  oscillations  
are exp losive , d am p ed , or chaotic , th a t  is sensitive to  initial 
condit ions. Such implications for the  law s of m otion , it has been  
noted , h o w e v e r ,  generally , can n o t be determ ined analytica lly . As  
discussed in Section 4 . 9  of C hapter Four, non-linear d if fe rence  and  
differentia l equations are either d ifficult or impossible to  solve  
analytica lly , and hence require numerical simulation (page 3 , Baker &
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Gollub, 1 9 9 0 ) .  M o reo ver ,  in th e  GS mode! no closed form  expression  
to  equation  4 . 2 9  m ay  be specified, necessitating firm  level 
o ptim iza tion  over tim e and aggregation . To facilitate  dynam ic  
s im ulation , w e  note w ith  regard to  specification o f the  n e w  m odule  
a lgorithm , in the  modified modei, w e  have m ade the  price o f put  
options used for risk m a n a g e m e n t endogenous to the  GS sty le  model,  
in a m ann er expla ined b e lo w  in Section 5 .3 .  W e  ad o p t "s m a ll-  
c o u n t r y " assum ptions o f an infinitely elastic supply  o f "risk  
m a n a g e m e n t"  available to  firms. Each o f the population o f tw e n ty -  
f ive  firms is assum ed to  be a price-taker w ith  respect to  purchasing  
put options. A  general equilibrium perspective on risk m a n a g e m e n t  
is no t considered .
From ali o f  th e  above w e  see th a t  introducing the  risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  param eter  9, depending upon its a rg um en ts , m ay , on  
net, reduce th e  expected  cost of bankruptcy , and th e reb y  ceteris  
paribus, increase the  equilibrium level o f output, through facilita ting  
th e  accu m u lat io n  of equ ity , along w ith  changing the  m odel's  
dynam ics . W ith  the  added m odule, under realistic assum ptions  w ith  
regard firm  specific  price variability , returns should be grea te r  and  
th ro u g h  equ ity  accum ula tion , lead to greater output. In the  W il l iam 's  
parad igm , in ter-tem pora l asset allocation has been im proved, in this  
light, p e r fe c t in g  the GS style m odel, rectifying its N e w  K eynesian  
f ra m e w o rk ,  should positively im pact the  quantity  of a g g reg a te  o u tp u t  
th rou gh  changes in firm  ievel decision making. As w e  investigate  
b e lo w  th rough  numerical s imulation, this observation has both  
co m p a ra t iv e  static  firm -level implications along w ith  ag g regate  
d y n a m ic  e f fec ts .  (The e ffec ts  h o w ever ,  m ay to  som e e x te n t  be o ver­
s ta ted  because of the  lack o f realism in som e of the  GS assum ptions.  
C orrecting  the m odei o f som e of its unrealistic assum ptions w e  
postpone until C hap ter  Six.) T he  e f fe c t  upon borrow ing , in ves tm en t,  
and ag g reg a te  o u tp u t found in th e  modified GS model are im po rtan t  
because , as it is generally  cheaper to  be fully hedged th an  it is to  face
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th e  exp ec ted  marginal costs of bankruptcy , introducing the  risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  m odule should lead to  increases in o u tp u t a long w ith  
o th er dyn am ic  e ffec ts .  T h e  quantifiable size and nature o f  such  
e ffe c ts ,  h o w e v e r ,  m ay  not be determ ined analytically  from  inspection  
o f reduced fo rm  equations derived from  the first order m ax im ization  
s h o w n  in equation  5 .7  above . It requires instead investigation  
th ro u g h  num erical sim ulation, as undertaken in Sections 5 . 4  and 5 .5  
and as discussed in Section 5 .6 .
5 .3  Risk M a n a g e m e n t  Specification
In order to include risk m an ag em en t in the GS style m odel, w e  
ad o p t s tandard  option pricing theo ry  and add a m odule to th e  program  
specified  and sim ulated in C hapter Four. Im portan tly , the  n e w  
m odule  uses th e  exo genou s  inputs and endogenous results found  in 
th e  m odel o f  th e  previous chapter, to solve for the  price of put  
options. No n e w  exogenous assum ptions are needed. T h e  put  
options co m p u ted  in the  introduced m odule represent th e  s tate  
co n t in g en t  assets used to ensure the  returns to borro w ed  w o rk in g  
capita l w h ich  reduce or elim inate the  expected  marginal co s t of  
b a n kru p tcy , and th re a t  of insolvency. T h e y  are used as a m eans of  
ensuring th e  return or fu ture  value of the borrow ed  inven to ry  o f  
w o rk in g  capita l, by locking-in firm specific prices equal to the  
b an k ru p tc y  threshold level. To  price such s ta te -co n tin g en t assets,  
th e  established body o f theo ry  has been used.
U sefu lly , option pricing theory , w e  note, is not inconsistent  
w ith  W il l iam 's  paradigm  o f fu tures m arkets and risk m a n a g e m e n t.  As  
m en tio n ed , earlier, option pricing th eory  is em bedded  w ith in  C A P M  
th e o ry  since the  com bination  o f long options and short assets , or the  
o pp osite , m ay  be used to construct a risk-free rate of return. C A P M ,  
h o w e v e r ,  concerns the  general equilibrium pricing o f financial 
securit ies , w h e re a s  th e  W il l iam 's  model is a partial equilibrium  
exp lanatio n  o f w h y  firms ensure an ex ante  value for assets or
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inven to ry , im proving in ter-tem poral asset a llocation, in this case, o f  
b o rro w ed  w o rk in g  capital, given various m otives, including the  
precau tio nary  one. T h e  C A P M  perspective on hedging involves  
m o v e m e n ts  a long the  security  m arket line, w h ich  w e  found  w e re  
diff icu lt  to justify  from  the  perspective o f econom ic rationality . T h e  
W illiam s parad igm  concerns h o w  firm ensure th a t  th e y  rem ain  on the  
line, i.e. genera te  returns according to their level o f risk, because  put  
options m ay reduce or elim inate the  fluctuations in return to  bo rro w ed  
w o rk in g  capital. In addition to consistency, the W il l iam 's  m odel w e  
will s h o w  offers  an exp lanation  o f w h y  micro-financial b ehav iour has  
ag g re g a te  e f fec ts .  W e  will find also th a t  the adoption  o f the  
W ill ia m 's  m odel w ith in  the  N e w  Keynesian f ra m e w o rk  found in the  
GS m odel, presents som e insights to the  system atic  risk issues raised 
earlier arising from  a C A P M  and M M  perspective .
Turning to  the m echanics of option pricing, w e  recall th a t  a put  
op tion , as exp la ined , gives the  o w n e r  the  right to  sell a given quan tity  
o f assets, at a certa in  s tr ik e  or e x e rc is e  price, w ith in  or a t th e  end o f  
a specified tim e fram e. Several key econom ic variates are required to  
co m p u te  a theoretica l price o f the put option, nam ely  its relationship  
to  th e  underlying m arke t asset price, the  rate o f interest rate and the  
price volatil ity  o f the  underlying asset. The form ulation utilized relies 
upon th e  w e l l -k n o w n  Put-Call Parity th e o re m .8 D epend ing  upon  
o n e 's  underlying asse t/ in ven to ry  position, one typ e  o f deriva tive  
c o n tra c t  over another m ight be favoured . In the  modified the  GS  
m odel, the  concern  o f firms is w ith  protection fro m  d o w n -s id e  
exp o su re  o f a long asset position. Their s tra tegy is to  buy a put  
option to ensure firm specific prices, in e ffec t , at least equal to  th e  
threshold  level, as explained above in Section 5 .2 .  Purchasing a put  
option confers  the right to  sell o u tpu t at the m in im um  price i / f, w h ich
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8T h e re  are m an y  useful discussion o f option pricing th eory . T h e  w o rks  o f J .C .  
C o x  and M .  R ubenstein , O p tio n  M a rk e ts ,  (1 9 8 5 )  or R .M . B ookstaber, O p tio n  
P r ic in g  a n d  S tra te g ie s  in  in v e s t in g ,  (1 9 8 1 )  are particularly thorou gh .
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ensures so lven cy , a llow ing  the  firm to b reak-even. (For com parison ,  
long call options give one the  right to purchase a given q u an tity  of  
assets , a t  an agreed strike price on or w ith in  a specified t im e  fram e  
and m ay  be theore tica lly  priced in a similar m anner.)
U nderstand ing  the  m echanics of risk m an ag em en t,  w e  turn  to  
th e  theo re t ica l pricing of an option. In received financial th e o ry ,  five  
param eters  are needed for the  option pricing form ulas all o f  w h ic h  are  
fo und  in th e  model presented and simulated in C h ap te r  Four, as 
exo g en o u s  inputs or endogenous results. The  param eters  and their  
logic are as fo llow s. Their validation through s imulation appears  in 
Section  5 .4 .
1. P t+1:  T h e  Firm Specific  O u tp u t Price: The greater the  price  
of th e  underlying qu antity , the  greater the intrinsic va lue  of a 
call option w ith  a given strike price (that is, th e  right to  
purchase). C onverse ly , the  low er the price o f  the  underly ing  
quantity ,  the  greater the  intrinsic value o f a put option w ith  a 
given strike price (that is the  right to sell).
2 . X it+1: Exercise Price: For a call option w h ich  is in the  
m o n e y 9, th e  lo w er the  exercise price, the greater th e  intrinsic  
value of the  option. For a put option, the greater the  exercise  
price, the  greater the intrinsic value o f the option.
3 . T im e  to  Expiration: T h e  longer an option has to  run, the  
greater th e  probability th a t  it will be possible to  exerc ise  th e  
option profitab ly , hence the  greater the value o f th e  option . As  
th e  GS model assum es a first-order dynam ic  process, th e  t im e  
to  expiration is a single period.
9For a Call O ption , in -th e -m o ney  w ould  put the strike price b e lo w  the  m arke t  
price. For a Put O ption , in -the -m on ey  w ould  put the strike price a b o ve  th e  m arke t  
price.
2 2 5
4 . r t \ In terest Rates: As options involve a right to buy or sell 
th e  underlying asset at the  d iscounted value o f the  fu tu re  spot  
price: the  greater the  degree o f discount, the more va luab le  is 
the  right. T h e  rate o f interest rate determ ines the size o f the  
d iscount. Analogously , as options are a m eans o f b orrow ing  
and lending positions, the  value of such lending and bo rrow ing  
rises w ith  the rate o f interest.
5 . a :  Volatil ity : Volati l ity  is co m p uted  as a m oving  average  
fro m  th e  assum ed standard deviation of firm specific prices, as 
assum ed for simulation o f the GS model. Variab ility  in firm  
specific  prices a ffec ts  return on investm ent. Firm specifica lly ,  
if prices in the  fu ture  w e re  kn o w n  w ith  certa in ty , there  w ou ld  
be no need to  purchase options. (Also uncerta in ty  over the  
th re a t  o f b ankruptcy  w ould  be e lim inated.) Ceteris paribus, if 
th e  variability  o f f irm  specific prices increases, so will th e  price  
of its option.
W e  o bserve  th a t  all o f these  param eters  appear d irectly  or indirectly  
in th e  m odel specified and s im ulated in C hapter Four, so th a t  no n e w  
e xo g en o u s  param eters  are required to  endogenously  solve for th e  
price o f  risk m a n ag em en t.  Relying upon the m odel's  results to  solve  
fo r  th e  price o f  risk m an ag em en t,  the m odule will as w ell  de te rm in e  
th e  optim al size of the  option position required to m anag e  th e  firm  
specific  price exposure . In th e  added module, specifically , w e  use the  
fo l lo w in g  standard equation  based upon the Put-Call Parity T h e o re m ,  
as m entioned  ab ove , derived from  Black-Scholes option pricing  
fo rm ula  (F .B lack &  M .S ch o les , 1 9 7 3 ) ,  to solve for the  price o f a put  
option , 4k
<I'f = n P D U O  = C\P,\Ka,r) 4 V i -  P,1 
where, C (P ),xU t,ri = P/V(d,) - X(!1e 'r' N(d2)
5 .8 )
In th e  option  valuat ion  model  to  de te rmine  the  price of risk
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m a n a g e m e n t:  W h e re  d 1 and d 2 are defined accordingly:
5 .9 )
4 —  ----
(7
I t
dz=d^-of t
Further, w e  define  th e  o ther param eters  accordingly:
W: T h e  put option price
C: T h e  call option price
P't ; Firm specific o u tp u t price
X't+1: Exercise price
t: T im e  to  expiration - one period
a 2 T h e  instantaneous variance o f the asset price
N( ) T h e  cum ula tive  normal distribution function
rt: T h e  rate of interest at t im e t
Using the  above  form ula for the  price of a put option , w e  
incorporate  risk reduction and d o w n -s id e  risk e lim ination into th e  n e w  
m odel, in th e  fo llow ing  m anner. In C hapter Four w e  exp la ined h o w  
th e  M arg ina l Cost o f Bankruptcy  drove a w e d g e  b e tw e e n  the  
trad it ional w a g e /m a rg in a l  cost relationship. W ith  the  added risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  m odule, the purchase o f put options, at a cost  
ca lcu la ted  end ogenously , m ay  serve to reduce the  marginal cost of  
b a n kru p tcy . A  fully hedged neutral position eliminates the  possibility  
o f b a n kru p tcy , by ensuring th a t  the price received by a given f irm , at  
a m in im u m , is i i t+1 -  \ / t+ i,  th a t  is firm specific prices at least e q u a l  
the  threshold  level for so lvency. Using the  above  fo rm u la , the  
pro gram  en do genously  determ ines both the price o f p u t s ,^ ,  and the  
size o f  th e  position required to  full or partially hedge the  exp osure ,  
th a t  is A. T h e  optim al expend itu re  on the option position, th a t  is the  
eco no m ics  o f f irm  level optim ization , hereafter 6, as m entioned  has
as a rg u m en ts  the  price o f puts, the  com puted  A, and the  cost of  
b an kru p tcy . Put options contracts  are purchased up to  an optim al  
point, th a t  is, w h e re  th e  value o f the  last currency unit sp en t just  
equals  th e  exp ected  d iscounted cost of not having hedged o ne 's  
positions. Fully hedged, the  probability of bankruptcy  is zero; w h ile  
if th e  firm  is fuliy unhedged , the  probability o f bankru p tcy  reverts  to  
th e  m odel o f C h ap ter  Four, w ith  the  consequent e f fe c t  on firm  
behav iour. As m entioned earlier, given the e f f ic iency  o f using 
options, it nearly a lw ays  pays to be fully hedged, ex c e p t  for exam p le  
under conditions of e x tre m e  volatility. W e  assum e th a t  th e  risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  option has an exercise or strike price a t- th e -m o n e y ,  th a t  
is, a t  the  t im e of purchase, t im e t, w ith o u t  intrinsic va lue . Firm  
specifica lly , the  strike price o f the put option equals the  price o f the  
underly ing q uan tity  to  be sold at tim e f +  7, such th a t  U t4 l  >  V t+1. 
it guaran tees  a price a t t im e t +  1 a t least equal to  th e  b an kru p tcy  
th resho ld . (Hence , the  in e q u a lity  criteria above , u 't+1 >  vit+1. T h e  put  
option  ensures firm  specific  prices at least equal to the  threshold  
level.)  O ptions, w e  assum e, are of the  E u ro p e a n  s ty le ,  th a t  is m ay  
only be exercised at exp iration . W e  assum e th a t  options a i lo w  the  
firm  to  hedge one period into the fu ture , and if not utilized, as w h e n  
u 't+1 >  v j+ / ,  th e y  expire w orth less . Fully hedged, a f irm  m ay  receive  
a price exceed in g  \ / t+1, but never be low .
5 . 4  C o m p ara t ive  Static  S imulations of the M odified  GS M odel
In Section  5 .3  abo ve  w e  m ade som e preliminary observations  
ab o u t th e  modified m odel's  com para t ive  statics. Before looking at  
h o w  the  dynam ic  behaviour o f the  GS style model w ith  the added risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  m odule behaves, w e  turn to  the results o f co m p ara t ive  
static  sim ulation to see the  e ffec ts  upon o u tput and profit. In this  
w a y  w e  ensure th a t  the  modified model continues to beh ave  in the  
sam e  m icro -eco no m ic  fashion as explained in C hapter Four, including  
th a t  it obeys the th ree  Propositions concerning capital s tru ctu re , price
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un certa in ty  and o u tp u t co n vex ity  as appears in the GS articles ( 1 9 8 8 ,  
1 9 9 3 } .  W e  s h o w  th a t  the  m odifications to the  GS sty le  m odel 
b eh ave  as exp ected  w ith  regard to the  argum ents  found in th e  option  
pricing m odule . Recalling som e of the simulation exp erim en ts  o f  
C h a p te r  Four, m aking com parisons w ith  the  m odified versus  
unm odified  GS sty le  m odel, are instructive in this regard. A fte r  
considering co m p ara tive  statics, w e  turn  to  the dyn am ics  o f  risk 
m a n a g e m e n t .  W ith  reference to the  GS Propositions, the  results of  
six s im ulation experim ents  for the i ' t h  firm at tim e t  =  2 ,  are reported  
to  s h o w  h o w  perturbations to  exogenous variables e f fe c t  
in tertem pora l behaviour w h e n  risk m an ag em en t is available . Looking  
f irst a t  co m p ara tive  statics, w e  recall the  equity  exp erim en ts  from  
C h a p te r  Four. B elow , in Figures 4 7  to 5 0 ,  w e  com pare  the  e f fe c t  
upon firm  level com p ara tive  statics o f changing the  initial level of  
e q u ity  w ith  and w ith o u t  risk m an ag em en t assumed ( "n o  R M "  and  
"R M ") .  S im ulations, w e  will see, sh ow s h o w  changes in capital  
structu re  a f fe c t  the  use o f risk m an ag em en t.  In Figures 4 7  and 4 8 ,  
w e  see th a t  for the  reasons discussed above , the availability  o f  risk 
m a n a g e m e n t ,  as it reduces or e lim inates the th rea t o f b an kru p tcy ,  
sharp ly  expands outpu t. For purposes o f com parison, the  scales of  
th e  graphs are the  sam e. W e  see th a t  under risk m a n a g e m e n t,  the  
revenu e  and cost curve  n o w  rises much more gradually , as s h o w n  in 
m uch f la tte r  marginal curves, rising beyond the scale o f the  horizontal 
axis. In Figures 4 9  and 5 0 ,  w e  have increased the initial level o f  d eb t  
in the  capital s tructure , m aking risk m a n ag em en t th a t  m uch  more  
im p ortan t, because the  th rea t o f bankruptcy  is n o w  greater.  
A lth o u g h  greater deb t m akes individual firms more cautious w ith  
respect to  borrow ing w o rk ing  capital and hiring w orkers , th e  e f fe c t  
is sharp ly  reduced w ith  risk m an ag em en t purchased in the  fo rm  o f put  
options. Gearing-up  on a small level o f equity  m akes sense w h e n  a 
m in im u m  prices are ensured. In the  four co m p ara tive  static  
sim ulations, w e  note, th a t  ail other param eters , notab ly  th e  variance
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in f irm  specific  prices and profit retention are the sam e ( 1 0 %  and  
8 0 % ,  respective ly ).  T h e  four simulations sh o w  the  e ff ic iency  o f  risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  using derivatives . In v ie w  o f their relatively lo w  cost,  
because  o f  their gearing like e ffec t ,  for a small prem ium  a large  
exp o su re  m ay  be contro lled .
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Turn ing  to th e  last t w o  sets o f experim ents  for th e  i ' t h  f irm , w e  
see th e  e f fe c t  o f changing  the  variability in firm specific prices. It is 
quite in teresting, because on the one hand, increased u ncerta in ty  
w ith  regard to  f irm  specific prices, d t+1, a ffec ts  the  th re a t  o f  
b an kru p tcy  v iz -a -v iz  the threshold level, \ / t+1, and th e reb y  reduces
borro w in g  and even tu a lly  ag greg ate  ou tpu t as w e  s a w  in C h ap te r  
Four. W ith  greater variability , h o w e v e r ,  in firm specific  prices  
increases the  cost o f m anaging risk, as w e  explained in the  last 
section . G iven th e  gearing-like e ff ic iency  o f risk m a n a g e m e n t ,  
h o w e v e r ,  a net gain in o u tpu t occurs even  w ith  g reater firm  specific  
price risk. In Figures 51 and 5 2  the  variability  in firm specific  prices  
is increased to  2 0 % ,  from  the  previously assum ed 1 0 %  o f  the  
previous four figures. W e  see, w ith o u t  risk m an ag em en t g rea te r  firm  
specific  price variability  leads firms to  cu t-b ack  on in v e s tm e n t and  
produces reduced ag g reg ate  ou tput. W h e n  the  risk m a n a g e m e n t  is 
op eratio na l, using the  m odule added to the  GS style program , a gain  
in o u tp u t  occurs , y e t  th e  e ffec t ,  is diminished by its g reater  cost.  
A lth o u g h  from  the  s tandpo in t o f profitability, using risk m a n a g e m e n t  
is s u p e r io r to  reducing inves tm ent and ou tp u t, its benefits  are reduced  
b ecause  o f the  e f fe c t  greater firm specific price volatility has upon its 
price.
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As w e  can see from  the  six co m parative  static  sim ulations for  
the  i ' t h  f irm , the  availability  o f risk m an ag em en t boosts o u tp u t  
co nsiderab ly . W ith  greater initial equ ity  in the  capital s truc tu re , as 
th e  e x -a n te  exp ected  cost o f bankruptcy  is reduced, th e  gains in 
o u tp u t  fro m  m anaging risk are smaller. As firms purchase put options  
because  o f the  un certa in ty  over fu ture  firm specific prices in relation
to  th e  threshold  bankrup tcy  criteria, experim ents  on price vo la ti l ity  are  
quite  interesting. C om paring  Figures 51 and 5 2  w ith  th e  four  
previous ones, w e  see the  gains in ou tpu t w h e n  risk m a n a g e m e n t  is 
an option . As price volatil ity  is a key param eter  in the  risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  pricing m odule o f the  s imulation program , the  a b o ve  
exp er im en ts  s h o w  th a t  risk m a n a g e m e n t does boost th e  level o f  
o u tp u t ,  but th e  b enefit  is slightly reduced w ith  greater vo lati l i ty . As  
m easured  by outp u t, w h e n  risk is m anag ed , a gain occurs. U nder risk 
m a n a g e m e n t ,  h o w e v e r ,  because the cost o f m anaging  exposure  
increases w ith  greater volatil ity , th a t  is, firm specific price variab ility ,  
as per th e  ob jective  function , equation 5 .3 ,  the  e ff ic iency  o f avoid ing  
risk is reduced. In sum , w e  see from  com parative  s tatic  sim ulations  
s h o w n  ab o ve , th a t  w ith  risk m a n a g e m e n t available in th e  fo rm  o f a 
put option , the  profit m axim ising level o f  o u tpu t is greater b ecause  o f  
th e  f irm 's  net reduction in cost. Reducing or e lim inating marginal 
b an kru p tcy  cost, through  elim inating uncerta in ty  around firm  specific  
price variab ility , and hence its relation to the threshold  for  
b a n kru p tcy , encourages  the  borrow ing of w ork ing  capita l, g ro w th  in 
eq u ity ,  and th e  expansion  o f ou tp u t. Lastly, w e  note th a t  all o f th e  
a b o ve  co m p ara t ive  static  results are intuitively consisten t w ith  the  
Propositions o f the  GS m odel.
5 .5  D yn am ic  S im ulations of the  M odified  GS M odel
W e  n o w  turn to h o w  the  GS style simulation program  b ehaves  
over  t im e  if risk m a n a g e m e n t w e re  available to firms in their  
optim isation  calculus. Using the m ethod explained in C h ap te r  Four, 
w e  h ave cond ucted  several s imulation experim ents  to investigate  the  
in ter-tem pora l e f fe c t  o f risk m an ag em en t upon the  GS sty le  model.  
R esem bling the  six experim ents  used to dem o nstra te  th e  m o de l's  
c o m p a ra t iv e  statics, found in Figures 4 7  to 5 2 ,  w e  n o w  s h o w  the  
e f fe c t  o f  risk m a n a g e m e n t  upon the  m odel's  dynam ics. U nder various  
scenarios w ith  respect to  initial values for various param eters , w e
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report in Figures 5 3  to  5 8 ,  the  dynam ic  trajectories w ith  and w ith o u t  
risk m a n a g e m e n t  to facilita te  com parison . For each  set of  
p aram eters , w e  have tw o  simulations: In Figure 5 3 a  for exam p le , w e  
find th e  d ynam ic  tra jec to ry  and in Figure 5 3 b  the  phase portrait. As  
w e  recall from  C hapter  Four, the  phase portraits w e re  necessary  in 
order to  explore the  role of random  attractors  and higher  
d im ensionality  in the  GS m odel. Using the  sam e param eters , in Figure  
5 4 a  and 5 4 b ,  w e  have the  tra jec tory  and phase portrait p lotted  but  
under th e  assum ption  th a t  risk m a n a g e m e n t ("R M ") is availab le .
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FIGURE D/E S IG M A PROFIT
R ETEN TIO N
T ech
Fig. 5 3 a .  - b. 
No R M
5 .7 5 2 0 % 2 5 % 3 .5
Fig. 5 4 a .  - b. 
R M
5 .7 5 2 0 % 2 5 % 3 .5
Fig. 5 5 a  - b. 
No RM
6 .0 2 0 % 2 5 % 3 .0
Fig. 5 6 a .  - b. 
R M
6 .0 2 0 % 2 5 % 3 . 0
Fig. 5 7 a .  - b. 
No RM
6 .0 2 2 % 2 5 % 3 .0
Fig. 5 8 a .  - b. 
R M
6 .0 2 2 % 2 5 % 3 .0
fable 5.1
T h e  param eters  for each s imulation as appear in Tab le  5 .1  are noted  
for th e  individual f igures. T h e  simulation results s h o w  th a t  the  
availab ility  o f risk m a n a g e m e n t sharply increases outpu t, trans fo rm ing  
th e  dynam ics  of th e  sys tem . As w e  can see, introducing risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  changes  the  Law s of M otion  from  oscilla tory
co n v e rg e n c e  to  oscillatory d ivergence. The  tra jec tory  g enera ted  
w h e n  risk m a n a g e m e n t is available features  sharply greater levels o f  
a g g reg a te  ou tpu t, because firms are n o w  not afraid to  b o rro w  and  
invest. C om pared  to simulations 5 3  and 5 4 ,  in Figures 5 5  and 5 6 ,  
w e  reduce slightly the  level o f techn o log y , holding other param eters  
u n ch an g ed , w h ich  should as w e  have seen in C hapter Four, m ake  the  
e c o n o m y  less co n verg en t,  in com bination  w ith  reducing the  initial 
a m o u n t  o f  equ ity  in the  capital s tructure. W e  see th a t  the  e ffe c ts  of  
decreas ing  the  initial level o f equ ity  in com bination  w ith  low ering  the  
level o f tech n o lo g y  ag gregate  ou tpu t are largely o ff-se tt ing . Having  
in itially less equ ity  in the  capital s tructure, has the e f fe c t  o f m aking  
risk m a n a g e m e n t  slightly more im portant, as the risk to  inso lvency  
arising from  firm specific prices not m eeting the  threshold  level is 
e n h an ced . In Figure 5 6 a ,  w e  see, introducing risk m a n a g e m e n t  
tra n s fo rm  th e  tra jec to ry  fro m  one w h ich  is con vergen t to one w h ich  
displays oscillatory d ivergence . Looking at the phase portra it in 
Figure 5 6 b ,  w e  see th a t  w ith  risk m an ag em en t in p lace, the  
oscilla tory d ivergent dynam ics are n o w  more e ffec ted  by th e  random  
attrac to r .  In the  phase portrait w e  see th a t  a lthough d o w n -s id e  
exposu re  on firm specific prices have been e lim inated, b ecause a 
given firm  n o w  has greater incentive to invest and b o rro w  w ork ing  
capita l, its levels o f equ ity  are more a ffec ted  by the  random  a ttrac to r ,  
u (,  th an  th e y  w ou ld  be o th erw ise , if investm ent and borro w ing  had 
been d iscouraged. Price variability  above  the threshold level, n o w  
piays a g reater role. Gearing-up on the level o f equ ity , sharply  
exp an d s  o u tp u t w h e n  the  th rea t o f prices be low  the  ban kru p tcy  
threshold  h ave been e lim inated, n o tw ithstand ing  the  low er level o f  
prod uctive  tech n o lo g y . Thus by introducing the  risk m a n a g e m e n t  into  
th e  m odel, w ith  the  assum ed exogenous param eters , the  sys tem  is 
rendered d ivergen t and the  periodicity o f cycles increased. W ith  risk 
m a n a g e m e n t ,  as ev idenced by the phase portraits, th e  random  
a ttrac to r ,  u (, has a g reater influence upon the  m odel's  d yn am ic
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b ehav iour, because a lthough d o w n  side price exposure  has been  
reduced or e lim inated , th e  spiral o f borrow ing- investing- w a g e s  and  
profit, are en couraged . W ith o u t  risk m an ag em en t availab le , firms  
fac ing  th e  th rea t  of firm specific prices, d t b e io w  \Zt, b o rro w  less, 
w ith  a sm aller im pact upon real w a g e s , and ultim ately  profits and  
o u tp u t ,  th e re b y  leaving a smaller role for the random  input in the  
m o d e l's  dynam ics .
M ak ing  a com parison b e tw e e n  Figures 5 6  and 5 4 ,  w e  see th a t  
by introducing risk m an ag em en t,  the econ om y in both cases is 
ch an ged  fro m  oscillatory convergen ce  to d ivergence. As m easured  
by ag g reg a te  o u tpu t,  the benefits  of risk m an ag em en t are large. 
G earing up on a low er level o f initial equ ity  is particularly  beneficial 
w h e n  risk m a n a g e m e n t is available, especially w h e n  because o f  a 
lo w e r  level o f tech n o lo g y , production is more labour in tensive. U nder  
such c ircu m stan ces , th e  random  input is more im portan t and has a 
strong e ffe c t  upon the  sys tem 's  dynam ic  tra jectory . In the  last tw o  
sets o f  s im ulations, w e  change only the  variability in f irm  specific  
prices from  2 0 %  to  2 2 % .  Increasing the variability in f irm  specific  
prices even  very  slightly m ake the  eco n o m y more c o n v e rg e n t  as 
s h o w n  by com paring  Figures 5 5  and 5 7 ,  w h en  risk m a n a g e m e n t  is 
not an option. W h e n  risk m an ag em en t is available , h o w e v e r ,  
increasing the  variability  in firm specific prices, increases th e  in fluence  
o f th e  random  input. Price variability e ffec ts  risk aversion th ro ug h  the  
relationship b e tw e e n  firm specific prices i i t and the  threshold  i / f, as 
w e  k n o w  from  our simulations in C hapter Four. C hanging  price  
variability  is particularly im portant w h e n  risk m a n a g e m e n t  is 
considered , because firstly increasing it, m akes hedging m ore  
im po rtan t,  secondly , it slightly raises its price through th e  option  
fo rm u la , as co m p u ted  endogenously  by the m odel, and lastly, as w e  
h ave  noted it m akes the  model more subject to the  random  input. 
C om parin g  Figures 5 6  and 5 8 ,  w e  see th a t  the  model as calibrated is 
fa irly  sensitive to the  price o f  risk m anagem en t.
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A G G R E G A T E  O U T P U T  &  E Q U I T Y
TRAJECTORIES
Figure 53a. No RM: Initial D/E = 5.75, 
Tech = 3.5, Dividends = 25%, Sigma 
= 2 0%
Tech = 3.5, Divid. = 25%, Sigma = 
20%
236
A G G R E G A T E  O U T P U T  &  E Q U I T Y
TRAJECTORIES
TIME
Figure 54a. RM: Initial D/E = 5.75, 
Tech = 3.5, Divid. = 25%, Sigma = 
2 0 %
Tech = 3.5, Divid. = 25%, Sigma = 
2 0 %
237
A G G R E G A T E  O U T P U T  &  E Q U I T Y
TRAJECTORIES
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Figure 55a. No RM: Initial D/E = 6, 
Tech = 3, Divid. = 25%, Sigma = 
2 0 %
Figure 55b. No RM: Initial D/E = 6, 
Tech = 3, Divid. = 25%, Sigma = 
2 0 %
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A G G R E G A T E  O U T P U T  &  E Q U I T Y
TRAJECTORIES
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Figure 56a. RM: Initial D/E = 6, Tech 
= 3, Divid. = 25%, Sigma = 20%
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Figure 56b. RM: Initial D/E = 6, Tech 
= 3, Divid. = 25%, Sigma = 20%
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= 3, Divid. = 25%, Sigma = 22%
Tech = 3, Divid. = 25%, Sigma = 
2 2 %
2 4 0
A G G R E G A T E  O U T P U T  &  E Q U I T Y
TRAJECTORIES
Figure 58a. RM: Initial D/E = 6, Tech 
= 3, Divid. = 25%, Sigma = 22%
= 3, Divid. = 25%, Sigma = 22%
While output is expanded with risk management in Figure 58, the 
effect is smaller because of the greater cost of managing risk, making 
the importance of the random attractor somewhat smaller. Explaining 
further, risk management, as we have seen so far increases output, 
but at the expense of increasing aggregate instability, and making the 
model's dynamics more sensitive to the random attractor.
Relating the effect of increasing firm specific price variability to 
the broader issues, we see that without risk management, it renders 
the system more stable, as firms become more risk averse to the 
possibility of firm specific prices, i f t+1 below the threshold v'f+7, that 
is insolvent. Although risk management facilitates and encourages 
investment and output swings, when firm specific price variability is 
increased, it has the effect of raising the cost of risk management. 
Compared to the output and dynamics when price variability is 
smaller, under such conditions, investment and growth in equity is 
discouraged, as shown in the levels of attained in Figure 58a 
compared to that obtained in 56a. The result arises because greater 
price variability makes it more dear for the firm to hedge its position. 
More expensive risk management has the same effect as increasing 
costs, upon system stability. Investment and borrowing are slightly 
discouraged and output is reduced. Although down-side exposure 
may be reduced or eliminated, aggregate instability remains because 
borrowing of working capital, relative to borrowing without risk 
management available, is encouraged, exaggerating the wage- 
dividend spiral found in the model. Such effects are shown in the 
corresponding phase-portrait or orbit where we see that the dynamics 
are subject to the random attractor. Although the dynamics of the 
GS model arise from the output-wage-profit and dividend spiral, as 
depicted in the stylized Figure 3.1 of Chapter Three, they are 
randomly effected by the variability in firm specific prices through its 
impact upon profits and retained earnings. As explained earlier, 
following the William's paradigm of futures markets, as options are
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a means of borrowing or lending a position in order to improve the 
inter-temporal allocation of assets, it is not surprising the greater 
growth in equity with risk management leads to greater aggregate 
instability.
In all three sets of simulations, we see that introducing risk 
management, increases output sharply relative to not managing risk. 
Comparing Figures 58a and 58b with 56a and 56b, we see however 
that because risk management is slightly more expensive, the gains 
in output are reduced, within the time frame shown, recalling that the 
trajectory is divergent, and many more iterations with greater 
precision are often useful in numerical analysis. Predictably, 
increasing firm specific price variability has a dampening effect upon 
cyclic oscillations. The plotting of phase portraits, moreover, shows 
that with risk management, although the down-side of price exposure 
has been eliminated, the "exposure" of the model's dynamics to the 
effects of the random input are enhanced. With and without risk 
management, aggregate output declines in comparison to the levels 
with lower firm specific price variability because of the greater risk of 
bankruptcy. Risk management still has a role in increasing output, 
but the gain is smaller because of its greater cost. As we recall, the 
price of put options is positively related to price variability.
5.6 Risk Management and Non-Linear Dynamics
In the final section of Chapter Five, the inter-temporal 
behaviour of the modified GS style model is discussed from 
standpoint of how risk management influences dynamic behaviour. 
We consider the sensitivity to changes in initial conditions, and how 
it effects the role of the random input the model's dynamics. In this 
way, we may round-out the subjects of non-linear dynamics and 
chaotic behaviour, in light of the simulations seen in Section 5.6. In 
Chapter Four, we explained that linearization around the steady state 
ignores such possibilities as sign changes in the phase line as typified
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in the t e n t  f a m i l y  of functions which display multiple equilibria, 
sensitivity to initial conditions, and such phenomenon as period 
doubling or bifurcations (Chapter 2, Gulick, 1992). In Section 4.9 of 
Chapter Four, such phenomena were examined using numerical 
simulation. It was also shown that properly, the GS model should 
behave as a second order system, because of the random input, uft. 
In Section 5.6, returning to the subject of non-linear dynamics, we 
discuss the laws of motion for the modified GS style model relative 
to the laws of motion for the unmodified one, that is without risk 
management. We will interpret further the meaning of how the 
modified model behaves in response to changes in initial conditions 
and perturbations to the exogenous parameters which drive the cost 
of risk reduction.
Building upon the observations made in Section 5.5, we have 
found that introducing risk management renders the system's 
dynamics less stable and leads to increased periodicity, that is the 
number of iterations per cycle. In addition, with risk management 
encouraging investment, the dynamics are more effected by the 
random input, u 'v The phase portraits shown in Section 5.5, are 
typical of the a t e n t - s t y i e  logistic map, indicating chaotic oscillations 
(see, page 23-25, Ott, 1993 or Chapter 1, Gulick, 1992). The 
realism of such results are subject to qualification, however, in view 
of some of the model's unrealistic structural specifications, as we will 
explain in Chapter Six. In the six simulation experiments detailed 
above in Table 5.1, a perturbation to a particular exogenous initial 
parameter was performed to determine its effect upon the inter­
temporal dynamics of the GS style model when risk management is 
assumed. As a point of reference we showed how the model 
performs when there is no management of risk and firms adjust 
output to reduce the expected cost of bankruptcy. Although some 
of these parameters have been investigated before, our purpose was 
to consider in particular the effect upon periodic behaviour arising
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from the model's non-linear dynamics when it is assumed that risk is 
managed from the standpoint of initial condition sensitivity.
For each of the simulations we have seen the dynamic 
trajectories and the corresponding phase portraits. The changes to 
inter-temporal dynamics between each figure reveals the great 
sensitivity of the GS style model to varying the initial conditions. 
Such sensitivity is particularly important when the system is rendered 
explosive and divergent under risk management. The trajectories and 
orbits for each experiment demonstrate how the model behaves when 
risk management is available to the firm. We have seen from the 
phase portraits and the dynamic trajectories, for example, as shown 
in Figure 55 and 56, the effect of reducing the initial equity in the 
capital structure for each of the population of twenty-five firms. With 
decreased initial equity, there is more risk to manage, because of 
greater borrowing. Such circumstances, without risk management, 
would render the system more stable as it raises marginal bankruptcy 
cost, inducing risk aversion. Assuming risk management, under the 
assumption of reduced initial equity, as shown in the dynamic 
trajectories and phase portraits, renders the system oscillatory 
divergent, and more subject to the random input. Gearing-up on 
reduced equity is attractive, especially when the down-side of 
borrowing, having insufficient profits to service debt, has been 
eliminated, however, there are macro economic implications.
Surveying the above results, an intuitive interpretation is that 
the availability of risk management creates an aggregate externality 
in the form of increased systemic instability. In a sense, it enhances 
the role of the random input argument in expression 4.38 while 
making the other argument of expression 4.38 less important. In the 
experiments, introducing risk management to the GS style system, 
unambiguously leads to sharply greater output, as we can see from 
the vertical scale, but also greater dynamic instability in the 
aggregate. As mentioned earlier, managing risk is much cheaper than
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avoiding it, hence the net gain in output. Like the other simulations, 
it appears that the micro-economic gains at the firm level generate 
greater systemic instability at the macro-economic level. Arguably, 
the c o s t s  in macro-economic output variability constitutes a form of 
externality created by risk management. While before the effects of 
the random attractor were internalized, they are now externalized into 
aggregate output instability. The results are consistent with the 
William's paradigm in that using options improves the inter-temporal 
allocation of assets at the firm level, improving profits, and growing 
equity and output. Properly understood, r is k  m a n a g e m e n t  is not 
about eliminating or reducing risk. Rather, by allowing the firm to 
concentrate upon price relationships rather than their absolute level, 
it yields improved performance as measured by profits and output. 
At the macro level, however, greater cyclic instability is created.
The simulations found in Section 5.5 serve to verify that the 
dynamic behaviour of the GS style model with risk management is 
consistent with option pricing theory, and our general observations on 
its inter-temporal nature. The simulations provide several new 
insights into the dynamics of a New Keynesian style model when the 
assumed financial market imperfection is correctable. We have 
shown that risk management leads to greater firm output, and greater 
profitability, but at "p r i c e With risk management, unambiguously, 
cyclic periodicity increases, as would arise from a sign-changing 
inflection point in the phase line becoming sharper. (Sharp, sign- 
changing inflection points are important in logistic maps because may 
give rise to chaotic trajectories (Chapter 2, Ott, 1993).) Aperiodic 
behaviour is also observed along with extreme sensitivity to initial 
conditions, typical of chaos. With risk management, the roie of the 
random attractor in the model is enhanced. Arguably, based upon the 
above simulations, removing or sharply reducing the threat of 
bankruptcy arising from the original stylized assumptions on financial 
market imperfections through risk management, transforms firm
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specific risk into a form of systemic macro-externaiity. The macro­
externality takes the form of reduced cyclic stability, and possibly 
explosively, divergent and chaotic trajectories in aggregate output. 
Risk management m a g n i f i e s  the model's borrowed working capita! - 
wage - dividend spiral, and hence aggregate instability, enhancing the 
role of the random attractor. With downside exposure reduced or 
removed, borrowing for positive but possibly modest returns is 
encouraged. With the threat of bankruptcy removed, the real wage - 
profit spiral is enhanced. Recalling the results of Section 5.5 we see 
that a net gain in output with risk management occurs, along with a 
greater cyclic instability. In effect, it appears that in the aggregate 
risks cannot be eliminated, only transformed: The gains in macro 
output come at the "expense" of greater systemic volatility through 
the GS model's structural dynamics, as shown in the phase portraits. 
Consistent with the William's paradigm, the use of derivatives 
improves the inter-temporal allocation of assets, increasing equity and 
output. Although firm specific exposures have been managed, the 
"cost" has been increased aggregate instability. We see, that within 
the confines of the GS style model, adding the risk management 
module has both aggregate and dynamic output implications.
The above effects, however may be over-stated, because of 
the lack of realism found in some of the GS specifications, particularly 
with regard to unlimited borrowing at a fixed rate of interest which 
does not include the risk of default. Even with the returns on 
borrowed working capital risk managed, lenders may still be reluctant 
to provide unlimited amounts, as per perfect capital market theory. 
Arguably, the model implicitly assumes an informational asymmetry 
between lenders and borrowers, in the sense that the former are 
unaware of the economies's deep dynamic structure in the Lucas 
sense, particularly with regard to the borrowed working capital - wage 
bill externality. Not risk adjusting the cost of capital in the GS mode! 
also creates a curious relationship between the providers of equity
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and the providers of debt. Risk managed or not, the model would 
appear to be biased in favour of expanding market value, 
notwithstanding the risks, placed upon book value. We explore this 
point in Chapter Six. The questions of market versus book value bias 
is arguably exacerbated by the dividend pay-out regime required for 
the GS model. Stochastic as GS propose in their article or on a fixed 
percentage basis as used for simulation, not applying financially 
rational behaviour to dividend structure, and assuming that lenders 
are unaware, further impacts the output-dynamics. Even without risk 
management in place, the dividend approach specified in the GS 
model imposes certain biases in the models dynamic behaviour, for 
reasons we will explain, and hence merits further inquiry. Valuation 
under Neo-classical financial economics should be invariant to h o w  
expected returns are distributed. Returns to share holders, dividend 
yields, should reflect the risk adjusted cost of equity capital. A 
commitment to pay dividends rather than retaining capital for 
precautionary motives exposes debt holders to the risk of market 
value falling below book value, however, as might occur during an 
economic contraction. For a firm to pay dividends facing the risk of 
default or which are unrelated to the cost of equity capital, lacks 
realism. In Chapter Six, we conclude our analysis of the GS style 
model with the risk management module by addressing such issues 
and deficiencies.
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SIX: SOME REMAINING TECHNICAL ISSUES
6.0 Introduction
In Chapter Five we investigated the dynamic implications of 
introducing risk management into the GS style model. Using both 
linearization around the steady-state and non-iinear techniques, we 
found that the possibility of hedging against price uncertainty
increases the magnitude of macro-economic fluctuations. Period
/
doubling bifurcations and even aperiodic chaotic deterministic 
dynamics exaggerated by the model's stochastic features may arise 
because firms become less risk averse during the expansionary phase 
of the economic cycle. We cautioned, however, that some of these 
results may be subject to qualification, raising issues with respect to 
the possibly unrealistic specifications found in the GS style model 
upon which the numerical simulation program is based. In this 
Chapter, our focus is not upon adding new complexities to the GS 
style model, but rather upon rectifying these problems in 
specification, by modifying the specification somewhat further. Like 
Chapters Four and Five, we use numerical simulation to understand 
how such changes in specification of the GS style model may alter its 
Laws of Motion.
We will consider first the issue of the rate charged for loanable 
funds, and secondly- will focus upon the return structure, looking 
again at the role played by dividends as specified in the GS model. 
In the GS modei, the cost of loanable funds which provide working 
capital is invariant with respect to firm's capital structure, r t = 8 , the 
consumer rate of time preference which is a constant over time. 
Although with changes in profits, the ratio of debt to equity of a 
given firm may change, in the GS model, what they are charged for
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borrowed working capital does not. Effectively, the GS model does 
not risk adjust the cost of capital, and hence the return required by 
the individual time discount, 8 . Given the constraint on equity, 
making the cost of borrowed working capital constant, would seem 
to encourage borrowing, as gearing is increased. We redress this 
feature in Chapter Six by making changes to the cost of capital 
endogenous to the model, as we explain below. The second issue we 
take-up in Chapter Six concerns the structure of returns in the GS 
model. The return structure of the GS model, the proportion of 
profits distributed as dividends versus retained as profits, is very 
important to its dynamic behaviour. Recalling from Chapter Four, as 
examined in Figures 22 to 24, and as mentioned by GS (page 100,
1993), profit distribution through dividends must be sufficiently large 
in order to inhibit unbounded growth in equity. If growth in equity is 
unbounded, because of diminishing risk aversion, a trajectory in 
output which is monotonic and divergent may arise. Such dynamic 
behaviour, however, raises questions with regard to the realism of 
either a fixed dividend rule as employed in the model or a purely 
stochastic approach as presented by GS; and secondly, challenges 
received theory with regard to the impact of return structure upon 
valuation. As per the Modigliani-Miller theorem (hereafter, MM), the 
valuation of a firm depends upon the riskiness of it's net operating 
income, and not upon it's mix of dividends and capital gains. Under 
such a framework, aversion to bankruptcy, a sudden loss in valuation, 
should be unchanged. In the GS model, however, the structure of 
returns affects valuation and leads to real effects, including the 
dynamics of output as we showed in Chapter Four. Rather than 
financial magnitudes being merely the reflection of real
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economic activity as presented in the Neo-Classical system, financial 
arrangements have real effects. In Chapter Six, we take-up this 
issue, examine its theoretical aspects, considering how the model 
might behave if changes to the profit distribution rule were made 
endogenous to the model's structure.
6.1 The Cost of Loanable Funds
Financial matters, in particular the role of interest rates, have 
played distinctly different roles in the various business cycle theories. 
In Neo-Classical macroeconomic theory and its derivatives such as 
Monetarism, little importance was given to financial considerations 
such as the cost of loanable funds for two principle reasons. Firstly, 
because of the principle of dichotomy, namely that real variables are 
independent of the absolute price level and secondly, that the long- 
run rate of output, including fluctuations in it, are governed by 
fundamental trends relating to technology, labour supply, and 
institutional structures, as embodied in the models of Friedman 
(1968) and Phelps (1970) using the n a tu r a l  r a te  h y p o t h e s i s .  In 
addition to the dichotomy principle, in finance, this perspective finds 
support in Fisher's S e p a r a t io n  principle showing that investment, 
production and consumption decisions may be undertaken 
independently from financing decisions (Fisher, 1930), along with the 
Modigliani-Miller (hereafter, MM) theorem showing that the firm's 
valuation is independent of how it funds its assets.
In contrast to the above reasoning, investment plays a central 
role in the Keynesian system and its derivatives because of its effect 
upon aggregate demand. In Keynes' theory of the business cycles, 
the importance of the investment function arises through its effect
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upon aggregate demand (Hall, Chapter 4, 1990). By comparing the 
marginal efficiency of capital with the interest rate on borrowed 
funds, firms decide how best to adjust their capital stock. In 
Keynesian theory and its derivatives, the market rate of interest, the 
supply price of capital and expectations of prospective yields together 
determine aggregate investment (page 51, Hall). Investment 
volatility, as we explained in Chapter Two is the source of 
perturbations leading to cyclic variations in output. By contrast, in 
Neo-Classical economics with its emphasis upon aggregate supply as 
mentioned above, variations in the rate of interest are not relevant to 
explaining fluctuations in economic output. Similarly, Monetarism 
ascribed fluctuations to short-run movements in aggregate demand 
originating with monetary disturbances. Changes in the rate of 
interest were not the source of variability, but rather a result of 
changes in the monetary base. In contemporary research into cyclic 
fluctuations, the channel of causation between interest rates and 
aggregate demand tends not to be emphasised. In Real Business 
Cycle theory, shocks to technology along with strong assumptions 
regarding the pro-cyclic nature of consumption and leisure, are 
required to generate patterns empirically consistent with cyclic 
fluctuations; while the research agenda in New Keynesian research 
places emphasis upon nominal rigidities such as menu costs, 
informational assymetries with respect monitoring, and insufficient 
second order effects precluding optimizing adjustments (see, Mankiw, 
Volumes I & Ii, 1993). In view of the above, the GS model with its 
fixed rate of interest unrelated to the contribution to risk made by 
investments in working capital funded through debt, features a form 
of informational asymmetry, as used in the NK literature, at the same
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time embodying Neo Classical features as mentioned earlier in 
Chapter Two, Section 2.33. In the remarks below we pursue this 
point, examine its implications, and propose an alternative 
specification.
In order for the value of the firm to be independent of the ratio 
of debt to equity, as per MM theory, the excess expected rates of 
return arising from investments earning above the risk free rate must 
be discounted according to their contribution to portfolio risk 
(Sargent, Chapter 7, 1979). In the GS model, however, the rate 
charged at time t, rv  as explained in Chapter Four, Sections 1 and 2, 
is fixed and invariant to changes in capital structure (It is assumed 
invariant to time, a constant). As the available equity is fixed, all 
additions to working capital must be financed through debt. 
Effectively, the GS models allows a given firm to gear-up its 
performance at a rate of interest unadjusted for risk, thereby, 
encouraging investment, increasing the market value of the firm 
during the expansionary phase of the business cycle while increasing 
the risk of bankruptcy during the contractionary phase of the cycle 
when market value tumbles, possibly below that of book value. Such 
results are very controversial in light of received financial-economic 
theory. Arguably, the optimizing behaviour of firms in the GS model 
resembles the investment decision rule of Keynes (1936) and Tobin's 
Q  ratio (1969), in that the criterion for capital expansion involves 
making ex ante comparisons of what firms may earn in the product ^ 
market with what savers require in the lending/securities market. 
Effectively in the GS model, when the ratio of the ex ante expected 
rate of return on the book value of their assets exceeds the cost of 
capital (Q  >  1), then expansion should occur. Such an approach has
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implications for how we interpret both the analysis found in their 
article along with the results of simulation.
By specifying the cost of capital as invariant to the ratio of 
debt to equity, that is without adjustment for risk, as the total capital 
base expands, increasing valuation, the GS model violates Fisher's 
principle of Separation, is at odds with MM theory, and distances 
itself from Neo-Classical principles of neutrality and dichotomy. 
Without risk adjusting the cost of capital, gearing adds to the present 
value of the firm, growing market value but increasing the exposure 
to book value, especially during the contractionary phase of a 
business cycle. Although ex ante risk aversion enters into the 
decision by firms with respect to their capital borrowing behaviour, 
by allowing, in effect, valuation to increase with gearing, (because 
the cost of capital is n o t  risk adjusted), a logical inconsistency it 
might be argued is created between how firm's regard risk versus 
how supplier's of capital regard it. The GS approach resembles the 
structure specified in the NK informational asymmetry literature 
(Mankiw, 1985). For example, although the representative firm 
increases the ratio of debt to equity in its capital structure, because 
of monitoring costs, financial intermediaries continue to lend working 
capita! at the fixed rate of interest. Lenders are systematically 
unaware of the economies's laws of motion. By not risk adjusting the 
cost of capital, the model is enhancing the firm's market valuation, 
thereby reducing the necessity for risk averse behaviour. In contrast, 
theoretically, if the valuation of a firm's return across different states 
of nature were discounted using a rate which is risk adjusted over 
time to changes in capital structure, unlike the GS model, because of 
its effect upon borrowing and investing behaviour, the threat of
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insolvency during the contractionary phase of the business cycle 
might be reduced. Risk adjusting the cost of capital should be 
stabilizing to the simulated GS style model, but can this observation 
with regard to dynamic behaviour be validated using numerical 
simulation? The question of risk adjusting the cost of capital is 
critical because of its effect upon the firm's book value. Although 
equity providers are keen to see the market value of the firm increase 
through borrowing, especially at a fixed rate of interest; the concern 
of lenders, however, is to preserve book value, informational 
asymmetry notwithstanding. Risk adjusting the cost of capital as 
debt is increased would hold constant or even reduce market 
capitalization, potentially transforming the model's dynamics.
In light of the above commentary, below we re-specify the 
model accordingly and discuss the results of numerical simulation. 
There are many possible ways of adjusting the cost of debt capital in 
the GS modei to a firm's capital structure. We have chosen, without 
ioss of generality, to specify this relationship by adjusting the cost of 
capital in proportion to the change in the ratio of debt to equity over­
time, calibrated according to slope of a Security Market Line, that is 
the rate at which the market trades-off risk and reward. (We use 
contemporary empirical market data for the security market line.1) 
These changes in specification were introduced into Module I of the 
simulation program with consequent effects for its dynamic iterations. 
Like Chapters Four and Five, we compute G (a t, u t) for the firm with 
the average level of equity in period two, as the representative firm,
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^he slope of the security market line is quite robust to 
changes in systemic market factors. A slope of 0.7 was assumed 
for calibration which is consistent with the body of empirical 
work (see, Copeland & Weston, Chapter 7, 1992).
and then apply the results to the assumed population of twenty-five 
firm, using their individual firm specific price shocks. We use the 
same procedures for aggregation as explained in Chapter Four. In 
order to learn as much as possible from this change in specification 
to the GS style model, we present both inter-temporai trajectories and 
the phase portraits, as found below appear in Figures 59 to 62. The 
effects of the change in specification when risk management are also 
discussed.
Turning to Figures 59a and 59b and 60a and 60b, we see two 
sets of simulations with and without the cost of capital adjusted over 
time to changes in the capital structure, as per the discussion above. 
In the first, resembling the results of Chapter Four, we see first a 
dynamic trajectory and secondly a phase orbit which is slightly 
convergent. In Figures 60a and 60b, holding all parameters the same, 
we see that the effect of assuming that the cost of capital is adjusted 
over-time to changes in the capital structure. In the simulations, over 
time, assuming that the cost of capital is risk adjusted, we see that 
convergence is quicker, and the level of aggregate output falls by 
roughly one-third. Risk adjusting the cost of capital serves to dampen 
the oscillations. When profits grow such that the ratio of debt to 
equity falls, the cost of borrowed working capital declines. If, under 
such circumstances, although random firm specific prices are low and 
profits fall, in the next period working capita! loan obligation is 
reduced. The interaction lessens the effect of the fall in profits upon 
investment, required labour and real wages. Under risk adjusted cost 
of capital, if profits fall because of low firm prices and the ratio of 
debt to equity increases, the increased cost of capital in the next 
period will dampen investment. Rather than continuing to borrow at
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the same rate when profits fall, firm respond by reducing investment 
and borrowed working capital. With less debt capital exposure, if 
prices should be low again, the cyclic impact is reduced. From the 
above description of the model's mechanics, we can see why risk 
adjusting the cost of capital leads to lower levels of investment and 
output. The introduced change in specification has reduced the 
extent to which the dynamics are driven by the random input u t in 
G (a t,  u t) . Although not shown, simulations of the model assuming 
risk management is available but making the cost of capital sensitive 
to capital structure, also reveal a dampening of the oscillations, which 
as we recall from Chapter Five grew sharply, often in an explosive 
manner, when hedging was introduced. The results show that our 
findings in Chapter Five with respect to the impact upon aggregate 
stability of risk management are to some extent over-stated. 
Adjusting interest rates to changes in capital structure when risk 
management is available leads, tends to stabilize oscillations when 
they are convergent, and if they are divergent may change the system 
to one which is not. We see that introducing risk adjusted rates of 
interest may reduce the number of periods per cycle.
Appraising the above results, we observe that after a manner, 
firms in addition to being risk averse to bankruptcy, are now using 
profitability as arises from price variability, to gauge the investment 
environment. Although firm specific prices are normally distributed, 
and a good price is as likely to be followed by a bad price, as any 
price, through its impact upon the cost of capital, the firm as an 
optimizing agent, in effect, uses it as leading indicator of what might 
follow, in the fashion of the accelerator principle of J.M. Clark 
(1917), wherein changes in output causes changes in investment.
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Re-specifying the GS style model to make the cost of capital 
continuously adjustable to changes in equity and capital structure 
resembles the accelerator literature, where we find postulated a great 
sensitivity of investment to changes in the rate of growth in income 
{Hall, 1990). Making the cost of capital sensitive to capital structure 
has the net effect we have seen of dampening the economic cycle 
with and without risk management available.
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6.2 Dividends and Valuation
As we first noted in Chapter Four, the rate at which profits are 
distributed plays a very important role in the dynamics of the GS 
model through its effect upon the firm's level of equity. Without 
some distribution of profits, although the firm may not raise new 
equity because of the constraint, its growth may allow the capital 
base to increase monotonically, leading to an explosive oscillations in 
aggregate output. With large equity reserves, the fear of bankruptcy 
would be reduced, and output would grow sharply in an explosive 
manner, as we saw in Figures 21 to 24 of Chapter Four. With 
proportionately less debt, risk taking investment is encouraged, 
resulting in larger and steeper declines in aggregate output during 
contractionary phase of the economic cycle, because of the 
relationship between real wages and profits. Such observations, 
however, beg the question of the model's underlying logic with regard 
to the effect of dividends upon market value or capitalization. 
Although we have explained how the mode! behaves, from the 
standpoint of comparative statics as well as dynamics, questions 
remain with regard to the effect of dividends upon the risk of 
bankruptcy. At the end of Chapter Five, we raised the objection that 
using either a fixed dividend rule or a purely stochastic variable as 
proposed by GS, is unrealistic since firms faced with the choice of 
insolvency or not to pay dividends, would surely choose the latter. 
We also mentioned in Chapter Three, Section 3.3, that the model's 
downward rigidity with respect to profit distribution. More formally, 
the approach taken by GS involves the fundamental issue of whether 
valuation should be effected by how profits are distributed. 
According to Modigliani-Miller (MM) Theory, adjusted for risk and
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taxation issues, valuation is invariant to the nature of earnings. Given 
a level of return, capitalization does not change with mix of dividends 
and capital gains. In the simulated version of the GS modei, 
however, we see that the risk of insolvency is reduced and real 
output effects occur the less profits are distributed, (that is the more 
they are retained), leading to increased dynamic instability. Retaining 
earnings through reduced dividends, lessens the risk of bankruptcy, 
encouraging investment, by enhancing market valuation.2 This result 
arises because of the implicit assumptions adopted by GS in their 
model, particularly with regard to why investment occurs and the 
constraint on the availability of new equity. At variance with received 
financial-economic theory, real effects upon the dynamics of 
economic output arise, in this context, from changes in dividend 
distribution by way of valuation. Structured in this manner, the GS 
modei with respect to the dividend structure involves several logical 
inconsistencies. We begin with these inconsistencies and their 
implications, before we consider how their approach to dividends 
might be reformulated.
As mentioned, according to received neo-classical economic 
and financial theory of Modigliani and Miller, firm market valuation 
should be invariant to how returns are made to holders of equity. 
Although GS present a general form for the profit maximization 
problem, as repeated in equation 4.5 of Chapter Four, they are 
reticent with regard to what underlies the investment decision. GS 
describe the firms as risk averse, without considering the perspectives 
of investors and lenders. We only know that firms issue new claims,
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2See, Dicheu, I.D., "Is the Risk of Bankruptcy a Systemic 
One?", Journal of Finance, 53(3), 1988.
debt, against the book value of their assets, in order to increase 
market value. Their approach resembles the Q-theory of productive 
investment as first introduced by Keynes (1936) and developed by 
Tobin (1968, 1969), wherein firms commit themselves to investment 
using borrowed working capital, but with profits possibly below 
anticipated levels. Adopting the Q Theory, investment occurs when 
firms as profit maximizers, acquire new productive assets (along with 
contractual obligations to workers in the GS model), and sell claims 
against their productive proceeds in the capital market for a greater 
money value than their cost. Conversely, disinvestment, from an 
initial level of equity, occurs when firms find that productive assets 
have greater money value than their cost. Under such circumstances, 
it will be profit maximizing to sell those assets, and distribute the 
proceeds upon liquidation to claimants, bond holders and to equity 
holders. Although not stated by GS, the model implies that the 
criterion for expansion or contraction, is comparing what managers 
can earn in the product market with what savers require in the 
securities market. In order to implement such a structure properly, 
however, it should recognize the trade-off between risk and reward 
of various claimants, notably holders of debt and equity. GS, we 
note, only make mention of equity holders under circumstances of 
liquidation and ignore the risks to debt holders of greater debt (GS, 
page 86, 1993). The combination of an equity constraint with a 
financial market imperfection, requiring expansion to be debt financed 
but using a fixed dividend pay-out rule as we have used or one which 
is purely random, leads to several inconsistencies.3
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3According to Capital Asset Pricing theory, regardless of 
individual subjective attitudes towards risk taking, the marginal 
rate of substitution between risk and reward, in general
To appreciate this point, we draw upon the theoretical contributions 
of Merton (1974) and Krainer (1992).
In the GS model, funding investment in assets by issuing new 
equity is not possible. By having a constraint on the availability of 
new equity, the optimal trade-off for income sharing between debt 
and equity holders, adjusted for risk, is affected. Generally, bond 
holders, as is well known, have a prior claim to the income and assets 
of the firm, while the claims of equity holders are riskier since they 
are residual. Taking such observations one step further, Merton 
(1974) has likened shareholders to owners of call options on the 
underlying assets of the firm while the loan guarantee of bond holders 
is viewed as a put option. Owners of call options are pleased to see 
the value of their underlying assets increase in value, especially if it 
is financed by bonds. Owners of put options, in contrast, merely 
wish to protect the book value of their claims, not wishing to see the 
assets expanded, especially if it involves taking on greater exposure 
with possibly adverse consequences, during the contractionary phase 
of the business cycle. According to Krainer (chapter 3, 1992), who 
uses the Merton model to develop an optimal trade-off rule between 
the different claimants, a risky strategy from the perspective of bond 
holders is one in which it finances its future assets with ever greater 
debt. Using the Merton model, and assuming different degrees of risk 
aversion between the two types of investors, Krainer formulates a 
globally optimal static equilibrium in which the book value (or product 
market) value of the company equals its capital market value (Krainer, 
pages 70-75, 1992). We repeat these results using the graphs below.
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equilibrium, is the same for all individuals (page, 183, Copeland 
& Weston, 1992).
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Figure 61: Return/Risk Trade-offs for
Debt & Equity Holders
VARIABLES SPECIFICATION
Ratio of Income from Debt and Equity X(b)/X(s)
Input Contribution from Debt and Equity K(b)/K(s)
Risk-Reward Trade-Off Rate Debt Holders dd
Risk-Reward Trade-Off Rate Equity Holders ee
Table 6.1: Variable Specifications
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Figure 62: Optimal Trade-off between
Debt and Equity Holders
t
Looking first at Figure 61, we see the optimal trade-off rates for 
transforming inputs into returns for debt holders and for equity 
holders. As we can see, equity holders are less risk averse than bond 
holders and are keen to see market value grow. The schedules, d d  
an e e ,  in both graphs, represent all the points along which Tobin's 
Q  = 1 .0 . Above, the schedules, market value exceeds book value, 
while below, book exceeds market value. Superimposing the graphs 
from Figure 61, we represent in Figure 62, the optimal equilibrium of 
debt and equity in this economy. For reasons of risk aversion, the 
required rate of return on debt is lower than the return on leveraged 
equity, and hence the e e  schedule intersects the d d  from below. 
Without leverage or gearing, the above analysis collapses to the 
optimal trade-off rule between return to debt and equity holders, and 
inputs to return, namely:
4
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X ( b )  = K ( b )
X ( s )  K ( s )
which is equivalent to the equation of Marginal Rates of Substitution 
along the contract curve in an Edgeworth Box diagram. The above 
analysis shows how risk affects the two types of investors who fund 
factor inputs (labour) to a given firm. According to Krainer, the 
difference between the two types of investors arises from their 
different attitudes to taking risks. Debt holders are more risk averse 
and are keen to preserve book value, while leveraged equity holders, 
are less risk averse and would like to see market value grow (Krainer, 
page, 79, 1992).
The above analysis shows the implications of the financial 
market imperfection and constraint assumptions found in the GS 
model. The GS model by constraining the amount of equity, and 
forcing new capital to be financed by debt, favours growing market 
value at the expense and risk to book value. Nominal assumptions 
notwithstanding, the GS model favours equity holders over bond 
holders, even though under accepted business practice, under 
conditions of insolvency and liquidation, debt-holders have prior claim. 
The contractionary phase of the business cycle holds greater risk for 
debt holders than it does for owners of equity when market value 
may fall below that of book value, however, in the GS model risk 
aversion relates to the behaviour of equity owners and not holders of 
debt. (Liquidation occurs when holders of debt do not receive their 
expected payments, not when equity owners endure poor returns.) 
Recalling Figures 61 and 62 above, we observe that the GS model 
favours solutions above the e e  and d d  schedules. Although the focus
6.1)
of the GS model is how changes gn firm equity effect aggregate 
output, abstractly, from a general equilibrium perspective, an 
implication of the GS model, is that debt holders should gain from 
cyclic expansions, but lose out during economic contractions when 
market value falls below that of book value. As laid out in the GS 
model, such results resemble the model of Allen & Gale in which 
there is under-investment in safe assets when certain classes of 
financial assets exist (1997).
Such circumstances are heightened by the dividend pay-out 
rule available to equity holders. Under received financial-economic 
theory, market valuation should be invariant to the nature of returns. 
The GS model is constructed so that retained earnings increase the 
firm's equity base, encouraging risk taking as it adds to market value. 
As we saw in Chapter Four, Figures 21 to 24, retention of profits, 
rather than protecting returns based upon book value owed to bond 
holders or compensating for the greater risk in the capital structure 
from new borrowing, dynamic volatility in equity and output is 
increased. In the GS model, lenders receive a fixed rate as explained 
in Section 6.1, while shareholders see their returns preserved as 
dividends p l u s  the potential for growing market value for their 
investment with greater risk. Although received financial theory tells 
us that market valuation should not change with the proportion o fJ 
profits distributed, in the GS model, by retaining earnings- adding to 
equity, risk taking is encouraged, increasing exposure should firm 
specific prices fall below the threshold level of bankruptcy. 
Effectively in the GS model, the implicit call owned by shareholders 
increases in intrinsic value when profits are retained and borrowing 
grows, while the implicit put held by bond holders loses intrinsic value
through greater risk of bankruptcy, as may occur during the 
contractionary phase of the business cycle. Following option pricing 
theory, increased firm specific price volatility a f t e r  capital structure 
has been decided would benefit equity holders at the expense of 
debt holders.
How might these inconsistencies be addressed? With a debt 
financed expansion, and an equity constraint, one possible way to 
improve the logical consistency of the GS model, so that bond holders 
are compensated for the increasing risk of bankruptcy as assets are 
expanded through borrowing, would be if, over-time, dividends were 
reduced through greater profit retention, and used to reward bond 
holders for the increased risk to their claims against book value. (A 
Floating Rate Note would be an example of such an arrangement.) In 
the simulations below, we further modify the model, just as we 
introduced risk adjustment to the cost of capital of Section 6^ 1 
above, so that a further endogenous structure and specification yields 
a gain in the returns to debt holders which is financed by reduction 
in dividend yields to equity holders. In this way, we equate the risk- 
reward trade-off between the market value held by equity owners and 
that of debt holders, as per the optimal trade-off rule of Kraine, 
discussed above. Like Section 6.1, we continue to use as a proxy 
for the risk-reward trade-off, an assumed slope of the Security Market 
Line to determine at what rate returns to debt holders are increased 
as firm gearing is increased, but now use a portion of retained 
earnings as the source of the gain. By using retained earnings to 
modify and risk adjust the returns to bond holders, their exposures^ 
during the contractionary phase of the business cycle, as we see in 
Figures 63 to 64, are reduced. The proposed modification to the
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dividend structure, rather than assuming a constant as we have 
previously or making it stochastic as GS propose, modifies retained 
earnings over-time. Over time, the random attractor, firm specific 
price shocks serve to vary equity and profits over-time, altering the 
capital structure so that the introduced endogenous structure to 
adjust returns to debt holders at the expense of equity holders. The 
assumptions for the exogenous parameters used in the simulation 
appear in each of the graphs.
From Chapter Six we see that some of the earlier results from 
Chapters Four and Five are subject to further qualification. By risk 
adjusting the cost of capital and the structure of dividends, that is 
making these two key parameters endogenous to the model and 
specified according to received financial theory, we see that some of 
the general claims made by GS based upon the behaviour of their 
model are over-stated. Effectively, the original specification of the GS 
model places greater risk upon bond holders than it does upon equity 
holders, encouraging borrowing to grow market value, given the 
equity constraint. If the cost of capital, as per MM theory were risk 
adjusted to changes in capita! structure, the oscillatory trajectory 
might be dampened and output reduced. Discouraging borrowing 
even to a small extent, would reduce the incentive and hence the 
output effects of risk management, as explored in Chapter Five. 
Dividend structure we have also argued, as per received financial 
theory, should reflect the cost of equity capital, which is the return 
required given a level of systematic risk, /?, and the position of the 
security market line. Making the cost of equity capita! endogenous 
to the system and adjusting the dividend structure also serves to 
dampen the oscillations observed along with the level of output.
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CHAPTER SEVEN. CONCLUSIONS
7.0 Key Results and Findings
In the course of our research we have explored in considerable 
depth the nature and behaviour of a New Keynesian style model 
featuring a financial market imperfection and a constraint on the 
availability of equity. The research has produced several useful 
findings, which may have a wider significance. In the remarks below, 
our final chapter, we will review these findings, interpret their 
meaning from the standpoint of research into macroeconomic 
modelling, and explore their policy implications, if any. To review, 
using numerical simulation we have verified all of the unproven 
Propositions made by GS with regard to comparative static behaviour 
of their model. The effect of perturbations in key parameters upon 
the model's comparative static results, namely the initial level of 
equity and the degree of uncertainty with regard to firm specific 
prices, through their effect upon marginal bankruptcy costs, are as 
GS have claimed. According to GS their research suggests that 
economies which are highly leveraged may gain substantially from 
infusions of equity capital (page 92, 1993). Our research into the 
model's dynamics shows that this is the case, but there are 
qualifications: Infusions of equity may increase output, however,
they may also result in destabilizing swings in aggregate economic 
activity. A further qualification relates to the productivity of capital. 
Although GS do not include a technology parameter in their model, 
we have, as specified in our simulation program. We have found that 
the productivity of the economy, as specified in our t e c h n o l o g y  
c o e f f i c i e n t  plays an important role. Perhaps counter-intuitively, when 
an economy is more productive, because it requires less borrowing of
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working capital to pay wages, decreasing exposure to low firm 
specific prices, it is more stable and less prone to cyclic oscillations. 
An economy with a low level of productivity, in contrast, as it is 
forced to borrow greater amounts to fund working capital to pay 
wages, is more exposed when firm specific prices are low and profits 
fall.
Our research into understanding the dynamic behaviour of a GS 
style model, has been very enlightening. Investigation of the model's 
intertemporal behaviour has shown that the assertions by the authors 
with regard to the model's dynamic behaviour are subject to many 
qualifications. We have found that the invocation of linearization 
around the steady-state, as adopted by GS to support the claim that 
their model generates multi-period cycles is of little value. We have 
shown that linearization ignores the model's complex dynamics, in 
particular such phenomenon as period doubling (bifurcations), 
aperiodic trajectories and chaos which arise because of the model's 
non-linear nature. Through numerical simulation we have learned that 
phase lines with sharp inflections in logistic space, c r i t i c a l - p o in t s , may 
occur (the so-called t e n t  diagram), indicating dynamic trajectories of 
various limit cycles as well as aperiodicity and chaos. Linearization 
around the steady-state may only be used to plot single period cycles 
and ignores the importance of initial conditions outside the 
neighbourhood of the steady-state. Using numerical simulation, our 
research has shown that distinctly different dynamic trajectories may 
be generated making very small changes in initial conditions. As 
shown through simulation, the model may generate a phase line 
implying a dynamic trajectory which begins with a region of 
monotonic convergence followed by cycles of various lengths. A
0
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phase line may cross the steady-state, d a / d t  = 0 , more than once, 
implying multiple steady-state equilibria, or display both convergent 
portions followed by oscillatory portions, separated by a sharp 
inflection. In addition to these observations, we have shown that 
although the GS model is an autonomous first order difference 
equation, it really behaves as a second order equation because of the 
presence of a random input, u t in G (a t/u J . By plotting orbits in phase 
of space of a t against a t+1, we saw the second order style behaviour, 
allowing us to understand the importance of the random attractor in 
altering behaviour. As mentioned in Chapter Four, this finding 
supports the assertion by GS in their 1988 article that with two 
random attractors, the model should behave as a third order 
difference equation. Together the above results and findings, 
underscore the value of numerical simulation to investigate non-iinear, 
higher order, dynamic behaviour. Non-linear New Keynesian models 
have an important role to play in macroeconomic research, but require 
appropriate techniques.
In addition to gaining a better understanding of the model's 
complex dynamics, we have also learned something about the 
implications of its specified structure. In Chapter Five, we highlighted 
the role of fixed rates of interest and dividend policy in creating a b i a s  
in the model's results. The presence of an equity constraint in 
combination with a cost of borrowed capital which is not risk 
adjusted to capita! structure, as per the GS model, imposes greater 
risk to book value during the contractionary phase of the economic 
cycle and hence disadvantages holders of debt. By ignoring the 
theory of capital structure, we saw in Chapter Six, that the GS model 
effectively favours borrowing by ignoring the exposure of debt
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holders to the risk of bankruptcy. Moreover, the implemented 
dividend ruie, because it favours the distribution of profits to equity 
holders without compensating bond holders for greater risk to book 
value, creates a further bias in the model's dynamic solution. Faced 
with a constraint on the availability of new equity, to assume that 
market value may be expanded by borrowing ever greater amounts of 
debt is difficult to justify in view of received financial theory. In a 
sense, the GS model by ignoring received financial theory, sets in 
place a mechanism to increase the chances of market value falling 
below that of book value, that is bankruptcy, as might occur during 
a wage-profit downward economic spiral. By not having an 
endogenous mechanism to correct a New Keynesian rigidity, such as 
risk adjusting the cost of capital or making profits distributions 
detrimental to non-equity claimants, as we have done, it might be 
argued that unrealistic model solutions are favoured. Appropriately 
re-specifying the model to adjust for these biases, as we 
accomplished in Chapter Six, to some extent corrects such 
limitations, subject to the values used for calibration and the assumed 
specification. Such effects are seen in terms of the model's dynamic 
behaviour. Risk adjusting the cost of capital and ensuring that profit 
distribution does not increase the risks of bankruptcy faced by bond 
holders, and reflects the cost of equity capital, renders the system 
somewhat more stable.
Our interest in a financial market imperfection model grew out 
of our concern with the subject of risk management, and in particular 
the question of what the macro economic implications were of using 
derivatives to hedge exposures. To answer this question we turned 
to a New Keynesian business cycle model featuring financial market
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imperfections, to see what effect introducing an endogenous 
mechanism to manage risk might have upon its aggregate dynamic 
behaviour might be. To explore the implications of risk management 
and what its aggregate dynamic implications might be, we introduced 
an endogenous mechanism to a New Keynesian business cycle model 
to correct its NK rigidities and imperfections. The 1993 model of 
Greenwald and Stiglitz is well suited to exploring the effects upon 
aggregate output dynamics of risk management innovation given its 
NK rigidities and imperfections. The NK rigidities and imperfections, 
explicitly and implicitly, are embodied in several features of the GS 
model. Firstly, the constraint on the raising of new equity forcing 
firms to borrow debt capital. Secondly, a lag between when working 
capital is borrowed and when stochastic returns, unique to each firm, 
are known. Thirdly, that the cost of capital is not tied to performance 
or risk adjusted to changes in capital structure. And fourthly, the 
returns to equity holders are not adjusted to the required returns to 
share holders given the risk arising from changes in capital structure. 
By introducing risk management as an innovation to the GS model, 
rather than reducing output in response to firm specific prjce 
uncertainty to reduce the cost of potential bankruptcy, firms may 
now modify their exposure, but at a cost. In the model as GS claim 
and as we have shown using numerical simulation, increasing price 
volatility (or lowering expected prices) reduces aggregate output and 
makes the economy more stable. In their model, the lag between the 
decision to borrow working capital to enter into wage contracts and 
when returns are realized, we saw, creates a threat of bankruptcy 
because firm specific prices are stochastic. The relation between 
uncertain prices and a bankruptcy threshold creates a form of risk
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aversion through marginal bankruptcy costs driving a wedge into 
traditional cost structure. Under the model's lag structure, working 
capital is borrowed and workers are retained without knowledge of 
future returns which are stochastic and firm specific. In the GS 
model, the fear of bankruptcy serves as a deterrent to borrowing, 
making the issue of how the modei might behave if state-contingent 
assets were introduced, an interesting one. The question is especially 
interesting in view of the many unsubstantiated assertions, as we 
have noted, that risk management has macro implications and that 
these same implications are stabilising and desirable. GS assume that 
no means exists, such as futures markets, to ensure that prices 
received at least equal the bankruptcy threshold, begging the question 
of how the model may behave if an endogenous mechanism to 
manage risk were available as well as offering related insights.
In this context, we considered both the model's comparative 
static and dynamic behaviour if an endogenous mechanism for risk 
management were to exist, allowing us to answer the question of 
what the macro implications of its use are, if any. The question is 
particularly illuminating in light of the many casual and unsupported 
claims that the management of financial risk at the firm level is 
necessarily beneficial in the aggregate. Remarkably, we have found 
through simulation of the GS model that the opposite proposition 
holds. Namely, that although firms individually may gain from the 
management of risk, leading to expanded output and greater profits, 
in the aggregate such behaviour creates a macro externality in the 
form of cyclic instability. With down-side exposure eliminated, firms 
are encouraged to borrow working capital and commit to a wage-bill. 
When prices are iow, the effect in reducing profits, output and
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workers required, is enhanced. Moreover, as per the GS model, with 
down-side price exposure eliminated, the firm, because of its greater 
borrowing and wage biii, now has greater exposure to the random 
attractor, u t . The intuition behind this insight lies in the nature of 
derivative markets. Although the firm hedging its revenue exposure 
has eliminated down-side exposure, it has come at a price. More 
generally, further intuition is found in the nature of derivative markets. 
With greater capita! at risk, the effects of economic contraction are 
more severe because although the representative firm has hedged its 
price and revenue risk, a party opposite to the transaction, who sold 
the Put Contract faces huge losses. (Although we have not modelled 
general equilibrium markets for options contacts, per se, in the 
simulated GS model, such observations based upon casual empiricism 
inform our discussion of these results, providing intuition.) Recall, 
derivative markets are only zero sum games in a tautological sense, 
for every winner there is a loser, but are not so in a quantitative 
sense. In purchasing a Call Contract, for example, the maximum the 
buyer may lose is limited to the commission paid to the seller, 
however the latter's potential loss, should prices increase, is 
unbounded. In the case of modified GS style model, although the 
representative firm has ensured a minimum value of its future sales 
receipts by purchasing put contracts, a party selling the put may face 
huge losses, which would be exacerbated during an economic 
contraction as he finds himself holding inventories for which there are 
no markets. Hence, introducing risk management by encouraging 
commitments to a greater wage-bill and greater dividends, renders the 
economic down-turn more severe, because state-contingent assets in 
the form of futures and options are not zero sum games in the
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quantitative sense. The party writing the put has accepted an 
asymmetric exposure which is exacerbated during an economic 
contraction. (The liquidity crisis in the Autumn of 1998, in which 
firms were unable to close-out derivative positions because of the 
absence of counter-parties, is a recent example.) The management 
of risk at the firm level may have its attractions, but it also has 
destabilizing implications in the aggregate when all parties are taken 
into consideration.
7.1 Implications for Research
What value have our findings for the science of economic 
modelling in general and the use of New Keynesian models with a 
financial constraint or financial market imperfection? With regard to 
the evaluation of models featuring non-linear dynamic relationships, 
as is well-known in the physical sciences, their ready interpretation 
using either analytic methods or linearization approaches impose 
many limitations upon research (Chapter 1, Baker & Goliub, 1990). 
This point is illustrated in much of the contemporary research into 
non-linear dynamics, particularly involving endogenous cycles. For 
example, the survey by Boidrin and Woodford (1990) of non-linear 
equilibrium models highlights the effect upon dynamic behaviour of 
endogenous mechanisms and underscores the importance of 
numerical simulation to reveal both periodic and chaotic behaviour. 
Non-linear growth models as mentioned in the survey by Scheinkman 
(1990) and over-lapping generation models as surveyed by Kelsey 
(1988) present many examples of such fruitful research. The 
availability of numerical simulation as means of investigating non­
linear endogenous cycle models also invites the potential for
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revisionism, especially with regard to the rational expectations 
hypothesis. As noted by Mulllineux, Dickinson and Peng (page 45- 
47, 1993), much of New Classical modelling has made extensive use 
of log-linear formulations (eg. Sargent & Wallace, 1975) with minima! 
a priori justification. Grandmount's article (1985) in which he 
demonstrated that a deterministic model which is non-linear and 
assumes rational expectations, may produce complex dynamics but 
with non-neutral money supply effects, lends support to the view that 
the assumption of iog-iinearity should be abandoned. Given the wide­
spread availability of software capable of numerical simulation, non­
linear methods of modeiiing, arguably, should be accepted as a 
standard of practice to learn the dynamic behaviour of both New 
Keynesian as well as New Classical style models. The availability of 
techniques for modeiiing complex dynamics also highlights the 
limitations of comparative static analysis as a tool for macro 
economic modelling. As is accepted in engineering and physics, in 
order to understand the laws of motion for persistent phenomenon, 
appropriate techniques are required, including non-linearity and a 
higher dimensional systems.
The second set of observations with regard to the research 
implications of our findings relates back to the remarks in Chapter 
One on the Samueison principle of correspondence. We have 
discussed that New Keynesian endogenous business cycle models are 
not simply about tardy adjustments to Walrasian equilibrium, but 
rather concern constraints and imperfections precluding optimization. 
Sub-optimization and second order arguments figure strongly in the 
NK literature, however the interaction and connection between 
economic units and aggregate stability remain weak. The GS model
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like many models found in NK research uses partial equilibrium micro 
imperfections to achieve general macroeconomic imbalances and 
perturbations from the equilibrium steady-state. In doing so, it places 
great weight upon narrow foundations. In creating models which rely 
upon imperfections of a single industry or a market to motivate an 
entire economy, the role of other economic agents are ignored. In the 
view of Zarnowitz (1992), New Keynesian research leaves one with 
many small stories, as opposed to one which is g e n e r a l . (Including 
parties to the other side of futures transactions or debt and equity 
holders, might be some examples.) Based upon our research, the 
view that either sub-optimization must be modelled in the aggregate 
or that greater micro-market interaction between economic agents 
should be considered, in order to achieve correspondence, would 
appear both desirable and sensible.
Further implications of our research relate to the subject of 
persistence. The GS model, resembling much of New Keynesian 
macro theory, relies upon endogenous specifications to shift 
Aggregate Supply, allowing cycles to persist even without outside 
influences. In relying upon endogenous mechanisms as the source of 
shifts in Aggregate Supply and persistence, New Keynesians have 
accepted a weighty challenge: Exogenous influences in the form of 
systematic perturbations are rejected as unable to produce the 
recurrent sequences of expansions and contractions known as 
business cycles. (Even the random attractor found in the GS model, 
of itself, would not be sufficient to generate cycles.) On the other 
hand, considering Real Business cycle models, we ask, how much 
e c o n o m i c s  is there, after all, in appealing to technological shocks to 
the production function to create shifts in Aggregate Supply?
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Properly, apart from natural disasters or meterological processes, is 
not all economic activity and events somehow endogenous? It might 
be argued that such perturbations as technological shocks are not 
different, in spirit, from Jevon's sun-spots model of 1884 or Moore's 
weather driven cycles of 1914 (see, chapter one, Morgan, 1992). 
Historically some endogenous models, such as those of Frisch (1933) 
as discussed in Chapter Two, have used endogenous propagation 
mechanisms to convert exogenous perturbations into cycles. In 
contemporary research like the GS model, the internal dynamics of 
credit and capital formation alone interact through wages and profits 
to have persistent effects upon real economic activity. For how long 
the cycle may continue, that is for how long the effects of sub- 
optimization may persist, appear indefinite. Perhaps such 
observations argue for the introduction of further endogenous 
mechanisms into NK models as we have done. Or maybe, in the 
manner of Frisch, perhaps a model of business cycles should include 
exogenous forces, in the form of financial market innovations or new 
technology interacting and correcting persistent endogenous defects. 
We need not always be limited to a model involving only one story.
As indicated by the results of our research, the inclusion of 
additional endogenous innovations or mechanisms to inter-act with a 
persistent sub-optimization mechanism, may be rewarding. New 
Keynesian modelling such as that of GS avoids the issue of how long 
such endogenous mechanisms may persist. In financial constraint 
and financial market imperfection models such as that of GS, 
endogenous mechanisms only contribute to economic instability. 
Much of New Keynesian literature, by concentrating upon 
endogenous sources of defects, would appear to ignore the possibility
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of autonomous innovations, endogenously solving problems in the 
manner once suggested by Schumpeter (1939). To disregard the 
possibility that endogenous mechanisms might lead to further 
autonomous innovations correcting faults is to adopt an essentially 
static world-view. To disregard such possibilities is to reject the 
notion that economic systems are ultimately self-optimizing. In this 
spirit, we introduced risk management into the GS Model to examine 
its effects upon cyclic behaviour. New technology or innovation, 
although difficult to specify, remains a reality, and may be important 
for its ability to correct or modify the results of sub-optimization and 
second order effects persisting through into economic cycles. As we 
have found, with the potential for unanticipated aggregate dynamic 
effects. In view of our finding that economies with greater 
productivity are more stable, modeiiing technological innovation 
should be a particularly useful topic. (According to some analyst the 
continuation of economic expansion over the last two decades in the 
United States, appearing to replace traditional cycles, has been 
facilitated by the savings in cost arising from information technology.) 
In light of the above, a productive iine of inquiry in such research, 
might be to consider endogenous mechanisms and autonomous 
forces which both contribute to cycles in the manner of Frisch, as 
well as dampen them and inter-act with the phenomenon of 
persistence. Such lines of reasoning may also hold suggestions for 
the connections between business cycle theory and the theory of 
economic growth which perhaps has been obscured by the tendency 
to assume little or no coherence between very iow frequency 
oscillations (trend) and oscillations of a medium frequency which we 
call business cycles.
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Apart from the broader business cycle issues, our research also 
holds interesting implications for the macro economic implications of 
risk management. As a fallacy of aggregation, we have shown the 
identification of micro-economic gains with macro benefits is without 
merit. Financial innovations, such as risk management are a reality 
of the economic landscape, however their ready interpretation and 
wider economic significance is not easily analyzed. Our modified 
version of the GS model invoked "small-country" assumptions with 
regard to risk management. At the prevailing price, if it is economic, 
firms may purchase as much of it as required to manage exposure. 
The supply of Put Contracts was made horizontal. In the modified GS 
model, risk management as it encourages investment has 
consequences during the contractionary phase of the business cycle. 
The intuition behind these results relates to the nature of derivative 
markets, as mentioned above in Section 7.0, and the fact that 
hedging may occur only one period into the future, while down-turns 
in the economic cycle may persist for many quarters. Continued 
hedging may occur, but often it is into a bear market. In this light, 
methods to establish long-term or perpetual claims on aggregate 
income, although they do not exist, may be beneficial (Schiller, 
1995). All of these results point to the-potential value of research 
into modelling the aggregate dynamic effects of the use of derivative 
markets such as futures and options. Although considerable effort 
has been made into the understanding of futures markets at a micro 
and firm level, general equilibrium modelling in a macro context may 
represent useful lines of inquiry.
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7.3 Implications for Public Policy and Regulation
Our research into the dynamic behaviour of a New Keynesian 
business cycle model having a financial constraint and imperfections 
along with our research into its behaviour when endogenous 
innovations are introduced may have implications for financial market 
regulation relating to the use of derivative products as well as the 
general conduct of macro economic policy. Although a compre­
hensive discussion of such subjects is beyond the scope of a 
concluding chapter, we will in Section 7.3, comment on what our 
findings into the aggregate dynamic effect of derivatives and risk 
management may hold for the regulation of financial markets, in 
particular such issues as systemic risk, transparency, and macro 
disclosure arising from their usage. As discussed in Chapter Five, 
through various forms of aggregation fallacies, a considerable amount 
of writing has given support to the view that as risk management, 
using futures and options, appears to be desirable for individual 
economic agents, it must be good for the economy as a whole. 
Contemporaneously, fuelled by recent economic crises, considerable 
attention has been given at the macro level to concern over the 
possibly d e s ta b i l i z i n g  effects of derivative products in a world 
combining capital mobility and floating exchange rates (see Crockett, 
1996, for a useful survey) because they combine great financial 
leverage or gearing with the possibility for a sudden change in value. 
Situations of illiquidity may be amplified by derivative markets, 
precisely because of gearing, and when counter-parties to risk 
management positions may be unable to close-out open positions. 
Looking at some of the reasons why derivatives may have 
destabilizing effects in the aggregate is revealing.
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The possibility that the use of derivative markets may actually 
contribute to systemic risk as a form of moral hazard has involved 
appeals to a number of stylized phenomena. According to some 
authorities, the Basle rules with regard to capital adequacy interacts 
with credit to reinforce economic cycles by increased lending during 
expansions followed by sharply reduced lending during cyclic 
contractions (Plender, J. "Taming Wild Money", F in a n c ia l  T im e s .  
page 21, October 21, 1998). Moreover, according to the same 
author, widely used Value at Risk models create further problems by 
reducing credit as volatility increases.... precisely when greater credit 
might be useful because of the changes in market value.4 in this 
context, derivative markets with their great power for financial 
gearing are seen as potentially destabilizing. Such viewpoints harken 
back to the works of the Classical Economists on the effects of 
gearing, causing rapid changes in the availability of credit, as in 
Hawtrey's d r a in - o f - c a s h  from the banking system modei (1913). 
Making matters worse, trading activities involving derivative positions 
by financial institutions are often held off-balance sheet, making it 
difficult to judge the exposure of profits, and hence overall market 
vaiue, to such positions (Foikerts-Landau, Ito, et al. Chapter II, 
"International Capital Markets: Initiatives Dealing with Derivatives", 
IM F : W o r ld  E c o n o m i c  a n d  F in a n c ia l  S u r v e y s .  1995). According to 
the same study, accounting standards do not adequately record over- 
the-counter positions in derivative markets. Such standards do not 
adequately ensure sufficient over-sight by regulatory bodies and do
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4Such views are echoed by C.A.E. Goodhart of the Financial 
Markets Group of the London School of Economics in an unpublished 
paper entitled, Financial Globalization, Derivatives, Volatility 
and the Challenge for the Policies of Central Banks.
not allow investors to adequately assess the risks to market value. 
Although value-at-risk and capital-at-risk modelling is widely utilized, 
there is no guarantee that banks and other institutions taking 
positions in derivative markets indeed use the same model. 
Complicating the situation is that the cumulative risk of various 
derivative positions may be less or more than the risks arising to 
positions in the underlying individual securities. Unlike normal 
securities, strict additivity does not hold. Matters are made worse by 
the fact that positions in derivative markets inter-act. A simple linear 
relationship between exposures arising from derivative positions 
cannot be assumed. The value-at-risk of derivative positions, with 
movements in underlying securities and markets, may change 
dramatically in a matter of minutes. Typically, institutions using 
derivatives, as a matter of policy, and as encouraged by the Bank for 
International Settlements and the US Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, m a r k - t o - m a r k e t  positions on a daily basis. If, however, 
investors and traders from other institutions, correspondent 
institutions for example, even using on-line, real-time information 
technology such as Reuters or Bloomberg are only up-dated on a 
quarterly, or worse, annual basis, it may reduce the value of such 
information as a positive externality. Transparency may not be 
improved. Without transparency the potential for diminishing the 
severity or reducing the frequency of crises may be limited. 
According to the Fisher report as published by the BIS in 1994, the 
reporting of comparisons between ex ante value-at-risk and actual 
losses, would be beneficial (Fisher, 1994} however it has yet to 
occur. Unless compelled to report such comparisons, one must 
wonder what the commercial incentives would be (Folkerts-Landau,
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Ito, et al. 1995}. In addition, the US Financial Accounting Standards 
Board has recommended the reporting of individual positions rather 
than the common practice of netting-out positive and negative 
derivative positions, because the exposures arising to such positions 
may not symmetric and off-setting (SFAS No. 119, 1994). Of 
course, however valuable such recommendations and initiatives may 
be at the microeconomic level of individual banks and institutions; 
they do not tell us anything of their benefit in the aggregate or over­
time. When one banks illiquidity or credit crunch will transmogrify 
into a systemic financial crisis is anyone's guess.
In order to appreciate the aggregate benefit in terms of 
macroeconomic stability of reporting and understanding value-at-risk 
arising from the use of derivative products, we need to take-on-board 
the issue of financial instability. The literature on macro financial 
crises and instability is old as economics itself and is beyond the 
scope of the present discussion, although we can say, that critical 
synthesis of various views and models has yet, if ever, to arrive, as 
we may gather from selected research. The monetarist view was 
that real effects arise when monetary disturbances lead to banking 
panics (M. Friedman & A. Schwartz, 1963). Minsky (1977), as a 
Neo-Keynesian, linked potential crises to over-accumulation of short­
term debt. Blanchard and Watson took a rational expectations 
approach to the modelling of speculative bubbles (1982). While in a 
model using a dynamic feedback specification, De Long, Bradford, 
Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990), argued that rational 
speculation leads to destabilization. According to Spotton, traditional 
models which price assets according to the present discounted value 
of expected income are inadequate because they do not include how
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institutional factors shape the formation of expectations (Spotton,
1994). According to Spotton, credit financed speculation may play 
a critical role (page 183, ibid, 1994). In an article by Bernanke 
(1981) crises occur because of real effects from changes in the cost 
of credit. From the above sketch, we see, stretching back to the 
classical economists, virtually every school of business cycle theory 
has attempted to explain financial crises5 Looking over their models 
of business cycles and their attempts to explain the existence of 
financial crises and markets collapses, we observe that their empirical 
support is usually limited to the examination of a particular crisis. 
Quoting Zarnowitz (page 110, 1992), "There is no consensus on the 
nature of financial crises and their role in business cycles."
Where does this leave us with regard to the macroeconomic 
impact of derivative products, and whether their usage is potentially 
destabilizing? In addition to the micro-phenomenon described above, 
are there reasons why derivatives merit special concern from the 
standpoint of systemic risk to the financial system? Are further policy 
initiatives caiied for in order to facilitate m a c r o  d i s c l o s u r e  and 
transparency, in order to prevent illiquidity in one derivative market or 
one of class of security leading to a general crises? We have seen 
from our discussion of risk management in Chapter Five, that from 
the standpoint of the party hedging, the notion that either market or 
idiosyncratic risk is actually reduced through using derivatives is 
questionable. As we argued, derivatives have more to do with 
ensuring that we earn returns commensurate with our level of market
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5For example, Mill, John S. "Paper Currency and Commercial 
Distress." In C o l l e c t e d  W o r k s  o f  J o h n  S t u a r t  M i l l ,  vol. 4, edited 
by John Robson, 1826. Reprint Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1967.
risk, P , by ensuring good asset utilization, rather than reducing market 
risk which adds nothing to market capitalization. Through our 
dynamic modelling of the GS model and modifying it by adding state- 
contingent assets, derivatives actually lead to greater risk taking 
because down-side exposure was limited, with aggregate implications 
as measured by the stability of output. In Chapter Four, risk aversion 
because of price uncertainty discouraged investment, dampening 
oscillatory behaviour. Risk taking encouraged by the use derivatives, 
during an economic expansion leads to expanding the market value 
of the firm, however, during the contractionary phase of the cycle, 
there are still commitments with respect to working capital borrowed 
to pay wages and dividends to distribute. Even though the firm's 
revenues are guaranteed through having purchased Put Options, 
prices are still below their upside potential. The result is that the 
taking of derivative positions as it leads to expansion of the capital 
base through borrowed working capital, is destabilizing, creating 
greater risks to book value during an economic contraction.
Further intuition for the macro destabilizing effects of these results 
were found in the threat to book value faced by debt holders, as 
discussed in Chapter Six, and the observation, noted earlier that 
derivative markets for both hedgers and speculators may involve 
highly asymmetric outcomes. Aggregating across different parties, 
positions may not be netted-off. At a macro level, one may not 
assume that hedgers are not net-short and speculator are not net-long 
{Williams, 1994). During a sharp economic down-turn, because of 
the asymmetry of exposure, although a firm having hedged, may only 
lose the price of the option(s), the counter-party to the derivative 
transaction may lose far greater amounts. Their value-at-risk is not
2 9 0
equal. Under conditions of financial market imperfections, further 
research and modelling of derivative markets in a general equilibrium 
setting may be useful to learn greater of their systemic dynamic 
effects and may be instructive in the formulation of regulation and 
policy.
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